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Abortion and the Constitution: The
Need for a Life-Protective Amendment
Robert A. Destrot
As a result of the recent congressional hearings held on proposed
constitutional amendments designed to overturn the rulings of the
United States Supreme Court concerning abortion, the abortion contro-
versy has once again become a major topic of public interest. The
author seeks to identify the two distinct areas of debate involved in the
issue and to discuss, in particular, the central topic raised by many of
the proposals-the rights of the unborn.
It is a misfortune if a judge reads his conscious or unconscious sym-
pathy with one side or the other prematurely into the law and forgets
that what seem to him to be first principles are believed by half of his
fellow men to be wrong . . .1
Abortion, the right to privacy, the right to life-these topics have
been in the public eye since the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court in Roe v. Wade2 and Doe v. Bolton.3 These decisions have not
settled the abortion controversy: it continues in Congress, 4 in the
courts,5 and in the media. 6 The subject matter is complex and may
be debated at many levels. However, without a focus or common
ground of discussion, efforts toward resolution inexorably lead to more
debate, more confusion, and ultimately, frustration and anger for the
parties involved.7
* A.B., 1972, Miami University; J.D., 1975, Boalt Hall School of Law. The
author acknowledges Professor Hal Scott, now at the Harvard Law School, and Mr. Joe
Feldman of Boalt Hall School of Law for their assistance in locating the materials cited
in footnote 83, and Ms. Gudrun Fuchs, a visiting research scholar at Boalt Hall School
of Law, for the many hours she spent translating the parts of the opinion of the West
German Federal Constitutional Court found in the Appendix to this Comment.
1. O.W. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 295 (1920).
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Roe].
3. 410 U.S. 179 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Doe].
4. See, e.g., San Francisco Chronicle, April 7, 1975, at 34, col. 1 (editorial
comment).
5. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Edelin, Crim. No. 81823 (Super. Ct. Suffolk
County, Mass., filed Feb. 15, 1975) on appeal, No. 81823 (Ct. App. Suffolk County,
Mass., filed July 1, 1975) discussed in NEwswEEK, March 4, 1975, at 18.
6. See, e.g., NEwswEEK, March 4, 1975, at 18 (cover story).
7. See, e.g., NEWSWEE_, June 9, 1975, at 11 (current status of abortion controver-
sy characterized as "sellout").
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ABORTION AND THE CONSTITUTION
This Comment undertakes to identify and explore several areas
of debate. First, it discusses the rationale and practical effect of the
Supreme Court's decision to legalize abortion in Roe v. Wade (here-
inafter the "access" question). The focus then shifts to a discussion of
the Court's decision in Doe v. Bolton and the existence of state power
to regulate the means through which abortions may be obtained. Fi-
nally, mention is made of the background, rationale, and content of
proposals for reform in these areas. It is hoped that the areas of de-
bate relevant to this controversial issue will be seen as separate is-
sues, each requiring careful and individualized consideration.
I
ROE v. WADE: A QuEsnoN OF AcCESS
A. Introduction
In Roe v. Wade, which involved a challenge to the Texas abor-
tion statutes,8 the Court held that a woman's decision to procure an
abortion is constitutionally protected and may be restricted only in the
face of a compelling state interest. The majority opinion identified
legitimate governmental interests in protecting the unborn and in en-
suring that abortions are performed in circumstances maximizing the
health and safety of the mother. These interests were then weighed
against the more generalized interests of the pregnant woman.9
The Court's attempted accommodation of these interests was
based upon a division of pregnancy into three periods, roughly equiva-
lent to "trimesters".10 During the first trimester there was to be no
interference with either the decision to abort or the means by which
this decision was to be effectuated. In the Court's opinion, neither of
the states' interests was so compelling as to justify any restriction upon
either the personal freedom of the pregnant woman or the medical
judgment of her attending physician. 1 The Court concluded that near
8. TEx. PENAL CODE §§ 1191-94, 1196 (1963).
9. The decision purported to decide the issue without predilection. Roe, 410 U.S.
at 116-17. The opinions, however, do not bear out this assertion. Recurrent in both the
majority and concurring opinions are both the personal opinions of the Justices and the
phrases "meaningful life" and "potential life." Roe, 410 U.S. at 162, 163; Doe, 410 U.S.
at 217. This is not to say, however, that the Justices did not make an attempt to
subordinate their personal feelings; but if, as they correctly noted, the question was of
such a nature as to be singularly inappropriate for judicial decision, it is difficult to
understand why they even decided the case. Where particularly delicate policy questions
are involved, the appointed judiciary may be the least qualified to speculate as to the
proper resolution. A legislature, or the people themselves, would be able to rest their
decision upon basic democratic principles; a judicial tribunal invoking the doctrine of
judicial review would not. See A. BicKEL, Tun LEAsT DANoEROUS BRANC H (1962).
10. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-63.
11. Id. at 163.
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the onset of the second trimester, the health hazards associated with
abortion were sufficiently serious to outweigh the risks of continuing
the pregnancy to term. Thus, the states' interest in safeguarding the
well-being of the woman led the Court to permit state regulation of
abortion procedure in ways reasonably related to the protection of ma-
ternal health.' The Court felt that subsequent to the point at which
the unborn attain viability' 3 the states' interest in the protection of "po-
tential life" would become compelling. During this final period of
pregnancy, the state could, at its option, prohibit abortion except when
necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.'4
B. Structuring the Interests
By characterizing the major interests affected by a woman's deci-
sion to procure an abortion as those of the woman and the state, the
Court was able to avoid the underlying conflict between fundamental
personal rights-the clash between a woman's right to privacy and her
unborn offspring's right to live-which lies at the heart of the abortion
issue. Since the Court characterized the basic conflict as one between
an individual's right to privacy in decisions regarding reproduction and
a set of state-asserted interests, including a concern for "potential" life,
any discussion of the primary nonmaternal' 5 interests involved-those
12. See Part 1[ infra.
13. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
14. "Viability" is defined as the ability of the unborn to survive outside the uterus.
This stage of maturity can, under present medical technology, be reached as early as 20
weeks. See Tmm, March 31, 1975, at 82 (smallest surviving infant weighed 395 grams).
The Court placed viability at 28 weeks, but conceded that it may occur as early as 24
weeks. Roe, 410 U.S. at 160.
15. In any decision concerning abortion, the marshalling of the interests at stake
must reflect the potential effects under various results. Rather than characterizing the
interests as either maternal or state-which may ignore other interests at least as
important as those of the state and encourage a bias in favor of maternal interests-the
interests involved are best characterized as either maternal or nonmaternal.
For the woman, pregnancy represents a substantial burden, both mental and
physical. Abortion is one means by which to avoid some of these problems. For the
unborn, abortion is an ultimate event which terminates existence. The unborn's interest
in life clearly does not depend upon the existence of a public policy concerning abortion.
For the state, an anti-abortion policy may seek to protect the unborn either because of a
belief that those who are incapable of protecting their own interests need the protection
of the state, or for more pragmatic reasons (for example, to increase the labor force).
Likewise, a pro-abortion policy might be aimed at enabling a woman to end an unwanted
pregnancy, or at facilitating a state policy to limit population growth.
There are other nonmaternal interests affected by a decision regarding abortion
policy, the clearest of which are the interests of the father. Since Roe, however, the
father's rights have been regarded as unpersuasive in comparison to the mother's decision
to abort. See, e.g., Coe v. Gerstien, 376 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Fla. 1974), (three-judge
court), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 417 U.S. 277, affd in part sub nom., Poe v.
Gerstien, 412 U.S. 279 (1974) (per curiam affirmance of denial of injunction against
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of the unborn-could be avoided by assuming that those interests
were somehow less than "real."1  The device which the Court em-
ployed to sidestep a resolution of the more difficult issues presented
by the conflict between personal rights was both subtle and deceptively
simple. The Court wrote:
Logically, of course, a legitimate state interest in this area need not
stand or fall on acceptance of the belief that life begins at conception
or at some other point prior to live birth. In assessing the State's in-
terest [emphasis added], recognition may be given to the less rigid
claim that as long as at least potential life is involved, the State may
assert interests beyond the protection of the pregnant woman alone
[emphasis by the Court]. 17
This slight shift in characterization of the interests at stake allowed the
Court to eschew any frank discussion of the "difficult question of when
life begins""' and to reject the "rigid" claims argued by both sets of
adversaries.' 9  By resorting to the concept of "potential life"20 to de-
fine the existence of the prenatal human organism, and by assuming
that an individual's life must be "meaningful" before there is logical
enforcement of the statute) (statute provision requiring consent of father); Doe v.
Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189 (1973) (same); Jones v. Smith, 278 So. 2d 339 (Fla. App.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 958 (1974) (same).
It should be noted that if one assumes at the outset that the unborn have no
interests, one has effectively decided the most difficult question presented by abortion.
All that is left is to balance interests which are less than "ultimate" for those involved.
16. By characterizing the unborn as "potential" life the Court assumed at the
outset that it was dealing with something less than actual human life. Such a characteri-
zation goes a long way toward deciding the ultimate issue; once the unborn are reduced
to the status of "potential" life, their destruction is made to seem less serious. Thus, by
giving constitutional recognition only to the "less rigid" claim that only potential life
exists before birth, the Court implicitly decided the "difficult question of when life
begins," which it so eloquently sought to avoid later in the opinion. See Roe, 410 U.S. at
150, 159. In the Court's eyes this potentiality exists until live birth, at which point actual
life begins. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65 (in the post-viability stage the state may pro-
tect the "potentiality" of life).
17. Roe, 410 U.S. at 150.
18. Id. at 159.
19. The "rigid" claims of the opposing parties are essentially two: one side argues
that a woman has an absolute right to procure an abortion at any time; the other side
claims that the unborn are living human beings deserving of constitutional protection.
The Court rejected both of these claims, opting for a limited right in the first case, and
adopting the "less rigid" claim of "potential" life in the second. The second claim,
however, was actually the central issue of Roe v. Wade, for if the unborn are living
human beings entitled to constitutional protection the claim of a right to abortion fails.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 156-57. The Court never discussed just why the "rigid" claim on behalf
of the unborn had to be rejected, but it is fair to assume that rejection of the proposition
that actual human life was involved made its subsequent decision on the meaning of the
word "person" much easier. Indeed, it would have been difficult for the Court to explain
just why a living human being is not a "person" within the meaning of the Constitution.
20. See note 16 supra.
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justification for protecting it,21 the Court was able to compromise the
interests of the unborn by defining away their rights. While the Court
felt that no "person" entitled to constitutional protection existed at con-
ception or at any other period prior to live birth,2 2 the state could assert
a compelling interest in protecting the unborn once they reached via-
bility.23 The Court completely omitted any discussion of why the un-
born should or should not have rights of their own. The rationale be-
hind this marshalling of interests and the necessity for this approach
to the issues were unexplained.
In an attempt to buttress its ultimate conclusion that the unborn
can find no protection under the Constitution, the Court attached great
weight to its professed inability to find agreement in the community
at large as to when life begins. The validity of such a justification,
however, is open to serious question. In fact, the answer to "the dif-
ficult question of when life begins" is a matter of common understand-
ing. The increasing sophistication of the science of biology has made
it impossible to deny that biologically, human life exists before birth.24
In fact, it is only within the context of the abortion controversy that
this basic fact is called into question. 215 In an editorial frankly discuss-
21. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
22. Id. at 158.
23. Id. at 163-64.
24. W. WMDLE, PHYSIOLOGY OF TE FETus 3 (1971):
Embryonic development is at one end [of the spectrum of human develop-
ment], maturation follows and aging comes at the farther end of a continuing
growth spectrum in which the only sharply defined boundary is at the be-
ginning. The other boundary is a variable one. It may be a day or a hundred
years.. . . Be that as it may, development goes on until the spectrum has
been completed or aborted by accident, genocide or disease. Fetal life is
normally only a small part of it, birth just an event along the way.
See GRAY, ANATOMY oF THE HumAN BoDY 56-57 (C.M. Goss, 25th ed. 1948); C.
HERTYWI, TEXTBooK OF Tr EMBRYOLOGY OF MAi AND MAMMALS (E.L. Mark transi.
1905); P. Winss, PRiNcILEs OF DEVELOPMENT: A TEXoox OF EXPERImENTAL
EmRYOLOGY 3-9, 14-17 (1939); E. Wrrscm, DEVELOPMNT OF VERTEBRATES 7 (1956).
See generally L. BARTH, EmBRYOLOGY 1-13 (rev. ed. 1953); Editorial, A New Ethic for
Medicine and Society, CALIFOmIA MEDIcE, September, 1970, at 68 (hereinafter cited
as C&LIFoRNIA MEDICnE).
25. The basic difficulty within the abortion controversy is a failure to agree on a
definition of the term "human life." Human life can be defined to include all individuals
who are biologically human (members of the species Homo sapiens), or it can be defined
as a quality attaching when certain societally defined criteria have been fulfilled. It is the
latter definition of "human" to which the Court was alluding when it claimed to find
disagreement in the community at large, including the medical and scientific communi-
ties, as to when "life," meaning "human life," begins. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 159. For
purposes of this Comment, however, "life" is equated with biologically human life so that
subjective criteria for establishing those qualities which make one "human" in the eyes of
society can be avoided. Compare CALvoRNA MEDIczNE, supra note 24, at 68, with the
following:
Whenever scientific debate becomes unreasonably strident, and its participants
unusually intransigent, one cannot help but suspect that technical matters are
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ing the changing attitudes toward the value to be placed upon individ-
ual human lives, California Medicine, the official journal of the Cali-
fornia Medical Association, noted that all of the rhetoric surrounding
the abortion controversy betrays "a curious avoidance of the scientific
fact, which everyone really knows, that human life begins at concep-
tion and is continuous, whether intra- or extra-uterine until death.
'26
So, by sidestepping discussion of biological fact, the Court was
able to recognize that viability, a concept fairly new to the controversy
over abortion, 27 signaled the period in which the state's interest in po-
tential life would become compelling.28 Yet, even when viability has
been reached, protection of the unborn is illusory because state protec-
tion of the unborn is not constitutionally compelled and may be set
aside when the life or health of the mother is in jeopardy.29 Since,
in the Court's opinion, the unborn have no constitutionally cognizable
no longer the real issue. In such circumstances it is not unusual to find that
opponents completely understand and accept the contents of each other's argu-
ments. They carry on the debate because they favor opposing policies, not be-
cause they disagree about scientific matters. They perceive a policy decision
as an implicit consequence of their technical conclusions, and having a per-
sonal preference for a particular policy they tend to defend whatever technical
conclusion is most conducive to their favored policy. In short, scientific ob-
jeotivity is abandoned in favor of scientific advocacy.
Blank, The Delaney Clause: Technical NaivetM and Scientific Advocacy in the Formula-
tion of Public Health Policies, 62 CALm. L. REv. 1084, 1119 (1975).
26. CALiFORm MEDIcrmE, supra note 24, at 68.
Thus, while the trimester approach to resolving the abortion issue appears warranted
if the sole question to be decided is the relative safety of "early" (first trimester) as
opposed to "late" abortion for the woman involved, it is too artifical to support rigid
constitutional rules governing either the existence of fundamental personal rights during
the prenatal period or the extent of state police power over the timing and quality of the
medical procedures involved in abortion. In purely biological terms, the trimester is a
construct having little significance other than as a convenient means by which to
estimate the progress of prenatal development. See sources cited note 24 supra.
Since the end result of the abortion cases is to deny all constitutional protection to
the unborn, the analytical framework upon which the decisions rest can hardly be
characterized as a "balance" between fetal and maternal interests without doing violence
to the meaning of the word.
27. Historically, the key points considered in the framing of abortion policy were
conception, quickening, and birth. Quickening was chosen by the early common law as
an interim point because it represented the first concrete proof that the child was alive.
See, e.g., State v. Cooper, 22 NJ.L. 52 (1849). Choosing viability as the relevant point
in the protection of the unborn, however, makes the bodily integrity of the fetus
dependent not on whether it is alive, but whether it is sufficiently mature to lead a
"meaningful" life should it survive the abortion procedures. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
28. Id. at 163. It is important to recognize that the Court did not refer to this
point as the beginning of the "third trimester," although some courts seem to have taken
this approach. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Anderson, 378 F. Supp. 1008, 1016 (D. Minn.
1974). Furthermore, although the point of viability was not strictly limited in the Court's
opinion, the lower courts seem to be interpreting the opinion as if it had been limited.
See id. at 1016.
29. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64.
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interest in the preservation of their own lives, the state's interest in pro-
tecting their lives would not be sufficiently compelling to require a bal-
ancing of the life interest of the unborn with the interest of its mother8 0
30. The Court buttressed its argument that the Constitution does not protect the
unborn against governmentally sanctioned destruction at the hands of their mothers'
physicians with the contention that abortion laws typicaUy contain an exception for the
life of the mother. This fact is undisputed. What is disputed, however, is that the
exception destroys the rule.
Clearly, the fact that there may be exceptions to any criminal law does not destroy
the law's proscriptions. The law relating to self-defense is, perhaps, the best example of
the law's recognition that there are situations where the interest of one individual in the
preservation of his or her own life is held to negate the criminality of the homicide or
battery with which the person is charged. The life exception to the rules against abortion
has the same genesis.
The other "inconsistencies between Fourteenth Amendment status and the typical
abortion statute" noted by the Court are equally devoid of merit. The Court pointed out
that, under Texas law, a woman could not be liable for an abortion performed upon her
as a principal or as an accomplice. Roe, 410 U.S. at 151 & nn.49-50. While this may
have been true to some degree in Texas, it was certainly not true in all other states. See,
e.g., Smith v. State, 33 Me. 51 (1833); In re Vince, 2 N.J. 443, 67 A.2d 141 (1949).
Vince was cited by the Court in support of the opposite contention. Roe, 410 U.S. at 151
& n.50.
The Texas rule that a woman could not be considered an accomplice is deserving of
independent scrutiny. The rule first found expression in Watson v. State, 9 Tex. Crim.
237 (1880), in which the court addressed itself not to the woman's legal culpability, but
to the evidentiary effect of her being considered an accomplice:
The rule that she does not stand legally in the situation of an accomplice, but
should rather be regarded as the victim than the perpetrator of the crime, is
one which commends itself to our sense of justice and right. . . . But, though
not strictly an accomplice inasmuch as she is in a moral point of view impli-
cated in the transaction, it would be proper for the jury to consider that cir-
cumstance in its bearing on her credibility.
Id. at 244-45 (emphasis added). Thus, even in Texas, a woman was considered to be
"implicated" in the abortion, a crime which was defined in terms of its effect upon the
fetus, not the mother. See, e.g., Moore v. State, 37 Tex. Crim. 552, 567-72, 40 S.W. 287,
290 (1897). The major case upon which the Texas court in Watson relied was Rex. v.
Hargrave, 5 Carr. & Payne 170, 24 Eng. Com. L. Rep. 509, 510 (1838):
Although all persons present at and sanctioning a prize fight, where one of the
combatants is killed are guilty of manslaughter, as principals in the second de-
gree; yet they are not such accomplices as require their evidence to be con-
firmed, if they are called as witnesses against other parties charged with the
manslaughter.
Since the Texas rule was based upon evidentiary rather than substantive considerations,
it was not essentially different than the rule in those jurisdictions which did not
prosecute the woman who procured an abortion. The rule proscribing prosecution was
equally based upon evidentiary considerations: the courts needed the woman's testimony
to bring the abortionist before the bar. In re Vince, supra at 451, 67 A.2d at 145.
The final "inconsistency" raised by the Court in support of the contention that
abortion laws were intended solely to protect the woman was the differentiation of
penalties between abortion and murder. Since criminal liability is solely a creature of
statute, one must assume that the perceptions of the legislators who framed the penalty
provisions governed the scope of the laws. The crime of abortion is one which has always
involved unique evidentiary and circumstantial problems, a fact which explains why the
penalties affixed were differentiated from those of murder. See, e.g., ch. 4 § 119 [1898]
1256 [Vol. 63:1250
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How expansive this life and health exception will prove to be re-
mains uncertain, but the Court's own language in recent opinions has
provided it with a seemingly wide scope. In the 1971 case of United
States v. Vuitch, 1 a vagueness challenge to the District of Columbia
abortion statute, the Court gave the concept of health an extremely
broad definition. That construction effectuated increased access to
abortion in the District without completely invalidating the statutes.
In effect, the broad strokes of Vuitch were a half-step toward the de-
cision in Roe v. Wade.32  In Roe, the Court enumerated a list of factors
paralleling those relied upon in Vuitch to support its decision to expand
a woman's right to privacy so as to include the right to procure an abor-
tion.
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman
by denying this choice altogether is apparent. Specific and direct
harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be in-
volved. Maternity or additional offspring may force upon the wo-
man a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be im-
minent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care.
There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the un-
wanted child and there is the problem of bringing a child into a fam-
ily already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In
other cases, the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed
motherhood may be involved. All these are factors the woman and
her responsible physician necessarily will consider in consultation.3"
Were the Court to continue to employ such an expansive definition of
health after Roe, 4 the exception to state proscription of abortion after
viability would swallow the rule, and the apparent accommodation of
Laws of New Jersey (not more than $5,000 or 15 years at hard labor, or both, if either
the woman or the child died as a result of the abortion).
31. 402 U.S. 62 (1971).
32. In Roe the Court stated: "We would not have indulged in statutory
interpretation favorable to abortion tin Vuitch] . . . if the necessary consequence was
the termination of life entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection." 410 U.S. at 159.
33. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
34. Given the Court's characterization and resolution of the primary conflict of
interests as one between the state and the pregnant woman, one would have to conclude
that the state protection of maternal interests, even at the expense of its compelling
interest in protecting those of the unborn presumed capable of extra-uterine survival, is
constitutionally mandated. An examination of the Court's language will serve to illus-
trate the point
For the stage subsequent to viability the State, in promoting its interest in the
potentiality of human life, may if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe abor-
tion except where it is necessary in appropriate medical judgment, for the
preservation of the life or health of the mother.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65 (emphasis added). If this language is taken at face value it
would appear that the Court did indeed declare abortion-on-demand to be a matter of
judicial policy, notwithstanding Chief Justice Burger's contentions to the contrary. See
Doe, 410 U.S. at 208 (Burger, C.., concurring).
1975] 1257
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interests in Roe would then prove wholly illusory. The compelling in-
terest in the preservation of the lives of the unborn then would be
nothing more than another legal fiction.
Such a broad definition of health should not survive the judicial
restructuring of abortion policy in Roe, unless it is made absolutely
clear that the practical effect of such a definition is to establish abor-
tion-on-demand for the full nine months of pregnancy as this nation's
public policy.35 The Court considered the interests underlying the
more expansive "health" concerns when it held that the protection of
unborn human life was not sufficiently compelling to override maternal
interests during approximately the first six months of pregnancy. After
viability, which may occur as early as five months, the states' interest,
even under the Court's formulation, becomes "compelling" and thus
clearly justifies regulations restricting the accessibility of abortion.
Only a highly predictable danger to the pregnant woman's life ap-
proaches the weight of the states' interest in precluding the destruction
of her unborn offspring after that point.
C. The Question Presented
That the unborn were found to be excluded from the protection
of the Constitution was the keystone of the Court's argument that the
state has no interest in protecting them through the use of criminal or
civil sanction. Since, under the Court's expansive definition of
"health" virtually any maternal interest may be sufficient to overcome
the state's compelling interest in preserving prenatal life, it cannot be
argued that the Court considered such life important enough even to
be included in the balancing which did take place.
An examination of the standards employed by the Court in its ne-
gation of state power to recognize in the unborn a fundamental
human right to life raises several difficult and serious questions con-
cerning the limitations of judicial power in this area of constitutional
law. The precise question presented to the Court in the abortion cases
was a matter of first impression. In construing the Texas abortion stat-
ute, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had ruled that the lives of
the unborn were protected not only by the statute,80 but also by the
35. "Abortion-on-demand" is used here to refer to the absence of legal restraint
upon the procuring of an abortion. The fact that a woman need procure a willing
physician or the funds with which to pay for the procedure are separate issues. To define
the term to include both of these factors would be to imply that a woman could force an
unwilling physician to perform the procedure, a proposition not without substantial
constitutional problems of its own, and that the state is under an obligation to pay for
any such services upon request, another proposition not without substantial difficulties.
36. See Thompson v. State, 493 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971), vacated and
remanded, 410 U.S. 950 (1973) (pursuant to Roe):
In the homicide statute the Texas legislature has manifested its intent to
1258 [Vol. 63:1250
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Texas constitution's counterpart of the due process clauses of the fifth
and fourteenth amendments.3 7  That determination of Texas law was
binding upon the United States Supreme Court." The effect of the
Texas courts ruling was to narrow the question presented in Roe to
the following: does the Federal Constitution forbid the protection of
the rights of the unborn? Although the Court took note of the decision
in Thompson v. State, 9 it did not discuss its rationale.
If it be assumed that the fundamental rights of life, liberty, and
property protected by the due process clauses of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments find protection under terms of the Constitution but
are not themselves of constitutional origin, it is clear that the Court was
dealing with a difficult question indeed. The Texas courts had deter-
mined that the unborn were human beings whose lives were deserving
of legislative protection. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that
no state may override the rights of a pregnant woman by simply adopt-
ing "one theory of life." 40 But the ultimate resolution of the question
protect that human life in existence by actual birth .... This is an implicit
recognition of human life not in existence by actual birth. The State attempts
to protect that human life not in existence by actual birth through its abortion
statutes and defines this as the life of the fetus or embryo.
493 S.W.2d at 919.
37. The court in Thompson stated:
The State of Texas is committed to preserving the lives of its citizens so that
no citizen "shall be deprived of life . . . except by due course of the law of
the land." Texas Constitution, Article I, Section 9, Vernon's Ann. Stat. Arti-
cle 1191 [the abortion law], is designed to protect fetal life . . .and this justi-
fies prohibiting termination of the life of the fetus or embryo except for the
purpose of saving the life of the mother.
Id.
38. Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875); accord, Fox
Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207 (1935); Broad River Power Co. v. South Carolina,
281 U.S. 537, 540 (1930); Enterprise Irrigation Dist. v. Farmers Mutual Canal Co., 243
U.S. 157 (1917); Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908). An examination of
the Texas cases construing that state's abortion law demonstrates that the opinion of the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was entirely consistent with past interpretations of the
statute. See, e.g., Gray v. State, 77 Tex. Crim. 221, 223-24, 178 S.W. 337, 338-39
(1915); Fondren v. State, 74 Tex. Crim. 552, 556, 169 S.W. 411, 413 (1914); Shaw
v. State, 73 Tex. Crim. 337, 338, 165 S.W. 930, 931 (1914); Moore v. State, 37 Tex.
Crim. 552, 560, 571, 40 S.W. 287, 289, 295 (1897).
39. Roe, 410 U.S. at 119 n.3.
40. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162.
The Court offered neither citations nor reasoned explanation for this holding. The
mere recognition of a continuing controversy over the extent to which the unborn are to
be protected explains nothing. Rather, it points to the impropriety of any judicial attempt
to resolve the controversy. Apparently the Court recognized this when it noted its own
lack of expertise in the matter. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 159. Nevertheless, it substituted its
own "theory of life" for that of the states. See note 17 supra. Texas had determined that
unborn human life was deserving of constitutional protection; the Court felt that it was
not. If a constitutional ruling establishing the latter view as the law of the land is not the
adoption of one theory of life, it is indeed difficult to determine what is.
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was not nearly as simple as the Court's language made it sound. Al-
though the effect of the Court's holding was to forbid state protection of
a class of individuals found to be human beings,41 the Court's opinion
contains no finding that such a state determination would be either
factually erroneous or so unreasonable as to be precluded by a broad
interpretation of the Federal Constitution.' 2
Since the Court was apparently unwilling to disclose the consti-
tutional basis of this particular facet of its ultimate resolution of the
merits of Roe v. Wade, the holding, of necessity, must rest upon a de-
termination that the judicial power of the United States includes the
right to restrict the protection of fundamental liberties to those classes
the Court deems worthy. This was the only theory upon which the
Court's implication of a right to abortion could rest.43
While the Court undoubtedly has the power to engage in such
interpretation, the exercise of that power gives an entirely new signifi-
cance to the maxim that the "constitution is what the judges say it is". 4,
Not only does the Court control the technical interpretation of the Con-
stitution, but by defining "person" narrowly to fit its perceptions of
acceptable public policy, it controls the applicability of the due process
clause to specific classes. This situation demonstrates the need for a
thorough examination of the constitutional policy considerations in-
volved in allowing the Court to be the sole arbiter of the existence of
fundamental rights simply by basing the application of the due process
clause upon its own perception of the relative worth of the parties whose
41. The Texas court found the unborn to be human in the biological sense. See
note 36 supra.
42. Compare Danforth v. Rogers, 486 S.W.2d 258 (Mo. 1972), wherein the
Supreme Court of Missouri attempted to speculate as to the outcome of Roe:
The issues in this case are sharply and significantly narrowed by the following
facts stipulated by the parties:
Infant Doe . . . and all other unborn children have all the qualities and
attributes of adult human persons differing only in age or maturity.
Medically, human life is a continuum front conception to death (emphasis
by the court).
The United States Supreme Court has expressed itself on the taking of "human
life" in the case of Furman v. Georgia [408 U.S. 238 (1972)]. As we read
the opinion in Furman, the Court generally expressed its disapproval of the
practice of putting to death persons who, some would argue, had forfeited their
right to live. We believe we must anticipate at least equal solicitude for the
lives of innocents (emphasis supplied).
Id. at 259.
43. Id. at 156-57.
44. See Doe, 410 U.S. at 221-22 (1973) (White, J., dissenting); cf. Dredd Scott v.
Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, (1857):
[Wjhen a strict interpretation of the Constitution according to the fixed rules
which govern the interpretation of laws is abandoned, and the theoretical opin-
ions of individuals are allowed to control its meaning, we have no longer a
Constitution: we are under the government of individual men, who for the
time being have the power to declare what the Constitution is, according to
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rights are asserted.4r This question and others closely related to it are
more fully discussed in Part V of this Comment.
D. Abortion: Some Common Assumptions
1. Abortion as a Matter of Personal Privacy
Perhaps the most commonly cited argument for the relaxation of
restrictive state abortion laws is the assertion that the matter should
be a private one to be decided by a woman in consultation with her
physician. This argument was accepted by the Supreme Court in Roe
and raised to constitutional proportions by its holding that the newly
created right to abortion was included in a broad right to privacy based
upon the fourteenth amendment's concept of liberty.
46
Notwithstanding the Court's finding as to the legal status of abor-
tion, it is difficult to characterize abortion as a purely private matter
unless one totally ignores not only the nature of abortion itself, but also
the many outside interests which are affected by such a decision. It
is necessary, then, to examine the logical basis for the finding and its
relevance to the growing debate over proposals to overturn or limit the
Court's decision by constitutional amendment.47  Assuming that a "pri-
vate matter" may be defined as an individual interest in which gov-
ernment and uninvolved third parties can claim no valid or permis-
sible interest, it follows that before the abortion decision may be char-
acterized as a private matter between a woman and her physician the
nonmaternal interests involved in such a decision must be identified
and weighed.
their own views of what it ought to mean. When such a method of interpre-
tation of the Constitution obtains, in place of a republican government, with
limited and defined powers, we have a government which is merely an ex-
ponent of the will of Congress; or what, in my opinion, would not be prefer-
able, an exponent of the individual political opinions of the members of this
court.
Id. at 790 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
45. Although the Court did not rely upon an express balancing of the interests of
the unborn as against those of pregnant women in coming to its conclusion that the
unborn are not "persons," the language of the majority opinion in Roe betrays all too
clearly that just such a weighing of interests took place: "This holding, we feel, is
consistent with the relative weights of the respective interests involved, with the lessons
and example of medical and legal history, with the lenity of the common law, and with
the demands of the profound problems of the present day." 410 U.S. at 165.
The difficulty with such justification, however, is that it does not answer the
question presented by the Texas statute, and the cases construing it. The validity of a
recognition of fundamental rights for a group of individuals does not turn upon the
relative weight of their interests in the eyes of the Court. Neither the common law, the
lessons of history, nor the profound problems of the present day are sufficient to justify
the denial of fundamental rights.
46. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
47. See Part IV infra.
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The primary nonmaternal interests involved in the access question
are those of the unborn. Since the unborn are physically incapable
of asserting and protecting their own interests, those interests must be
protected and asserted by government or by concerned third parties.
Approaching the problem from the perspective of those who perceive
abortion as the taking of human life, rejection of the privacy argument
follows logically from the commonly held belief that the taking of hu-
man life is a proper matter of societal concern. This was the position
taken by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in response to the pri-
vacy argument in Thompson v. State 4 and argued before the Supreme
Court by counsel for the State of Texas in Roe v. Wade. Given the
interest being asserted by the opponents of legal abortion-the right
of the unborn child to life-a pro-abortion argument based upon the
right to privacy is no argument at all. Rather, it is a conclusion, based
upon a decision that maternal interests take precedence over those of
the unborn.
Even if it be assumed that the foregoing bases for the decision
in Roe are valid, the privacy rationale as applied to strike down state
regulations governing the time, place and manner of the abortion pro-
cedure still suffers from a serious practical defect. Legal abortion, as
a medical procedure, is not a private matter. Although the personal
decision to undergo the procedure, as well as the medical record of
its performance, may be confidential, the actual procedure, performed
by a state-certified medical practitioner in a regulated health facility,
can hardly be considered a private occurrence. It is almost ludicrous
to compare the sterile anonymity of the operating theatre or clinical
facility to the privacy of the marital bedroom upheld in Griswold v.
Connecticut,49 especially when the procedures involved in the clinical
setting involve not only a high degree of technical expertise and danger
to physical health, 50 but also the economic incentives and considera-
tions attendant upon the operation of any public service facility.
Since the abortion procedure itself is far from private, the Su-
preme Court's decision to characterize the procedure as a matter of pri-
vate right is, of necessity, based upon its resolution of the competing
interests involved in favor of the woman and its holding that the unborn
are not "persons" within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment.
Thus, it is apparent that the privacy rationale must stand or fall on the
validity of the conclusions which support it. The strongest argument
against the legalization of abortion is that both prenatal and postnatal
48. 493 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971), vacated and remanded, 410 U.S. 950
(1973) (inconsistent with Roe).
49. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
50. See Part HI infra.
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human life are equally deserving of constitutional protection. The
Court rejected this proposition in Roe. In fact, the answer to the ques-
tion of when constitutional protection for human life begins was left
open by the Court.. As a result, several proposals for constitutional
amendments have been introduced to fill the gap.5 Such proposals
attack the very foundation of the Court's opinion and render the pri-
vacy rationale unsound as an argument in support of the decision; an
attack upon the decision is an attack upon the argument itself.
2. "Early" Abortion as a "Relatively Safe" Medical Procedure
Although a detailed discussion of this particular topic is more
properly reserved for an examination of the Court's invalidation of state
regulation of the medical aspects of the abortion procedure, it is not
without significance to the Court's resolution of the access question.
The proposition, directly stated, is that the relative safety of the abor-
tion procedure is relevant only to the extent that it compels the conclu-
sion that the procedure should be legal.
Since the abortion question involves a clash between the interests
of the unborn in continued growth and development and the mother's
interest in a life unfettered by fetal and infant demands, the relative
safety of the abortion process for the woman is irrelevant to the ques-
tion of whose interests will prevail; the abortion process is obviously
not designed to accommodate the interests of the unborn.
Once' having identified the interests involved in the access ques-
tion and having recognized the irrelevance of the safety argument one
is led to investigate the reasons behind the Court's acceptance of the
argument as a basis for decision. The answer to this inquiry becomes
apparent with the realization that the force of the "relative safety" ar-
gument depends upon acceptance of two novel and substantially
broader propositions: (1) that abortion laws were originally de-
signed to protect the woman from unsafe medical procedures and were
unconcerned with the preservation of prenatal human life; and (2) that
prenatal human life is not worthy of constitutional protection when
compared with the interests of a pregnant woman. The court accepted
both of these propositions.
E. The Fourteenth Amendment and the Unborn
To sustain the structure of the abortion cases it was essential for
the Court to hold that the unborn are not persons entitled to the pro-
tection of the fourteenth amendment 2 From a perspective in which
51. See Part V infra.
52. 410 U.S. at 156-58.
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abortion constifutes the taking of a human person's life, the privacy ar-
gument would have had to yield,58 for one person's interest in privacy
does not outweigh another's interest in remaining alive. In reaching
its conclusions regarding the status of the unborn, the Court relied on
an interpretation of the history of abortion practices in the 19th century
and a cursory examination of the uses of the word "person" in the text
of the Constitution.
Before turning to an examination of the Court's observations con-
cerning history and constitutional interpretation, however, it should
prove helpful to review what is perhaps the most crucial of the argu-
ments accepted by the Court: that "the fetus, at most, represents only
the potentiality of life."54  By resting its decision to legalize abortion
on a right to privacy founded upon the fourteenth amendment's con-
cept of personal liberty, the Court ostensibly sought to avoid the "diffi-
cult question of when life begins."55  Stating that a woman's right to
privacy is "broad enough to encompass her decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy,"5 6 the Court made the statement constitu-
tionally meaningful by further holding that the unborn have no consti-
tutionally protected right to life which would outweigh the interests of
women.57  However, given the nature of the problems raised by the
abortion cases, it is not clear that the Court could avoid that "difficult
question."
In order to reach the conclusion that a woman's right to terminate
her pregnancy is superior to the right of her unborn offspring to live
it was necessary for the Court to have made at least one of the follow-
ing assumptions: (1) human life does not begin until birth; (2) even
if human life does begin at some point before birth (for example,
"viability"), the unborn are not persons within the meaning of the Con-
stitution and, therefore, not privy to the constitutional right to life; or
(3) unborn life, regardless of its essential nature as either human or
nonhuman, is not an interest worth protecting when balanced against
other interests. Although the Court expressly adopted only the second
of the foregoing characterizations in holding that abortion is a purely
private matter, a close reading of the majority and concurring opinions
in Roe v. Wade reveals that all three of the assumptions underlie not
only the Courts conclusions concerning a woman's right to privacy, but
53. It is interesting to note that a majority of the Court accepted this proposition
without dissent. Presumably the Court felt that the express terms of the fourteenth
amendment precluded an interpretation in which the unborn were held to be "persons"
whose rights could be balanced away through state action.
54. 410 U.S. at 162.
55. Id. at 159.
56. Id. at 153.
57. See id. at 162-63.
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also its determination concerning the constitutional valuation of unborn
life.
1. Life Before Birth: Potential or Actual?
It has been said that abortion, while illegal, was nevertheless a
"victimless" crime, comparable to gambling, prostitution, and illegal
consensual sexual activity.58 Such a comparison however ignores the
fact that there is indeed a victim in every abortion-the unborn.
Without getting into the semantic difficulties inherent in the
nomenclature of the unborn, one may safely assume that there is at
least something which is destroyed in the abortion process. To some, 59
the unborn are human beings, fully endowed with the characteristics
of any other individual and, therefore, entitled to the full complement
of fundamental human rights, including the right to life.60 Others6
regard the unborn as a "protoplasmic mass" which is not comparable
to a living individual. These disparate views are largely based upon
value judgment, definition-and ontology. Thus, blind adherence to
either of the foregoing characterizations does nothing to advance the
factual inquiry; the search for an answer must look to a dispassionate
forum.
The vehicle employed by the Court to define the beginnings of
human life for constitutional purposes was the concept of "potential
life." Thus, in assessing the state's interest in the protection of unborn
human life, the Court rejected the contention that human life begins
at conception and, instead, adopted the view that "the fetus, at most,
represents only the potentiality of life."62  By electing to give recogni-
58. E. M. Scmmr, CRIFms Wrroui VICIIMS 11 (1965).
59. See, e.g., THE MoRLrrY OF ABORTION (I. NooNAN ed. 1970).
60. U.S. CONST. amend. V and amend. XIV, § 1.
61. See Guttmacher, Symposium-Law, Morality, and Abortion, 22 RuTGERS
L. REv. 415, 416 (1968): "My feeling is that the fetus, particularly during its
early intrauterine life is merely a group of specialized cells that do not differ materially
from other cells." But see A. GuTrmAcHER, HAVING A BAY 15 (1950) (same author):
"When the sperm has penetrated the egg, the male nucleus . . .fuses with the female
nucleus .... The new baby is created at this exact moment .... [At implantation]
not only has new life been conceived, but it is already well on its way." See also A.
GuTrMAcHER, INTO THE UmvERSE 84 (1937) (same author) (noting that "the world's
youngest human" was an 11-day-old fertilized ovum). See generally, Blank, The Delaney
Clause: Technical Naivet6 and Scientific Advocacy in the Formulation of Public Health
Policies, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 1084, 1119 (1974).
62. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162. It is interesting to note, in this regard, that the Court
itself quoted a telling statement of the American Medical Association's Committee on
Criminal Abortion regarding the characterization to be attached to prenatal existence:
"We had to deal with human life. In a matter of less importance we could entertain no
compromise. An honest judge on the bench would call things by their proper names. We
could do no less." Id. at 142, quoting 22 TRANs. A.M.A., 258 (1871).
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tion to the "less rigid" claim that "potential" life exists before birth 8
the Court served notice that, for constitutional purposes, life-as op-
posed to a mere potential or inchoate state of being-begins at birth.
The Court's use of the concept of "potential" life to describe the
nature of the prenatal organism creates an interesting legal fiction
which has no basis in fact. Scientifically speaking, an organism is either
alive or it is dead; before it exists-when there is only the potential
to create an organism-there is no organism. No meaningful scien-
tific justification can be found0 4 for describing the prenatal human
organism as a potentiality. Therefore, it seems strange that the Court
professed an inability to find agreement in the community at large as
to the point at which life "begins;" the answer it so earnestly sought
to avoid is a matter of common knowledge in scientific circles.08 Ac-
cording to California Medicine,6 the official journal of the California
Medical Association (hereinafter referred to as the C.M.A.): "the
very considerable semantic gymnastics which are required to rationalize
abortion as anything but the taking of human life would be ludicrious
if not often put forth under socially impeccable auspices."0 7
Given the wealth of scientific evidence which will attest to the
veracity of the foregoing statement, it is difficult to justify legalizing
the taking of what is admittedly human life. In order to accomplish
the desired result, one must divorce the idea of abortion from the con-
cept of killing a human being. Notwithstanding its belief that such an
idea is nothing more than a "schizophrenic subterfuge," the C.M.A.
editors took the position that such deception is necessary in order to
make abortion more palatable to those who might otherwise find them-
selves in an ethical quandry over allowing abortion to become nothing
more than a commonly accepted medical procedure.08 A careful ex-
amination of the language of the Court in Roe leads to the conclusion
that a similar approach underlies the Court's use of the term "potential
life" to describe the organism destroyed in an abortion, for it implicitly
denies that the destruction of this type of life is to be equated with
the destruction of actual human life. In short the Court decided that
"human" life does not begin until live birth.
Once having disposed of the "rigid" contention that human life
is destroyed in the course of an abortion, the Court had yet another
63. Id. at 150.
64. See sources cited notes 24-25 supra.
65. Id.
66. CALEFoNI MEDicINE, supra note 24, at 68.
67. Id. at 69.
68. Id. (during the period when the "new" ethic is replacing the old).
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hurdle to cross before deciding that legal restraints on a woman's deci-
sion to abortion were unconstitutional: that of history.
2. The Relevance of History: An Introduction
After briefly sketching a common law history of criminal sanctions
against abortion, the Court concluded that abortion practices in the
early common law period and "throughout the major portion of the
19th Century [were] viewed with less disfavor than under most Ameri-
can abortion statutes [passed within the last 100 years]."'6 9 It also
accepted the contention that at common law "a woman enjoyed a sub-
stantially broader right to terminate a pregnancy than she does in most
states today, '70 and relied upon persistent references to the significance
of quickening as sources of tradition and authority for its own resolu-
tion of the controversy. If practices were traditionally freer during
those periods considered by the Court, no overriding popular or gov-
ernmental concern for the unborn probably existed when the four-
teenth amendment was written; if the law treated abortions harshly
only when performed subsequent to quickening, then it could be ar-
gued that the Court had historical basis for choosing some interim point
at which to protect the unborn."' If, on the other hand, abortion was
perceived as an offense against the unborn rather than women, the
Court's rationale collapses. 72  Thus, before examining the conclusions
the Court drew from its historical excursus, it will prove informative
to review the historical terrain.
3. The Common Law
Perhaps the most influential statement of the common law atti-
tude toward abortion was that of Lord Coke. In his seminal series,
Institutes, he wrote that abortion of a woman "quick with childe" was
"a great misprision, and no murder."73  Coke's position on the status
of abortion during the early common law period, although widely ac-
cepted by most courts and legislatures as marking the minimum degree
of legal culpability for the commission of the crime of abortion, was
severely criticized by New York University law professor Cyril H.
Means in an article which appeared in the 1971 Women's Rights Sym-
posium of the New York Law Forum.74 Relying in the main upon Pro-
69. Roe, 410 U.S. at 140.
70. Id.
71. See note 25 supra.
72. Roe, 410 U.S. at 157-58 (by implication).
73. E. CoKE, THmD INsTruTur 50 (1648). Early American cases equated a
misprision with a misdemeanor. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 33 Me. 48, 55 (1851).
74. Means, The Phoenix of Abortional Freedom: Is a Penumbral or Ninth-
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fessor Means' analysis of the common law, which was written with the
express intention of influencing the outcome of Roe and Doe,7" the
Court alluded to doubts as to whether "abortion was ever firmly estab-
Jished as a common law crime even with respect to the destruction of
a quick fetus." 6  The Court attached great weight to the professor's
criticism of Coke's jurisprudence as well as the apparently "uncritical"
acceptance of Coke's statement of the common law by 19th century
American courts and legislatures.7 7  Professor Means' own interpreta-
tion of the common law was based upon two 14th century case re-
ports78 which he denominated The Twinslayer's Case and The Abor-
tionist's Case.
The Twinslayer's Case, reads as follows:
Writ issued to the Sheriff of Glousestershire to apprehend one D.
who, according to the testimony of Sir G[eoffrey] Scrop[e] [the
Chief Justice of the King's Bench], is supposed to have beaten a
woman in an advanced stage of pregnancy who was carrying twins,
whereupon directly afterwards one twin died and she was delivered
of the other, who was baptized John by name, and two days after-
wards, through the injury he had sustained, the child died: and the in-
dictment was returned before Sir. G. Scrop[e], and D. came, and
pled Not Guilty, and for the reason that the Justices were unwilling
to adjudge this thing a felony the accused was released to mainper-
nors, and then the argument was adjourned sine die. [T]hus the
writ issued, as before stated, and Sir. G. Scrop[e] rehearsed the entire
case and how he [D.] came and pled.
Herle: to the sheriff: Produce the body, etc. And the sheriff
returned the writ to the bailiff of the franchise of such place, who
said, that the same fellow was taken by the Mayor of Bristol, but of
the cause of this arrest we are wholly ignorant.
79
Contrary to the conclusion of Professor Means, The Twinslayer's
Case is not precedent for a "common law freedom" of abortion. By
Amendment Right About to Arise from the Nineteenth-Century Legislative Ashes of a
Fourteenth Century Common-Law Liberty? 17 N.Y.U.L. FORUM 335 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Means].
75. Means, supra note 74, at 336.
76. Roe, 410 U.S. at 136.
77. The Court even seemed to accept Means' contention that Coke may have
intentionally misstated the law to suit his own purposes, See Roe, 410 U.S. at 135 n.26;
Means, supra note 74, at 346. This contention is pure speculation on the part of Means.
See id, at 343-46.
78. Anonymous, Y.B. Mich. 1 Edw. 3, f. 23, pl. 18 (1327), in Means, supra note
74 at 337 an. 3 & 4 (denominated by Means as The Twinslayer's Case); Anonymous,
Y.B. Mich., (1348), reported in Fitzherbert, Graunde Abridgement, tit. Corone, f. 268,
pl. 263 (1st ed. 1516), f. 255, pl. 263 (3d ed. 1565), quoted in Means, supra, at 338-39
nn.5 & 6 (denominated The Abortionist's Case).
79. Anonymous, Y.B. Mich. 1 Edw. 3, f. 23, pl. 18 (1327) in Means, supra note
74 at 337-38 & nn.3 & 4 (C. Means trans.).
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focusing the reader's attention on the statement that the judges were
unwilling to adjudge the existence of a felony, and by simultaneously
relegating the closing lines of the case to a long textual footnote profes-
sing ignorance of their import, 0 the Means analysis of this early com-
mon law report gives an erroneous impression of early common law
attitudes toward the killing of the unborn. If one examines the clos-
ing lines of the first paragraph and those of the second, a conclusion
contrary to that of Professor Means-that abortion was indeed a com-
mon law crime as early as 1327-seems well supported.
From a critical examination of the case report several things ap-
pear. First, the writ issued to bring D. into court appears to have been
one of homicide, a fact which may be inferred from D.'s release to
mainpernors81 prior to the adjournment of the argument "sine die."
Since the writ of mainprise was the early common law equivalent of
bail in homicide cases,8 2 it is clear that D. was neither acquitted nor
released in the reported proceedings, but was held to answer the
charge at a later date. Second, it is clear that D. was not acquitted
in the course of the reported proceedings; only the argument was ad-
journed. No mention is made of the writ's being dismissed. Third,
it appears that after D. had been released Herle, the Chief Justice of
the Common Bench, 3 demanded his presence to answer the charge.
80. Means, supra note 74, at 338 n.4.
81. The mainpernor was a surety for the appearance of a person under arrest.
Upon receipt of a writ of mainprise the sheriff would release the accused into the hands
of the mainpernors to await the arrival of the itinerant judges who would hear the
charges. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1105 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
82. In the days of the early common law, bail was unavailable from the sheriff in
cases involving a charge of homicide. E. DE HAAS, ANIQUITIES OF BAIL: ORIGIN AND
ISTORIcAL DEVELOP1MNT IN CRIMINAL CASES TO THE YEAR 1275, at 68 n. 69 & 79
(1940) [hereinafter cited as DE HAAS]. To remedy this situation, the courts of chancery
devised the writ de ponendo. Id. at 68-69 & n.79, 118, 127 n.142. Under the writ, the ac-
cused was delivered to mainpernors, or sureties, who would guarantee his appearance be-
fore the court to answer any charges pressed. See 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *128
(1765). Later, the writ came to be known as de manucaptione. DE HAAs at 68-69.
In time, a special form of de ponendo became available where the investigation of the
homicide in question revealed that the defenses of self-defense, death from misfortune,
or non-felonious killing might be available. See id. at 122 n.125.
83. The naming of Sir Geoffrey Scrope, Chief Justice of the King's Bench, and Sir
Robert Herle, Chief Justice of the Common Bench, in the same case report gives some
clue as to the procedures followed in The Twinslayer's Case.
During the Michelmas term of 1327, the court of Edward III was located at York
for protection from the invading Scots. The court of King's Bench followed the royal
court in its travels about the country and also sat at York during this period. See 1
HoL swoRT's HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 204 (3d ed. 1922) [hereinafter cited as
HoLnswoRTH]. Facing a similar danger from the Scots, the Court of Common Pleas was
ordered to York from its usual seat at Westminster, and there it heard cases during the
Michelmas term of 1327. See 74 Selden Society, 4 Select Cases Under Edward II, at xlii
& n.2. See also HoLDswoRTH at 197.
During the early days of the common law it was standard practice for the justices of
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But D. was unavailable to answer in the proceedings at York since he
had been arrested in Bristol on another charge. Thus, Professor
Means' uncritical reliance upon the statement that the judges were un-
willing to adjudge the existence of a felony is misplaced; D. had been
recalled to answer the charges. Since another of the original uses of
the writ of mainprise upon which D. had been released was to procure
release prior to trial when there was some doubt as to whether or not
the killing was felonious,"4 D.'s recall to answer the charges lends sup-
port to the proposition that the judges had indeed characterized D.'s
actions as a crime.
The report of The Twinslayer's Case itself furnishes no clue as
to the factors motivating the judges' reticence to characterize D's ac-
tions as a felony, but it is reasonable to assume that they were similar
to those influencing the decision in The Abortionist's Case, decided 20
years later. That case is reported as follows:
One was indicted for killing a child in the womb of its mother, and
the opinion was that he shall not be arrested on this indictment since
no baptismal name was in the indictment, and also it is difficult to
know whether he killed the child or not, etc.8s
An examination of these two cases demonstrates that the reticence
of some early common law writers to classify abortion as a felony"0 is
traceable to two factors having little relevance to 20th century consti-
tutional adjudication: (1) a lack of knowledge as to the nature of pre-
natal development; and (2) problems of proof, including an inability
to ascertain with any degree of certainty whether or not the abortion
was the cause of the child's death. The importance of these related
factors was recognized by William Stanford in The Pleas of the
Crown,8 7 wherein he stressed that:
the realm to consult with one another when faced with a case of extraordinary difficulty.
See HOLDsWORTH at 196 n.10, 210, 233-34. The justices would also assist one another by
giving advice even during the course of a case. Id. at 196 n.10. Thus, given the fact that
the justices were unable to conclude at argument in The Twinslayer's Case that D.
should be found guilty of a felony (for which the usual punishment was death), it is
quite likely that after adjourning the argument the justices met to determine D's fate. See
id. at 210. Since D. was recalled to answer the charge, it is reasonable to assume that the
justices, in consultation, had indeed decided that the crime with which he was charged
was a felony.
84. See note 81 supra.
85. Anonymous, Y.B. Mich. (1348), reported in Fitzherbert, Graunde Abridge-
ment, tit. Corone f. 268, pl. 263 (Ist ed. 1516), f. 255, pl. 263 (3d ed. 1565), quoted in
Means, supra note 74, at 338-39 & n.5 (C. Means trans.) (infant was stillborn).
86. See e.g., M. HALE, HISTORY OF THm PLEAS OF THE ClowN 433 (1736). Contra,
e.g., W. BLAcSoNE, 4 COMmENTAarES *198 (1769).
87. W. STANFoRD, LES PLEES DEL CORON, Book I Cl. 13 (1557) (Queux choses
sont requisites h faire homicide), quoted in C. Means, supra note 74, at 339-40 & n.8.
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[it is required that the thing killed be in rerum natura. And for this
reason if a man killed a child in the womb of its mother: this is no
felony, neither shall he forfeit anything, and this is so for two rea-
sons: First because the thing killed has no baptismal [sic] name;
Second, because it is difficult to judge whether he killed it or not, that
is, whether the child died of this battery of its mother or through an-
other cause. Thus it appears in the [Abortionist's Case (1348)].
And see [The Twinslayer's Case (1327)] a stronger case ...
The full text of Professor Means' translation of Stanford's treatise,
which Means himself considered the "definitive analysis of [the] two
cases,"88 goes on to discuss Stanford's opinion that the lack of a baptis-
mal name noted in The Abortionist's Case "is of no force.""9  It ap-
pears that Stanford was more concerned with the difficulty-of-proof
problem inherent in the abortion cases which occasionally came before
the courts of England than he was with propounding a theory that abor-
tion was not a secular crime at common law. By comparing abortion
cases with those in which the charge was infanticide Stanford illustrated
the basis of his disagreement with Bracton's position that abortion is
homicide. In the case of infanticide, the child, according to Stanford,
was clearly in rerum nature (in existence) at the time it was killed,
a fact which at that time could not be substantiated in the case of an
abortion.
Although Professor Means states flatly that "the true reason for
the decision in The Twinslayer's Case is not the difficulty-of-proof ar-
gument of the justices in The Abortionist's Case. .. , but the simple
negation of secular criminality . .. in The Twinslayer's Case itself,"9
his conclusion that Coke's statement of the common law did not affect
its course is clearly erroneous. First, it ignores the subsequent de-
velopment of the common law relating to abortion; and second, it relies
upon The Twinslayer's Case as if it were precedent. As noted above,
however, The Twinslayer's Case is not precedent. 91 Furthermore, it
is interesting to note that Coke, who presumably had read and under-
stood the significance of the closing lines of The Twinslayer's Case,
did not consider it to be precedent: "And the Book in 1 E. 3 [The
Twinslayer's Case] was never holden for law."'
The basic importance of the two aforementioned factors to the
position of the early common law is underscored by their gradual de-
88. Means, supra note 74, at 339.
89. Id. at 340.
90. Id. at 351.
91. See text accompanying notes 79-83 supra.
92. E. Coxn, Tumn INsTrrrnm, *50-*51 (1648), quoted in Means, supra note 74,
at 345.
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mise in the face of the growing willingness of both statutory8 and com-
mon law04 to punish abortion as a crime. By the time Coke expressed
his opinion concerning the criminality of aborting a quick fetus, three
centuries had passed since the judges considered The Abortionist's
Case. Coke's statement reflects nothing more than a greater under-
standing of prenatal development: Coke was willing to consider the
unborn sufficiently alive after quickening to proscribe their destruc-
tion.95 His position was neither untenable in its own right, nor in con-
flict with the position of the early common law. Coke, like many com-
mon law judges throughout history, sought to bring the written com-
mon law into step with the times.0 6
93. See, e.g., Conn. Stat. tit. 22 §§ 14, 16 (1321), amended by Conn. Pub. Acts,
ch. 71 § 1 (1860) (deleting the "quickening" distinction); Maine Rev. Stat., ch. 160 §§
13, 14 (1840) (containing no quickening distinction); Lord Ellenborough's Act, 43 Geo.
3, c. 58 (1803), amended by, Offences Against the Person Act, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict., c. 85
(1837) (deleting the quickening distinction).
94. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Parker, 50 Mass. (9 Met.) 263, 265-66 (1845);
State v. Murphy, 27 N.J.L. 112, 114 (1858).
95. The importance of the evidentiary problem is underscored by a later English
case, Sims's Case, 75 Eng. Rep. 1075 (K.B. 1601). In full text it reads as follows:
Trespasse and assault was brought against one Sims by the Husband and the
Wife for beating of the woman, Cook, the case is such, as appears by examina-
tion. A man beats a woman which is great with child, and after the child is
born living, but hath signes, and bruises in his body, received by the said bat-
terie, and after dyed thereof, I say this is murder. Fenner & Popham (two
of the justices), absentibus caeteris, clearly of the same opinion, and the differ-
ence is where the child is born dead (as in The Abortionist's Case-ed.), and
Where it is born living, for if it be dead born it is no murder, for non constat
(it cannot be proved), whether the child were living at the time of the batterie
or not, or if the batterie was the cause of the death, but when it is born living,
and the wounds appear in his body, and then he dye, the Batteror shall be ar-
raigned of murder, for now it may be proved whether these wounds were the
cause of the death or not, and for that if it be found, he shall be condemned.
Professor Means expressed doubt as to whether the case has any value as precedent. See
Means, supra note 74, at 343-44. Nevertheless, the case is sufficiently ambiguous to make
any judgment on the matter purely conjectural. The importance of Sims's Case lies in the
similarity of its fact pattern to that of The Twinslayer's Case. The judges who sat on
Sims's Case in 1601 were of the opinion that if the abortion were the cause of the child's
death, the abortionist would be guilty of homicide. Apparently, the judges who sat on
The Twinslayer's Case in 1327 were of the same opinion, for had the Sheriff been able
to procure him, D. would likely have been condemned on a charge of homicide.
96. A notable attempt by a later common law judge, Baron Gurney, to accomplish
the same thing appears in Regina v. Wycherly, 173 Eng. Rep. 486, 487 (Nisi Prius
1838). In his instructions to the jury of matrons appointed to determine whether Ms.
Wycherly was pregnant, Baron Gurney, relying upon medical testimony to the effect that
quickening is meaningless in terms of prenatal development, ruled that the phrase "quick
with child" was to be taken as meaning pregnant, rather than as "with quick child". Since
a conviction of the defendant Wycherly would have resulted in her execution, the Baron
was evidently attempting to give the full protection of the law to her unborn offspring.
It is notable, however, that the quickening distinction, having been so firmly
engrained into the common law, sometimes persisted in the courts even after the
legislature had eliminated it. See Evans v. People, 49 N.Y. 86, 90 (1872) wherein the
court held that, due to the difficulty of proof, a charge of manslaughter could not be
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Even assuming that Coke's view was completely at variance with
the earliest common law precedents, however, one question remains
to be answered: why did Coke's view persevere and gain acceptance
by virtually every court which considered the matter? Perhaps the rea-
son lies in the fact that the common law was not insulated from ad-
vances in medicine and biology which made such theories as "mediate
animation" and "ensoulment" obsolete and therefore unsuitable as
bases for reasoned judicial opinions97 The majority opinion in Roe
contains no citations to cases which support the proposition that the
common law was unconcerned with the preservation of a "quick" fetus.
In light of the Court's conclusions about the position of the common
law, such an omission is indeed an anomaly, but it is easily explained:
the cases do not support the Court's interpretation. The Court's uncri-
tical acceptance of an advocate's interpretation of the common law only
served to confuse the issues and to rest an important constitutional
holding on an erroneous historical foundation.
4. 19th Century Case Law
The central thesis of Roe v. Wade and Professor Means' interpre-
tation of history upon which it relied for support are identical: the
existence of legal restrictions upon the availability of the abortion pro-
cedure was traceable solely to the law's concern with the preservation
of unborn human life. Perhaps one of the most widely cited cases in
support of this position is State v. Murphy,98 a case decided in 1858
by the New Jersey Supreme Court. In discussing the state abortion law,
passed in response to an earlier holding which had denied common law
protection to a woman who had undergone an abortion,99 the New
Jersey court made the following statement: 'The design of the statute
was not so much to prevent the procuring of abortions, so much as
to guard the health and life of the mother against such attempts."'100
Although this statement, taken out of context, lends strong support to
upheld prior to quickening. But see id. at 93-95 (Grover, J., dissenting on the grounds
that all that was necessary to support a charge of second degree manslaughter was the
death of the child).
97. The modern concept of "viability," as employed by the Court, is but a variant
on the concept of "ensoulment." "Ensoulment" marked the time when the unborn
acquired the distinctive quality of having a soul, thus making its destruction more
serious. Viability, as used by the Court, focuses on the ability of the unborn to lead a
"meaningful" life, a quality which the Court felt gave the state a compelling interest in
seeing them protected under certain circumstances. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
98. 27 NJ.L. 112 (1858).
99. State v. Cooper, 22 N.L. 52 (1849). See also State v. Meyer, 64 NJ.L. 382,
385 (1900) (explaining the genesis of the New Jersey statute).
100. 27 N.L. at 114.
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the central thesis of Roe v. Wade,101 the holding in Murphy is not
nearly so narrow.
Without examining the case in full, it is possible to conclude that
the law of New Jersey, both statutory and common, was unconcerned
with the preservation of unborn life. But the court's words, however,
clearly show that the opposite was true,112 even to the extent of pro-
hibiting an abortion by the woman herself:
At the common law, the procuring of an abortion, by the mother her-
self, or by another with her consent, was not indictable, unless the
woman was quick with child. The act was purged of its criminality,
so far as it affected the mother, by her consent. It was an offence
only against the life of the child . . . [Tihe statute [does not] make
it criminal for the woman to swallow the potion or consent to the
operation or other means to procure an abortion . . . . Her guilt
or innocence remains as at common law. Her offence at the common
law is against the life of the child.' 03
Thus, even conceding the validity of the ancient maxim cessante ra-
tione legis cessat et ipsa lex [the reason for the law ceasing, the
law itself ceases] which lies at the root of the Court's argument that
abortion in the early stages of pregnancy is safer than normal child-
birth,10 4 the truth of the maxim does not compel complete abrogation
of state restrictions on the abortion process. Abortion procedures are
not made safer for the unborn child. In short, use of the Murphy
case to support the Court's conclusion is pure sophistry; it ignores the
primary concern of New Jersey's common law, the life of the child. The
degree to which the Court's thesis is unsupported by the cases
may be ascertained by a simple examination of several additional
101. It is interesting to note the language in which both Mr. Justice Blackmun and
Professor Means characterized Murphy as support for their contentions. Means stated:
The only contemporaneous judicial explanation of the pre-Lister abortion stat-,
utes-a decision of 1858 construing New Jersey's first such statute in 1849-
contains the following:
The design of the statute was not so much to prevent the procuring of
abortions, so much as to guard the health and life of the mother against
the consequences of such attempts.
Means, supra note 74, at 389-90 (citing to Murphy 27 N.J.L. at 114).
Justice Blackmun stated:
The few state courts called upon to interpret their laws in the late 19th and
early 20th centuries did focus upon the State's interest in protecting the
woman's health rather than in preserving the embryo and fetus.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 151 (citing Murphy at 114).
102. State v. Cooper, 22 NJ.L. 52 (1849).
103. State v. Murphy, 27 NJ.L. 112, 114 (1858). The court went on to conclude
that the statute had been passed to cure a defect in the common law: that the common
law was concerned only with the life of the unborn and that if the woman were to be
protected, it had to be done by statute.
104. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 149; Means, supra note 74, at 382-96.
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cases, 10 5 all of which are cited in support of the central proposition that
the law was unconcerned with the lives of the unborn.
Perhaps the most instructive of these cases is one decided by the
Supreme Court of Maine in 1851, Smith v. State."6 Both Smith and
a New Jersey case, In re Vince,107 were cited by Mr. Justice Black-
mun, writing for the Court, in support of the unqualified contention
"that the pregnant woman herself could not be prosecuted for self-
abortion or for cooperating in an abortion performed upon her by an-
other."'08  Professor Means cited Smith along with a Massachusetts
case, Commonwealth v. Parker,0 9 in support of the contention that the
Maine courts characterization of an abortion as being "without lawful
purpose" evinced an opinion that the killing of the unborn did not
contravene the strictures of the common law, but merely those of the
canon law.1° The cases cited, especially Smith, support neither the
central proposition itself, nor either of the subsidiary propositions
raised in its support:
[ .. The acts may be those of the mother herself and they are
criminal only as they are intended to affect injuriously, and do so af-
fect the unborn child. If, before the mother had become sensible of
its motion in the womb, it was not a crime; if afterwards, when it was
considered by the common law, that the child has a separate and in-
dependent existence, it was held highly criminal. Similar acts with
similar intentions by another than the mother, were precisely alike,
criminal or otherwise, according as they were done before or after
quickening, there being in neither the least intention of taking the
mother's life .. . . Consequently ... the defendant is charged
with what at common law was an offense by causing the abortion of
105. E.g., Smith v. State, 33 Me. 46 (1851); Commonwealth v. Parker, 50 Mass. (9
Met.) 263 (1845); In re Vince, 2 N.J. 443, 67 A.2d 141 (1949).
106. 33 Me. 46 (1851).
107. 2 NJ. 443, 67 A.2d 141 (1949).
108. Roe, 410 U.S. at 151. While the Court's contention is not without some
support in the other sources cited in the opinion, the unqualified citation of a case
standing for a contrary proposition is indeed questionable. For further discussion on this
topic see note 27 supra.
109. 50 Mass. (9 Met.) 263 (1845).
110. Means, supra note 74, at 362-73. The fact that abortion was at one time within
the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts does not make it a solely religious crime. The
ecclesiastical courts had a broad jurisdiction, which was not limited to offenses against
canon law. In secular matters, the courts applied Roman Civil Law, and took cognizance
of such varied matters as marriage and divorce (",family law"), and the probate of
estates. See generally I. STEPHEN'S COMMnENTARmS ON THE LAw OF ENGLAND 32-35 (E.
R. Dew, 20th ed. 1938); R. WALKER & M. WALKER, Tim ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 50-53
(3d ed. 1972). It is also important to note that the common law of abortion did not
originate in the canon law, although the canon law did condemn it. Rather, as the report
in The Twinslayer's Case indicates, abortionists were held to answer at common law on a
writ of homicide.
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a child, so far advanced in its uterine life, that it was supposed cap-
able of an existence separate from the mother, not with any crime
arising from an injury to the mother herself.111
The language of the Maine court in Smith is important in several
respects. It clearly reveals that under Maine law prior to the ratifica-
tion of the fourteenth amendment: 1 2 (1) the destruction of the un-
born child was, itself, the gravamen of the crime of abortion;"' (2)
the woman herself could very well be punished for destroying her un-
born offspring;" 4 (3) the "quickening" distinction had been abro-
gated;"' 5 and (4) the defendant would not be guilty of abortion were
the child to be unlawfully expelled, but live in spite of its premature
birth." 6 In light of these observations, it seems strange that the Court
was able to observe "that throughout the major portion of the 19th
Century prevailing legal abortion practices were far freer than they are
today,""' especially when those observations were based in part on
cases like Smith and Murphy." 8
Of similar import is the language of In re Vince,10 also cited by
the Court in support of its conclusions.' 2 ° While it is entirely reason-
able to contend that if a woman could not be punished for the crime
of abortion the law might well be designed for her protection, such a
contention finds no support in Vince. 2' The case is interesting not
111. Smith v. State, 33 Me. 48, 54-55, 57 (1851).
112. See text accompanying notes 187-218 infra.
113. Smith v. State, 33 Me. 48 (1851):
The offence described in the statute . . . is not committed unless the act be
done with an "intent to destroy such child" as is there referred to, and it be
destroyed by the means used for that purpose. It is required by established
rules of criminal pleading, that the intention, which prompted the act, that
caused the destruction of ithe child, as well as the act itself and the death of
the child thereby produced, should be set out in the indictment, in order to con-
stitute a crime punishable by imprisonment in the state prison, under the stat-
ute.
Id. at 58.
114. id. at 58.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 60.
117. Roe, 410 U.S. at 158.
118. Id. at 151 nn. 48-50.
119. 2 N.J. 443, 67 A.2d 141 (1949).
120. Roe, 410 U.S. at 150 n.50.
121. The Court attempted to bolster the assertion by citing several Texas cases
which ostensibly stand for the proposition that the laws were passed only to protect
maternal health, 410 U.S. at 151 & n.49. However, the cases do not support this
contention, even though the woman was not punished as an accomplice under the Texas
abortion statute. The cases evince, rather, a concern for the life of the unborn: Gray v.
State, 77 Tex. Crim. 221, 224, 178 S.W. 337, 338 (1915) (construing the statute to
abrogate the quickening distinction, and defining the crime of abortion as the destruction
of the life of the fetus or embryo); Fondren v. State, 74 Tex. Crim. 552, 556, 169 S.W.
411, 413 (1914) (indictment charging destruction of the life of the fetus); Moore v.
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only because the woman involved was forced to testify,122 but also be-
cause the New Jersey court made it clear that a woman could be
charged with the crime of common law abortion if the child had "quick-
ened." 123  Contrary to the implication of the Supreme Court in Roe,
the New Jersey statute involved 124 did not grant the woman immunity
from prosecution because of a policy favoring abortion. Rather, the
statute called for compulsory testimony from a witness who had partici-
pated in an abortion, and provided statutory immunity for the person
so compelled. The purpose of the statute was to facilitate punishing
the crime of abortion. 25 The grant of immunity was necessary to save
the statute from invalidity under the fifth amendmenes guarantee
against self-incrimination.
The importance of such facts is clear in terms of their effect on
the validity of the analytical structure upon which the Court based its
creation of a new constitutional right to abortion. The common law's
growing concern with the preservation of unborn life implicitly refutes
the central proposition of the Court's thesis: that access to abortion
was a common law freedom.
One need not limit inquiry to the cases to ascertain the weakness
of the contention that abortion laws were concerned only with the pro-
tection of the woman. Examination of the majority of the statutes held
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade,' 6 or by lower
federal courts employing similar rationales, 27 reveals that the legisla-
tures and courts of many states were indeed concerned with the preser-
vation of unborn life. If the only reason for challenging the validity
of state abortion laws is an alleged lack of necessity to protect a woman
from an unsafe medical procedure, such an attack fails upon a showing
that the state law is also concerned with the preservation of unborn
life.
If the state law forbidding abortion challenged in Roe were de-
signed in any respect to protect unborn life, their alleged constitutional
infirmity stems from neither a lack of rational basis nor a conflict with
the express provisions of the Federal Constitution; rather, it stems from
State, 37 Tex. Crim. 552, 560, 40 S.W. 287, 289, 295 (1897) (the gravaman of the crime
of abortion is feticide, the evidence in the case was sufficient to support the charge).
122. In re Vince, 2 NJ. 443, 451, 67 A.2d 141, 145 (1949).
123. Id. at 449-50, 67 A.2d at 144.
124. NJ. Rav. STAT. 2A:87-2 (1973).
125. In re Vince, 2 N.J. 443, 451, 67 A.2d 141, 145 (1949).
126. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 37: 1285 (1964); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 51
(1964); OHxo RaV. CODE § 2901.16 (1953).
127. E.g., Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224 (D. Conn. 1972), alf'd, 452 F.2d 1211
(1st Cir. 1972); Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis. 1970), appeal
dismissed, 400 U.S. 903 (1972).
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the fact that the federal judiciary has decided that such life is not
worthy of constitutional protection. 28  A thorough understanding of
constitutional law is not required in order to appreciate the distinction.
5. 19th Century Statutory Law
At the outset of this discussion it should be noted that the Su-
preme Court's conclusions concerning the position of 19th century stat-
utory law were expressed in absolute terms: "[the fact that] through-
out the major portion of the 19th century prevailing legal abortion prac-
tices were far freer than they are today, persuades us that the word 'per-
son', as used in the Fourteenth Amendment does not include the
unborn."'12 9 Therefore, according to the Court, laws protecting the un-
born are unconstitutional. Since this conclusion is based upon an al-
leged lack of statutory and common law concern with prenatal life in
the period prior to the ratification of the Constitution and the addition
of the fourteenth amendment, a demonstration that 19th century com-
mon and statutory law were committed to the preservation of unborn
life casts substantial doubt on the validity of the Court's view. At the
same time, such a showing lends credence to the proposition that
neither the words of the fourteenth amendment itself, nor the provi-
sions of any other section of the Constitution, require that the unborn
be excluded from the protection of the due process clause and, thereby,
denied the right to life.130
Perhaps the best evidence of state intent to protect the unborn
by statute is found in Smith v. State,'' decided by the Supreme Court
of Maine 17 years before the enactment of the fourteenth amendment.
Not only did the statute' 32 involved in Smith abrogate the "quickening"
requirement which had, by that time, become obsolete for purposes of
defining the nature of the offense charged, 83 but it also required speci-
ficity in pleading the offense defined by the statute. If the pleading
did not allege the destruction of the child, it would be held fatally de-
fective for not charging the essential element of the crime of abor-
tion.184 Even more revealing, however, is the 19th century Connecti-
128. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 161, 163 ("life, as we recognize it", "meaningful life")
(majority opinion); Doe, 410 U.S. 179, 209, 217 (1973) ("I am not prepared to hold
that a state may equate ...all phases of maturation preceding birth") (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
129. Roe, 410 U.S. at 158 (1973).
130. By holding that a state may not constitutionally adopt a "theory of life" which
would enable it to extend substantive protection to the lives of the unborn, the Court
effectively decided that the Constitution requires their exclusion. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162.
131. 33 Me. 48 (1851). See notes 106-16 and accompanying text supra.
132. Me. Rev. Stat. c. 160, §§ 13-14 (1840).
133. Id. § 14.
134. Smith, 33 Me. at 60.
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cut abortion law,""5 which demonstrates the concern of 19th century
legislation for the preservation of unborn life and identifies the inade-
quacy of the "analysis" undertaken in Roe v. Wade.
The nation's first abortion law was enacted in 1821 by the Con-
necticut legislature.'- 6 The history of that statute during the years be-
fore Roe v. Wade foreclosed any further attempt by the Connecticut
legislature to protect the unborn, reveals that as medical knowledge of
the unborn progressed, so did the protective ambit of the statute. In
Roe v. Wade the Court referred the reader to the position of the
American Medical Association [hereinafter the A.M.A.] in the period
prior to the adoption of the fourteenth amendment. 1 7 Stating that the
prevailing view of late 19th century America was anti-abortion,138 the
Court conceded that the position of the medical profession "may have
played a significant role in the enactment of stringent criminal abortion
legislation during that period."'139 Considering the commonly asserted
position that American anti-abortion legislation was intended to protect
the pregnant woman alone, one might imagine that the anti-abortion
position of the A.M.A. was based upon danger to women. This was
not the case, however. The A.M.A. Committee on Criminal Abortion
rendered a report to the A.M.A.'s 12th Annual Meeting in 1859, nine
years before the enactment and ratification of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The focus of the report was the unborn. The Court reported
the A.M.A.'s position as follows:'
40
It deplored abortion and its frequency and it listed three causes "of
this general demoralization":
The first of these causes is a widespread popular ignorance of
the true character of the crime-a belief, even among mothers them-
selves, that the foetus is not alive till after the period of quickening.
The second of the agents alluded to is the fact that the profes-
sion themselves are frequently supposed careless of foetal life ....
The third reason of the frightful extent of this crime is found in
the grave defects of our laws, both common and statute, as regards
the independent and actual existence of the child before birth, as a
living being. These errors, which are sufficient in most instances to
prevent conviction, are based, and only based, upon mistaken and ex-
135. Conn. Stat. tit. 22, §§ 14, 16 (1821), amended by Conn. Pub. Acts, ch. 71 § 1
(1860) (deleting the "quickening" distinction), held unconstitutional, Abele v. Markle,
342 F. Supp. 800 (D. Conn. 1972), reinacted Conn. Pub. Act No. 1, May 1972 Special
Session (declaring specifically a legislative intent to protect the unborn), held unconstitu-
tional, Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224 (D. Conn. 1972).
136. Id.
137. 410 U.S. at 141-42.
138. Id. at 141.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 141-42.
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ploded medical dogmas. With strange inconsistency the law fully
acknowledges the foetus in utero and its inherent rights, for civil pur-
poses; while personally and as criminally affected, it fails to recognize
it, and to its life as yet denies all protection. 14
1
The Court then noted that the A.M.A. adopted resolutions "calling
upon state legislatures to revise their abortion laws" and protested
"such unwarrantable destruction of human life.' 1 42  A report of the
A.M.A.'s position appeared in an 1860 edition of the Connecticut
House Journal, 14 and-though it is not clear what effect this report
had on the legislative process-the Connecticut statute was amended
that year to delete the quickening distinction. 44  Thus amended, the
statute remained in effect, surviving two attempts in the late 1960's to
change it, until ruled unconstitutional in Abele v. Markle.4 ' The
Abele case most clearly reveals that even if the intent of state abortion
laws was undisputed, the fact that they were designed to protect the
unborn would make little difference to the Court's decision;1 40 the in-
terests of the unborn had already been determined to be "insuffi-
cient":
47
The Malthusian specter, only a dim shadow in the past, has caused
grave concern in recent years as the world's population has increased
beyond all previous estimates. Unimpeachable studies [referring to
the report of the National Commission on Population Growth and the
American Future] have indicated the importance of slowing or halt-
ing population growth. . . . In short, population growth must be
restricted, not enhanced, and thus the state interest in pronatalist
statutes such as these is limited.'
48
The "pronatalist" sentiment about which the Abele court spoke was
summarized by the Connecticut Legislative Council as follows: "The
Council feels that should an unborn child become a thing rather than
a person in the minds of people in any stage of its development, the
dignity of human life is in jeopardy."'
149
After the first decision in Abele the Connecticut legislature rein-
141. 12 TRAs. A.M.A. 73-77 (1859), quoted in Roe, 410 U.S. at 141-42.
142. Roe, 410 U.S. at 142.
143. Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800, 805, 807 (D. Conn. 1972) (Newman, J.,
concurring).
144. See note 135 supra.
145. Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800 (D. Conn. 1972) (majority opinion). It is
interesting to note that the district court also relied upon Professor Means' interpretation
of the common law in striking down a statute which was clearly intended to protect the
unborn.
146. Id. at 802.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 816 (Clarie, J., dissenting).
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acted its abortion statute, this time specifically expressing its intent to
protect unborn life.'50 Again, the same three-judge federal court held
(2-1) that the statute was unconstitutional,' 5 ' relying upon an argu-
ment similar to that which underlies the Roe decision.'52
In Roe v. Wade the Supreme Court cited Abele with approval,
stating that its decision was "in accord" with the results of that case.'5
At first glance, however, the Court's statement appears erroneous.
While the Supreme Court concluded that 19th century abortion laws
were unconcerned with the lives of the unborn,' 54 the panel which de-
cided Abele felt that, notwithstanding the focus of Connecticut's 19th
century abortion law upon the preservation of prenatal life, the law
was unconstitutional "because due to the population crisis. . the state
interest in these statutes is less than when they were passed."' 5 5  The
resolution of this inconsistency may be found in the rationale of Bab-
bitz v. McCann,'56 another case the Court found "in accord" with its
decision. Babbitz invalidated an abortion statute which protected the
unborn "from the time of conception": "The mother's interests are su-
perior to that of an unquickened embryo, whether the embryo is mere
protoplasm, as the plaintiff contends, or a human being, as the Wiscon-
sin statute declares.'
57
The foregoing demonstrates the weakness of the contention that
abortion was a matter of right in 14th Century England and 19th Cen-
tury America-Professor Means' assertions to the contrary notwith-
150. Conn. Pub. Act No. 1, May 1972 Special Session.
151. Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224 (D. Conn. 1972).
152. See id. at 805-07.
153. Roe, 410 U.S. at 158. The Court also cited Bym v. New York City Health &
Hospital Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 194, 286 N.E.2d 887 (1972) as supporting its proposition that
the unborn are not "persons" protected by the Constitution. The import of Byrn,
however, is substantially broader, as reference to Judge Breitel's opinion for the Court of
Appeals points out:
The second level of debate is the real one, and that turns on whether the
human entity conceived but not yet born, is and must be considered a person
in the law. . . . It is not true, however, that the legal order necessarily cor-
responds to ithe natural order. That it should or ought is a fair argument, but
the argument does not make its conclusion the law ...
What is a legal person is for the law . . . to say, which simply means
that upon according legal personality to a thing the law affords it the rights
of a legal person . . . . That such action may be wise or unwise, even un-
just and evolutive of principles beyond the law does not change the legal issue
or its resolution. The point is that it is a policy determination whether legal
personality should attach and not a question of biological or "natural" corres-
pondence.
Id. at 200-01, 286 N.E.2d at 889. But see Glona v. American Guarantee Co., 391 U.S.
73, 75-76 (1968) (rejecting the "legal" - "biological" distinction).
154. See Doe, 410 U.S. at 190-91 (1973).
155. Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800, 802 (1972).
156. 310 F. Supp. 273 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
157. Id. at 301.
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standing.158 Since it was never a right recognized by the common law,
it cannot be considered to be a ninth amendment right retained by the
people. The newly created right to procure an abortion is the creature
of the substantaive due process arguments and erroneous interpreta-
tions of history relied upon by the Court in Roe; it is not a right which
may be characterized as "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people to be ranked as fundamental."
15 9
6. The Unborn as "Persons" within the Fourteenth Amendment
In the course of identifying the factors which went into the Su-
preme Court's resolution of the access question in favor of legal abor-
tion much has been made of the fact that the question's ultimate reso-
lution depends in its entirety upon whether or not a pregnant woman's
interest in privacy outweighs the interest of her unborn offspring in re-
maining alive. Clearly the issue cannot be resolved by stating that "the
court does not postulate the existence of a new being with federal con-
stitutional rights at any time during gestation."' 00 The Supreme Court
recognized the insufficiency of this formulation when it held that the
resolution of the access question depended entirely upon the validity
of the postulate.' 1
The central legal issue in Roe v. Wade was whether or not the
unborn are "persons" protected by the fourteenth amendment. 02 The
Court noted that if the unborn are "persons" Jane Roe's argument in
favor of legalized abortion collapses, "for the fetus' right to life is then
specifically guaranteed by the Amendment."'0 3 If, as the Court found,
the unborn are not "persons", the state's interest in protecting unborn
life would not be sufficiently "compelling" to outweigh the interests of
the woman.16 4 Given the importance of resolving this issue, and the
fact that the matter was one of first impression, 6s it is unfortunate that
158. To Professor Means, proof that the common law permitted unrestricted access
to abortion was sufficient to support the contention that this 'freedom" was subsumed
within the ninth amendment's guarantee of unenumerated rights. See Means, supra note
74, at 336. The "proof" offered by Professor Means, however, was his erroneous
interpretation of The Twinslayer's Case discussed in the text accompanying notes, 53-75
supra.
159. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
160. Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048, 1055 n.3 (N.D. Ga. 1970), afI'd, 410 U.S.
179 (1973).
161. Roe, 410 U.S. at 156-57.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 162-63.
164. Id.
165. The fact that several lower courts reached the issue in challenges to specific
state abortion laws is not material. The ultimate question whether the unborn are
protected from legislatively or judicially sanctioned destruction by the due process
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments could only arise in the context of the
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the Court's opinion does not contain a thorough analysis of the con-
siderations upon which its conclusions were based.
When it held that the unborn are not "persons" the Court rested
its decision on two factors which, taken together, convinced it that the
right to life does not exist prenatally:
All this [referring to a discussion of other constitutional usages of the
word "person"] together with our observation . . . that throughout
the major portion of the 19th Century prevailing legal abortion prac-
tices were far freer than they are today, persuades us that the word
"person"' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment does not include the
unborn.1 6
Since the Court's observations concerning the common law have been
found to be unsatisfactory as a basis for constitutional adjudication, it
is necessary to examine the Court's first observation-that the terms
of the Constitution do not admit of prenatal application-in order to
evaluate the Court's ultimate conclusion.
a. Constitutional Usage of the Word "Person"
Although the Constitution makes liberal use of the word "person"
it is not defined. The Court recognized this fact at the outset of its
inquiry into the word's meaning.1 7  A thorough examination of the
varied usages of the word throughout the text of the Constitution leaves
little doubt that the meaning of the word is generally derived from the
context in which it is used. The Court's inability to find other than
a postnatal application for the word bears witness to this fact, since the
Court might have professed an equal inability to find more than a few
references to "person" which have any other than an adult applica-
tion.1 8 If the Court was trying to establish that constitutional usage
of the word in sections other than the due process clauses of the fifth
and fourteenth amendments precludes any possible prenatal applica-
tion, it did not support the proposition by citing the reader to the con-
stitutional passages in which the word is employed. The fact is that
the Constitution does not define the word.
abortion controversy. The law in the only other area relevant to the question of prenatal
rights, property, 'as already settled in favor of the unborn. See Louisell, Abortion, the
Practice of Medicine, and Due Process of Law, 16 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 233 (1969).
166. Roe, 410 U.S. at 157.
167. Id. See generally address by Edward T. Lee to the Gary, Indiana Bar Associa-
tion, "Should Not the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States be
Amended?" (November 20, 1936) (arguing that the fourteenth amendment should not
include corporations).
168. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J.
920 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Ely].
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Two examples-the apportionment clause 6 ' and the twenty-sec-
ond amendment-should be sufficient to illustrate the Court's illogical
approach to the difficult problem posed in Roe v. Wade. The appor-
tionment clause directs that both representatives and direct taxes be
allocated by "adding to the whole Number of free Persons, and exclud-
ing Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other Persons,"'170 such enume-
ration to be made every 10 years "in such Manner as [Congress] shall
by Law direct." Although it has been argued that this clause furnishes
conclusive proof that the unborn are not persons,' 7' the argument can
best be characterized as "grabbing at straws." The Court was content
to note that it was "not aware that in the taking of any census under
this clause, a fetus has ever been counted."'71
Two facts should be noted in determining whether the apportion-
ment clause and the Court's use of the clause are relevant to the mean-
ing of "person" for purposes of due process. First, the clause directs
that a census shall be taken every 10 years "in such manner as [Con-
gress] shall by law direct," a fact which the proponent of its con-
clusive effect apparently neglected to note.17 Although Congress has
never done so, it would be neither irrational nor unconstitsutional for
it to direct that account also be taken of the unborn whenever the
census-taker is made aware of their existence. The fact that Congress
has never done so is irrelevant. The due process question cannot rea-
sonably be made to turn on so specious an argument. Second, if be-
ing counted in the decennial census is a primary requisite for person-
hood it is difficult to understand how a corporation may be a "person"
within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. This writer is not
aware that in any census a corporation has ever been counted. If the
constitutional usage of "person" is too inflexible to include the unborn,
it cannot reasonably be thought flexible enough to include a corpora-
tion. Yet it is a fact that the concept of corporate personhood was ac-
cepted by the Court without argument in Santa Clara County v. South-
ern Pacific Railroad Co.'74  The holding regarding the unborn can
169. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, 4.
170. The apportionment clause was changed by Section 2 of the fourteenth amend-
ment.
171. Means, supra note 70, at 402-03.
172. Roe, 410 U.S. at 157 n.53.
173. Means, supra note 75, at 402.
174. 118 U.S. 394, (1886):
The Court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the provi-
sion in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a State
to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,
applies to these corporations. We are all of opinion that it does.
Id. at 396.
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hardly be said to rely upon the intent of the Framers; most relevant
evidence seems to point in the opposite direction.
The second example of the Court's illogical approach to the prob-
lem is the twenty-second amendment. By its terms, the amendment
prohibits any "person" from being elected to the office of President
more than twice. It is apparent that the word "person" as used here
derives its meaning from the context. If one were to accept the Court's
analytical scheme in a future case where the meaning of the word were
in question, it might appear that "persons" are only those who are
natural-born citizens who have attained the age of 35.175
Admittedly the foregoing are extreme examples, but they are not
the only ones which can be employed to show that the Constitution it-
self is not so restrictive as the Court would have one believe.' 16 A
reading of the Constitution as a whole makes it clear that the only
clauses in which context does not supply the meaning of "person" are
the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. The
definition of the word in those contexts is critical. The two clauses
stand as the constitutional bulwark against unwarranted governmental
infringement of the inalienable rights to life, liberty and property.
Thus, even if it be assumed that most constitutional usage of "person"
in sections other than the fourteenth amendment does not apply to the
unborn, it does not follow that the same must hold true for purposes
of due process. After all, "it is a constitution we are expounding."
and "[i]ts nature, therefore, requires that only its great outlines be
marked;"' 17 the rest must be determined by reference to the nature
of the objects to be protected. The existence of fundamental rights
cannot be made to turn upon semantic niceties.
It should be remembered that in Roe the Court invalidated a
Texas law which had been construed to be protective of the unborn. 17
The lower court decision was based upon the premise that the unborn
are human beings. 79  The Court did not reject this proposition. The
ultimate issue before the Court, therefore, was whether the Constitu-
tion forbids state protection of individuals found to be human beings.'80
The question to be answered by the Court was this: absent some affir-
175. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
176. See also U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 2, and amend. XIV, § 3.
177. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1817).
178. See Thompson v. State, 493 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971), vacated and
remanded, 410. U.S. 950 (1973) (inconsistent with Roe).
179. Id. at 914.
180. The Court did not offer any citations or other authority for its unqualified
statement that Texas could not interfere with a woman's choice of an abortion by
adopting "one theory of life." Roe, 410 U.S. at 162. In fact, the opinion offers no clue
whatsoever as to why the Constitution would forbid such a course of action.
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mative evidence that the authors of the fourteenth amendment in-
tended to exclude the unborn, can it be assumed, for the purpose of in-
validating state protection of what is a fundamental right, that they in-
deed intended to exclude the unborn?'8' Although it purported to
give great weight to contemporary thought in the pre-fourteenth amend-
ment period, the Court did not address the question. Independent an-
alysis, however, reveals that the correct answer is "No".
b. The Fourteenth Amendment-A Historical Perspective
Few would argue with the proposition that the primary inalienable
rights protected by the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments are human rights.'5 2 Similarly, the life protected by the
clauses is human life. It follows then that the individual possessing
that biological force known as human life, a human being, is the object
of the amendments' protection-a person. Such an analysis is by no
means a new one. In 1911, Sir Fredrick Pollock observed that "[tihe
person is the legal subject or substance of which rights and duties are
attributes. An individual human being, considered as having such at-
tributes, is what lawyers call a natural person." 83 The remaining
question, however, is the one which the Court avoided, in Roe v. Wade:
does the language or the history of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments permit (or require) that a distinction be drawn between the "hu-
man being" and "human person"?
The Court's justification for what must be taken as an affirmative
answer to this question rests upon its observation that historically the
181. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S, 616 (1885):
fC]onstitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be
liberally construed. A close and literal construction of them deprives them of
half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the rights as if it con-
sisted more in sound than in substance.
Id. at 635.
182. See Address by Congressman John Bingham at Bowerstown, Ohio, August 24,
1866, in Cincinnati Commercial, Aug. 27, 1866, at 1, col. 1, 3:
Look at that simple proposition. No state shall deny to any person, no matter
whence he comes, or how poor, how weak, how simple-no matter how friend-
less--no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws. If there be any man here who objects to a proposition so
just as that, I would like him to rise in his place and let his neighbors look
at him and see what manner of man he is. (A voice-"He isn't here, I guess.")
That proposition my fellow-citizens needs no argument. No man can ...
dare to utter the proposition that of right any State in the Union should deny
to any human being who behaves himself well, the equal protection of the laws.
Paralysis ought to strangle the utterance upon the tongue before a man should
be guilty of the blasphemy of saying that he himself, to the exclusion of his
fellow man, should enjoy the protection of the laws.
183. F. POLLOCK, A Fmsr BooK OF JtuiSPRUDENCE 111 (3d ed. 1911), quoted in,
Means, supra note 70, at 409 n.175.
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unborn have never been considered persons "in the whole sense."18 4
This statement could be true if it relied solely upon the opinions of
courts addressing the question in the context of the abortion contro-
versy. But reliance upon other types of cases dealing with the rights
of the unborn is misplaced: the law of abortion protected their lives,
and the law of property recognized their rights to material posses-
sions.188 The validity of the Court's statement is not material, how-
ever, to a discussion of the possible justifications which might be raised
in support of a restrictive interpretation of the due process clause,'
8 6
particularly when the Court seemed bent upon ascribing the amend-
ment's alleged lack of flexibility to its authors. Given such a rationale,
the appropriate inquiry should focus upon the interests perceived by the
authors of the amendment rather than those envisioned by the Court.
Since the Court's determination that abortion is essentially a pri-
vate matter is based upon its holding that the unborn are not "persons"
within the meaning of the due process clause, it must be assumed,
in light of scientific data placing the beginning of biological human life
at conception,'l8 7 that the Court felt that the existence of human life,
as well as the point at which it begins, is irrelevant to any resolution
of the constitutional issues involved in the abortion controversy. If
it be assumed, however, that the "life" protected by the fifth and four-
teenth amendments is human life and the right to the preservation of
life is a "fundamental" interest, it follows that the existence of human
life in the period before birth is relevant to the issues involved in the
184. 410 U.S. at 162.
185. The fact that some courts may have felt it necessary to imply a "live birth"
requirement for the perfection of the rights of the unborn does nothing to lessen the fact
that the rights did indeed attach before birth; the birth requirement was only a means of
ascertaining whether there was a living plaintiff to assert his or her prenatally acquired
rights. The birth requirement is nothing more than a further manifestation of the
difficulty-of-proof problem which plagued the development of the early common laws
criminal sanctions on abortion. Further, it should be noted that a beneficiary, living at
the time a will is executed, need also be alive in order to perfect his or her rights to a
bequest or devise; if not, the common law provided for lapse of the beneficial interest.
See E. ScoLEs AND E. HALBACH, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND
TRusTs 709-19 (2d ed. 1973).
186. If protection of an individual's rights to life and property is insufficient to
make him or her a person "in the whole sense" what else could possibly be necessary?
The fact that live birth was said to be required for the perfection of the inheritance
rights of the unborn merely evinces recognition that a stillborn infant is hardly in any
position to assert its property rights. Similarly, the fact that the Constitution implicitly
requires that one be alive after attaining the age of 35 before the right to seek the office
of President can be perfected does not make the younger person any less a person "in the
whole sense." The right to run for President arises upon being born alive in the United
States. In short, being alive is a prerequisite for the enjoyment of any right. See, Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 272 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (right to life is the
"right to have rights").
187. See note 24 supra.
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controversy over legal abortion. The fourteenth amendment does not
speak in terms of a right to "meaningful"' 88 life, or a right to life "as
[the Court] recognized it;' 18 9 it speaks solely in terms of a right to
life. The primary question presented in Roe was this: may the Court
create substantive exceptions to the enjoyment of fundamental rights
where none appear in the Constitution?
The debates over section one of the fourteenth amendment show
that its authors were concerned that the proposed amendment protect
human life. The manifest purpose of the amendment as originally pro-
posed on December 6, 1865, was to deprive the states of the power
to violate the provisions of the Bill of Rights by placing the power of
enforcement of those rights in the hands of the Congress. 1 0 Mr. Bing-
ham, the author of the first section of the amendment, did not intend
to restrict its sweep to the negation of laws which the states had already
passed. He stated that no state ever had the power, by law or other-
wise, to abridge constitutionally protected rights.' 0 ' As one commen-
tator has noted,'92 it can be inferred that the Ohio congressman's re-
marks meant that no state could abridge, or could allow to be abridged
or denied, any constitutional privilege. On one occasion, speaking spe-
cifically of the right to life, Bingham stated that, notwithstanding the
fact that life had never "been protected, and is not now protected, in
any State of this Union by the statute law of the United States," such
a fact is not determinative of the existence of the right, for it is ex-
pressly protected in the Constitution. 93 Such a fact only pointed to a
need for enactments to protect the right."' Speaking in 1868, Con-
gressman Bingham described the intent of the amendment as follows:
There is not an intelligent man in America but knows that to secure
the rights of all citizens and free persons in every State was the spirit
and intent of the Constitution in the beginning. There is not an in-
telligent man in America but knows that this spirit and intent of the
Constitution was most flagrantly violated long anterior to the rebel-
lion, and the Government was powerless to remedy it by law. That
amendment [the fourteenth] proposes hereafter that the great wrong
[the denial of basic human rights in its then current form-slavery]
shall be remedied by putting a limitation expressly in the Constitu-
tion, coupled with a grant of power to enforce it by law, so that when
either Ohio or South Carolina, or any other State shall in its madness
188. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
189. Id. at 161.
190. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1865).
191. Id. at 2542-43.
192. J. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FoupRTEENTH AMENDMENT 80 (1908)
[hereinafter cited as FLACK].
193. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 429 (1865).
194. FLACK, supra note 192, at 81.
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or its folly refuse to the gentleman, or his children or to me or to
mine, any of the rights which pertain to American citizenship or to
common humanity, there will be redress for the wrong through the
power and majesty of American law.195
Given the fact that Bingham himself thought it immaterial to the
existence of a fundamental right that the right had never been pro-
tected by federal law, it is difficult to perceive just what relevance at-
taches to the alleged leniency of the common law toward abortion dur-
ing the 19th century. By the first section of the fourteenth amendment,
Bingham sought to assure the rights which pertain to "common hu-
manity." It is, therefore, relevant to inquire whether the fourteenth
amendment may be construed to exclude a group of individuals who
were regarded as human beings at the time the fourteenth amendment
was written,19 6 and who are considered to be human beings at the
present time. The Court based its restrictive interpretation of the
word "person" upon certain conclusions about state policies concerning
the unborn. 97 Therefore, it matters little in the constitutional context
that the states had not expressly declared the unborn to be persons "in
the whole sense;" the fact that some states, including Texas, had
declared them to be deserving of protection in their own right' s is the
functional equivalent.
As noted above, 9 9 the common law was not unconcerned with the
lives of the unborn. The Court itself pointed out that the dominant
popular feeling during the late 1850's, scarcely six years before the
framing of the fourteenth amendment, was hostile to abortion. The
organized medical profession in the mid-19th century felt that state
abortion laws should be tightened-and apparently they were.200  The
reason for this development was that abortion laws of the early 19th
century did not go far enough to protect unborn human life.2 ' In
response to the petition of the American Medical Association, at least
one state, Connecticut, strengthened its abortion law. 920 It hardly
seems reasonable to assert that the authors of the amendment were un-
aware of such sentiment in the educated circles of the times, especially
given the courts' cognizance of such attitudes. 0 In light of the con-
195. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 514 (1868) (emphasis added).
196. See, e.g., 12 TRANS. A.M.A. 73-77 (1859).
197. Roe, 410 U.S. at 161-62.
198. See Thompson v. State, 493 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
199. See text accompanying notes 52-130 supra.
200. See note 135 supra.
201. See 12 TRANS. A.M.A. 73-77 (1859).
202. See note 144 supra and accompanying text.
203. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 33 Me. 46 (1851); State v. Howard, 32 Vt. 380
(1859). See also, Regina v. Wycherly, 173 Eng. Rep. 486 (Nisi Prius 1838).
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temporary feeling that abortion involved the taking of human life, it
would be incongruous to claim that the authors of the fourteenth
amendment intended to exclude the unborn,204 and that they con-
sidered abortion to be a part of the liberty protected by the amend-
ment.2 °5 To do so would be to ignore the tenor of the times.
The fourteenth amendment recognizes two classes: citizens and
persons.2 °0  As to the broader class---"persons"-the rights of life,
liberty and property are assured.207  As to the narrower class-"citi-
zens"-a bar is interposed to state interference with the privileges and
immunities of national citizenship.208 The privilege of automatic citi-
zenship requires birth in the United States. The inherent rights of the
person, however, are subject to no birth requirement. That the au-
thors of the fourteenth amendment well understood the distinction they
had made between citizen and person is not open to dispute.200 The
same distinction exists in the fourteenth amendment today.
210
By use of the broader term "person" the author intended to in-
lude all individuals other than those who met the qualifications for the
title "citizen." There is no evidence that the authors intended to ex-
clude the unborn from this class of individuals. 21 ' In fact, given the
204. The Court merely noted that it was not "persuaded" that the fourteenth
amendment could be applied prenatally. Roe, 410 U.S. at 158. It never attempted to
show, as indeed it could not, that that amendment necessarily excludes the unborn.
205. The fact that many states prohibited abortion before the fourteenth amend-
ment became a part of the Constitution is itself strong evidence that the authors of the
amendment did not intend to include abortion as one of the liberties protected by the
due process clause.
206. FLACK, supra, note 192, at 63.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See W.D. GtrHR E, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CoNsTrrunoN OF
Trm UNTrED STATES 25 (1898), in which the author quotes Senator Edmunds, a member
of the Senate during the debates over the fourteenth amendment:
There is no word in it which did not undergo the completest scrutiny. There
is no word in it that was not scanned, and intended to mean the full and bene-
ficial thing it seems to mean. There was no discussion omitted; there was no
conceivable posture of affairs to the people who had it in hand which was not
considered.
See also FLACK, supra note 204, at 71-97; J.B. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENMENT 194-97 (1956).
210. Even were it true that the 19th Century common law was unconcerned with
the lives of the unborn the Court would not be bound by it. See United States v. Little
Lake Miserle Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973), wherein the Court explicitly
recognized the power of the federal courts to effectuate the statutory patterns established
by Congress by filling the "interstices." That reasoning applies with even more force to
the effectuation of the constitutional scheme for the protection of fundamental personal
rights. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1885), supra note 181.
211. Compare Dredd Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (18 How.) 393 (1857), wherein
the Court found an intent on the part of the Framers of the Constitution to exclude an
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predominantly anti-abortion mood of the country, as well as the inten-
sive lobbying campaign of the American Medical Association 212 and
the medical societies of some of the states,21 3 it is more reasonable to
infer that the unborn were meant to be included.
In Roe the Court was presented with substantial evidence, most
of which was undisputed, as to the biological reality of prenatal human
life.214  The Court recognized that these facts are "well-known". 21 5  It
is hard to imagine what other evidence of the "personhood" of the un-
born was necessary.216  The only meaningful and concrete distinction
between the unborn and their adult counterparts is one of age rather
than nature.21 7 If the constitutional concept of "person" is broad
enough to encompass corporations21 8 (a contention accepted by the
Court with considerably less hesitance), it is broad enough to include
the unborn offspring of human beings.
In Roe, the Court was faced with a dilemma. By giving an ex-
tremely broad definition to the concept of "health" when it upheld the
validity of the District of Columbia abortion statute1 9 challenged in
United States v. Vuitch,22 0 the Court had gone on record as supporting
wider access to legal abortion than had existed in the past. In Roe v.
Wade the Court was asked to complete the process begun in Vuitch-
entire class of individuals- those of African descent- from the protection offered their
rights by possession of the status of "citizen." The Court found no such intent in Roe.
212. See notes 137-44 supra.
213. In 1867 the Medical Society of New York condemned abortion at any stage of
gestation as "murder". See Means, The Law of New York Concerning Abortion and the
Status of the Foetus, 1664-1968, 14 N.Y.U.L. FoRUM 411, 459 (1968).
214. The only dispute found in the briefs concerns the question whether biological
human life is indeed human "in the whole sense." See Brief for Appellants at 19-22, Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 13 (1973). In this regard compare Means, supra note 74, at 403-04
(acclaiming the 18th century perceptions of one writer that the unborn are "monsters" as
a "clear voice of the Age of Reason!'), with CALFORNA MmIcINn, supra note 24 at 67
(noting that the contention that abortion is anything but -the taking of human life would
be "ludicrous if not set forth under impeccable auspices").
215. Roe, 410 U.S. at 156.
216. Consider Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), wherein the Court held that
the test of "personhood" for purposes of equal protection could be summarized as
follows: 'They are humans, live, and have their being. They are clearly persons within
the meaning of the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 70.
The fact that Levy involved illegitimate children who had already been born is hardly
material to the existence of fundamental human rights. Glona v. American Guarantee
Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968): "To say that the test of Equal Protection should be the "legal"
rather than the biological relationship is to avoid the issue. For the Equal Protection
Clause necessarily limits the authority of a State to draw such "legal" lines as it
chooses." Id. at 75-76.
217. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
218. Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
219. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-201 (1973).
220. 402 U.S. 62 (1972).
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to remove all access restrictions from the process. Yet, in Roe the Court
was forced to address the more difficult question of the constitutional
status of the unborn. The problem was significant since, historically,
the question of abortion had been intertwined with the question of
when life begins.2 2 : Faced with cogent arguments that the unborn off-
spring of human beings are individuals protected by the Constitution,
2 2
the Court knew that in order to legalize abortion, it had "to resolve
the difficult question of when life begins;" the nature of the issue pre-
sented left it no other choice.
II
ABORTION: A MEDICAL PROCEDURB
A. Introduction
At the outset of this discussion of the medical aspects of the abor-
tion cases, especially those considered in Doe v. Bolton, it is imperative
that several facts be kept in mind. The preservation of health and the
means by which the state may foster the attainment of this concededly
valid goal are matters closely intertwined with those discussed in Part
I. There are differences, however, and it is a serious mistake to pre-
sume that the Supreme Court's holding in Roe v. Wade-that there
is a "right" to elective abortion-conclusively settles the questions
raised by that holding in the area of health care services.
However, Roe v. Wade overlaps with Doe v. Bolton in its discus-
sion of state regulation of the medical aspects of abortion. 228  Al-
though the main issue in Roe concerned the existence of state power
to protect the unborn by restricting access to abortion, the Court did
not confine its discussion to that topic. Basing much of its decision
upon the premise that abortion laws were passed in order to protect
women from dangerous medical procedures, the Court, on finding such
a rationale no longer supportable, proceeded to strike down virtually
all access restrictions upon the abortion procedure. 4 Deciding to take
this reasoning one step further, the Court then inquired into the neces-
sity and utility of state health regulations which had grown up around
legal abortion practices in an analysis going beyond the traditional "ra-
tional basis" test. While the greater portion of the Court's reasoning
in this area may be found in Doe v. Bolton, the basic regulatory frame-
221. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Parker, 55 Mass. (9 Pet.) 263 (1845).
222. See, e.g., Danforth v. Rogers, 486 S.W.2d 258, 259 (Mo. 1972); Thompson v.
State, 493 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
223. Roe, 410 U.S. 113, 165 (1973).
224. See Part I supra.
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work upon which the states are permitted to construct constitutionally
acceptable regulations lies in the trimester approach of Roe.
225
Doe v. Bolton presented the analytically separate issue of the ex-
tent to which the state may regulate abortion procedures in order to
effectively safeguard maternal health more clearly than that issue was
presented in Roe v. Wade. A close reading of the majority opinion
in Doe, however, reveals that the Court was either unable or unwilling
to separate the distinct problems presented by the two issues. The
medical regulation issue involves two questions: (1) may the state, in
order to effectuate its interest in preserving maternal health, regulate
the abortion procedure at all; and (2) if so, to what extent?
These two questions are the focus of Part 11. Throughout, the
discussion assumes that the Court's decision regarding access to legal
abortion remains in force.
Roe severely limited the state's regulatory power during the first
trimester of pregnancy. Save for requiring that the procedures be per-
formed by a physician, the state may not impose any additional health
care standards.22 Only after the onset of the second trimester may
the state regulate abortion procedures at all. During the second and
third trimesters, however, the state must confine its regulations to mat-
ters involving maternal health,227 but even then the decision in Doe
precludes it from requiring that abortions be performed in fully
equipped hospitals 2 8 and from imposing mandatory consultation re-
quirements upon the physicians who are to perform the procedures. 29
While it is true that one's perspectives on the need for free ac-
cessibility to legal abortion will influence one's perceptions of what is
"proper" in this area, the need for objectivity is great.
B. The Standard of Review
Although abortion involves many nonmedical considerations and
decisions, it is primarily a medical procedure. As such it is subject to
reasonable regulation in the public interest.2 0 Since a state has an
225. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-66.
226. Id.
227. Id. During the post-viability period, however, the rule regarding protection of
the unborn is relaxed to some degree and regulations to maximize their protection are
permissible. Further, it is to be noted that the state is under no obligation to protect the
unborn at this time. Apparently the Court felt that even after "viability," the unborn
could claim no protection under the Constitution.
228. Doe, 410 U.S. at 195. See also Hallmark Clinic v. North Carolina Dept. of
Human Resources, 380 F. Supp. 1153 (E. D. N. C. 1974) (three-judge court).
229. Doe, 410 U.S. at 199.
230. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 387 U.S. 483 (1957).
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interest in the quality of all health care delivered within its borders,
it may reasonably prescribe certain minimum standards for the distribu-
tion and quality of medical services, including abortion. Indeed,
whether such power rests upon the concept of the state's police power
or upon a generalized "interest" analysis, it is fair to assume that pro-
tection of the public health is among the "powers inherent in every sov-
ereignty"2"1 which may be limited by the federal courts only to the ex-
tent required by the Constitution.282
The limitations upon state power to regulate the medical aspects
of abortion mentioned in the introduction to Part II are the result of
the Court's independent evaluation of the necessity and utility of par-
ticular regulations to the effective distribution of medical services.
The problem with this approach is that it was entirely inappropriate
to the Court's function as an appellate tribunal for it to strike down
state regulatory schemes on constitutional grounds unless it was pre-
pared to determine that the regulations were without rational basis.288
The Court did this in neither Roe v. Wade nor Doe v. Bolton. Instead,
it held the states to a higher standard of review.
2 4
This departure from the traditional standard of review is appar-
ently explained by the Court's concern -that state health regulations
might turn into "roadblocks" barring access to legalized abortion.28'
This concern was, perhaps, understandable in light of the Court's
sweeping invalidation of long-established state abortion policies, but a
mere "concern" should not, in itself, support a departure from the tra-
ditional standard. It does not appear from the facts of either Roe or
Doe that there was any danger of official disregard of the Court's direc-
tive concerning free access to legal abortions; 10 the statutes invali-
231. The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847); accord, Poe v. Ullman, 367
U.S. 497 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Rosen v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical
Examiners, 318 F. Supp. 1217, 1229 (E.D. La. 1970), vacated mem., 412 U.S. 902
(1974) (pursuant to Roe v. Wade).
232. Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
233. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 387 U.S. 483 (1957).
234. See Doe, 410 U.S. at 195.
235. Id. at 199.
236. The Georgia abortion statute challenged in Doe was based upon the American
Law Institute's Model Abortion Act, and was considerably more flexible than the Texas
statute challenged in Roe v. Wade. While the Georgia law was not as flexible as those of
New York or Hawaii, that fact does not support the presumption that Georgia would
have refused to accept the Court's access ruling. Obviously, the state was not so opposed
to abortion as to prohibit it entirely.
Furthermore, the Court made much of the argument that the restrictions placed on
abortion were unlike those of any other medical procedure. The answer to this argument
is that no other medical procedure is like abortion. Both the Texas and Georgia abortion
statutes explicitly recognized that fetal as well as maternal interests are involved in an
abortion. Thompson v. State, 493 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971); GA. STAT. ANN.
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dated were penal provisions.2 7  The Court should have waited for a
case actually presenting the problem of "roadblocks" before attempting
to fashion a solution.
To presume that all health regulations during the first trimester
were roadblocks was speculation in its purest form. It is settled that
"the judiciary may not restrain the exercise of lawful power on the as-
sumption that [a] wrongful purpose or motive [will] cause the power
to be exerted." 238  Such matters are most properly resolved by prompt
judicial action upon evidence clearly demonstrating an invalid state
purpose.
C. Deficient Studies and Definitions
An examination of the Court's approach to the medico-regulatory
aspects of abortion cannot end with the assertion that an inappropriate
standard of review was employed in reaching the decision. The
Court's reasoning suffers from even deeper flaws. Its blanket restric-
tions upon state power to regulate, especially in the first trimester of
pregnancy, are not only inconsistent with its own definition of "health,"
but also ignore the fact that a state might accept the Court's decision
on the access issue, yet remain firmly committed to a policy whereby
it would seek to make the available procedures as safe as possible.
In Doe v. Bolton, the Court reaffirmed its prior holding that
"health" encompasses many personal interests aside from purely physi-
cal health, such as familial circumstances, mental or emotional needs,
financial ability, and age.239 The use of such a standard to define in
part the interests which must be considered in allowing a woman to
procure an abortion presents a seemingly inexplicable inconsistency in
the Court's reasoning when that same standard is not applied in gaug-
ing the permissibility of state regulatory schemes designed to further
maternal interests.
Perhaps the most obvious example of this incongruity is the vir-
tually complete abrogation of state power to regulate during the first
§ 26-1202(c) (1972). Once the Court had determined that the protection of fetal
interests was not a matter with which a state could validly concern itself for at least the
first 6 months of pregnancy, the rationale for disparate access restrictions was no longer
constitutionally valid. In the context of Doe v. Bolton these restrictions were the
requirements of state residency, committee approval, and, to a lesser extent, two-
physician concurrence. The other health regulations involved in Doe merely reflected
state policy judgments regarding the necessity of safety standards. Nowhere in either
opinion did the Court go so far as to say that the remaining requirements were irrational;
it merely held, in effect, that they were unnecessary to the attainment of state goals.
237. Ely, supra, note 168, at 194 n.7.
238. McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904).
239. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153; Doe, 410 U.S. at 192; accord, United States v. Vuitch,
402 U.S. 62 (1972).
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trimester of pregnancy. The Court, after adopting an extremely broad
definition of health, restricted the state's power to consider the fac-
tors comprising this broad definition in devising a regulatory scheme
to protect maternal health. The Court rejected the contention that
first trimester abortion remains an inherently dangerous medical pro-
cedure, 240 and held, in effect, that early abortion, "although not without
its risk,"241 is, for constitutional purposes, now safer than normal child-
birth.242 Evidently the majority was impressed by the "now estab-
lished medical fact . . . [that] until the end of the first trimester
mortality in abortion is less than mortality in normal childbirth, 243 for
this fact is the sole basis upon which the first trimester prohibitions are
based.244 But would such a fact, even if established beyond any rea-
sonable doubt,245 destroy the constitutional validity of the regulations
being examined? Clearly it would not.
240. Roe, 410 U.S. at 149, 163.
241. Roe, 410 U.S. at 149.
242. Doe, 410 U.S. at 190.
243. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
244. Id.
245. This "fact" is not nearly so well established as the Court would have one
believe. Data from countries having wider experience with legal abortion does not
support the contention. See Brief for Certain Physicians Professors and Fellows of the
American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology as Amicus Curiae for Appellees at 37-
43, Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Certain Phy-
sicians], wherein the following figures were presented for the Court's examination:





Country/State Year Abortions Deaths Abortions Births
Denmark (92) 1961-66 27,435 9 30 10-20
England and




Sweden (94) 1960-66 30,600 12 39 14.0 (95)
Yugoslavia
(Skopje Univ.)
(96) (106) 1965-68 13,758 2 10.6 96.5 (97)
Hungary (98) 1964-68 939,800 11 1.2 49.7 (99)
Oregon (100) 1970 7,196 1 13.9 8.4
Maryland (101) 1968-70 7,664 3 40.5 23.1 (102)





Country/State Year Trimester Deaths Abortions Births
Denmark (92) 1961-66 8,684 2 23.0 10-20
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Given the Courtes broad definition of health, it is rather odd that
it focused on mortality as the only determinative health factor. Indeed,
Yugoslavia
(Skopje Univ.)
96) (106) 1965-68 7,833 2 25.5 96.5 (97)
Hungary (98) 1964-68 939,800 11 1.2 49.7 (99)
Oregon (100) 1970 5,351 1 18.6 8.4
*Breakdown data for England and Wales and Sweden are not available. There
were no early abortion deaths in Maryland 1968-70, but a relatively small number
(3,900) were performed early (101).
The sources for the materials cited above were reported as follows:
92) Olsen, Nielsen & Ostergaard, Complications to Therapeutic Abortion, INrL J.
GYNECOLOGY & OBsTmEmcs, Nov., 1970 at 823.
93) The Abortion Act (1967), BrT. MED. J., May 30, 1970 at 529-35 (findings of an
inquiry into the first year's working of the Act, conducted by the 'Royal College of
Obstetrics and Gynecology).
94) C. Tietze, Abortion Laws and Abortion Practices in Europe, in PROCEEDINGS OF
THa AM. ASSN. OF PLANNED PARENTHOOD PHYSICIANS 198 (San Francisco, 1969) (Ex-
CERPTA MEDICA INT'L CONG. SRIES No. 207).
95) 23 WORLD HEALTH STATISTICS REPORT, No. 7 (1970) at 546-49.
96) Jurukovski, Complications Following Legal Abortion, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
ROYAL SOCIETY OF MEDIcINE, August, 1969, at 830.
97) See source 95.
98) See Klinger, Demographic Consequences of the Legalization of Induced Abortion
in Eastern Europe, INT'L J. GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS, Sept., 1970 at 680.
99) See source 95.
100) OREGON STATE BD. OF HEALTH, THERAPEUTIC ABORTIONS IN OREGON-JANUARY-
DEC EmER 1970. See H.E.W., CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL, Abortion Surveillance
Report-Hospital Abortions, January-June (1970) (commenting on the nearly complete
nature of the Oregon statistics).
101) Cushner, Pregnancy Termination, The Impact of New Laws, an Invitational
Symposium, J. REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE, June 1971, at 62.
102) 1 VrrAL STATISTICS OF Tm UNITED STATES, Table 1-35, at 1-30 (1967); 7 (PART
B) VITAL STATISTICS OF TH UNITED STATES, Table 7-6, at 7-233 (1967).
106) Jurukovski & Sukharov, A Critical Review of Legal Abortion, INT'L I. GY-
NECOLOGY & OnSTTICS, May, 1971, at 111.
Several points should be kept in mind when considering the relevance of these
statistics. First, they do not purport to be the most recent statistical materials on the
subject; those materials and the problems associated with them are discussed in the text
accompany notes 251-268 infra. Second, since these materials were, in part, the source of
the Court's ruling on the relative safety of abortion, their relevance to the present
discussion is clear. Third, the maternal mortality figures quoted in the sources numbered
95, 97, and 99 were compiled under a classification system which included abortion-
related deaths, making the maternal mortality figure appear higher than it should have
for purposes of such a comparison. Fourth, the inordinately high maternal mortality ratio
noted for Yugoslavia and Hungary reflect adversely on the health care delivery systems
of these countries. How they were able to show such an extraordinarily good record for
abortion while, at the same time, showing such a poor record for maternal care would
seem to make their statistics fairly unreliable as indicators of "relative" safety. Finally, it
should be noted that even so much as comparing such a limited statistic as "abortion
mortality" to the broadly defined statistic of maternal mortality can be misleading in
favor of the safety of abortion. See text accompanying notes 282-85 infra.
So, even if one assumes that abortion related mortality is relatively low, it remains
fair to inquire just why such an assumption would demand either the total legalization of
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there is another extremely important consideration which must be ex-
amined before the rational basis of health regulation may be found
wanting. That factor is morbidity. 248 Its importance is equal to, if not
greater than, mortality, in considering the relative safety of any abor-
tion procedure.2 47  To invalidate abortion-related health regulations
solely on the basis of mortality2 45 is akin to striking down industrial
safety standards without considering the incidence of nonfatal in-
juries.24
9
Morbidity includes latent, as well as immediate complications.
The overall safety of any surgical procedure, especially abortion, can-
abortion for the first 6 months of pregnancy, see Part I supra, or the total abrogation of
administrative regulation of the health care aspects of the procedure during the first
trimester.
246. Morbidity is a collective term. For purposes of the present discussion it is
taken to mean all manner of complications, immediate as well as latent, which may arise
as a consequence of legal or illegal induced abortion. These include, but are not limited
to laceration of the cervix, hemorrhaging, uterine perforation, infertility, susceptibility to
miscarriage, and psychological sequelae.
247. See Editorial, How Safe is Abortion? THE LAN cET, December 4, 1971, at
1239:
The high incidence of post-abortion complications reported by Professor Stall-
worthy and his colleagues . . . is deeply disturbing, particularly since almost
identical results have lately been reported by [other sources]. Healthy young
women, whose only complaint is that they are pregnant, are entering the hos-
pital and being subjected to procedures that may permanently affect their fertil-
ity and occasionally jeopardize their lives. Clearly, the time has come for a
critical assessment of these complications.
248. If mortality associated with legal abortion is to be used as the sole indicia of
its safety, the following figures reporting abortion related deaths occurring in New York
City during the period 1970-1972 are instructive:




*includes two deaths subsequently discovered.
Pakter, O'Hare, Nelson, and Svigir, A Review of Two Years' Experience in New York
City With the Liberalized Abortion Law, in THE ABORMON ExpEENcE 47 at 63
(Osofsky & Osofsky eds. 1973) [hereinafter the article by Pakter, O'Hare, Nelson and
Svigir will be cited as Pakter, and the book edited by Osofsky & Osofsky will be cited
as OsoFsKv & OsoFsKY].
249. The folly of using abortion related mortality as the sole indicator of the
operation's safety vis-a-vis normal child-birth becomes apparent upon examination of all
the relevant health factors which would be considered were any other surgical procedure
under scrutiny. To fully appreciate the scope of the problem one need only consider the
remarks of Professors Stallworthy, Moolgaker and Walsh noting that while "[t]he
morbidity and fatal potential of criminal abortion is accepted widely . . . [tihere has
been almost a conspiracy of silence concerning [the] risks [of legal abortion]."
Staliworthy, Moolgaker, and Walsh, Legal Abortion: A Critical Assessment of its Risks,
THE LAN CET, December 4, 1971, at 1245 [hereinafter cited as Stallworthy]. Unfortunate-
ly, they noted, the emotional response evoked in any contemporary discussion of
abortion has obscured the perspectives of the public, the courts,, and the medical
profession itself. See id.
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not be judged solely upon its immediate impact on the patient; its long-
term effects must be considered. This is especially true when the pro-
cedure is performed on young women,25 for not only is their own
health and fertility25' at stake, but also the health of any future
"wanted" offspring which the woman may produce. 2 Too little is
known of the long-term effects of induced abortion in this country for
any court to attempt to determine its safety; it has only been available
on any analytically meaningful basis since 1970. Were the Court to
base its conclusions on the data available from countries where legal
abortion has been available for a much longer period, the decision
might not have been any more defensible from a legal point of view,
but the conclusion might have been different.
When morbidity is considered, the statement that an "early", or
first trimester, abortion is less dangerous than one obtained at a later
stage of gestation,2 5 8 becomes much less persuasive. It discloses
nothing about the risks of the abortion procedure as compared to those
of normal childbirth or any other medical procedure. Because there
is considerable controversy within the medical profession over the
safety and advisability of any abortion, regardless of the stage of gesta-
tion,215 it should be clear that early abortion is not so trivial an opera-
250. Compare Pakter, supra note 248, at 56 (207,366 of 334,865 abortions per-
formed in New York City during 1970-72 (61.8%) were upon women aged 24 or
younger. Of these, 89,264 (26.6%) were under twenty years of age), with Tietze and
Lewit, A National Medical Experience: The Joint Program for the Study of Abortion
(IPSA), in OsoFSKy & OsorsKy, supra note 248, at 5 (61.0% and 24.2% respectively).
251. See Stewart and Goldstien, Medical and Surgical Complications of Therapeutic
Abortions, 40 OBsT-Tcs & GYNECOLOGY, October 1972, at 539, 548 [hereinafter cited
as Stewart & Goldstien]; A. Wynn, Some Consequences of Induced Abortion to Children
Born Subsequently: A Supplementary Note of Evidence, (Foundation for Education and
Research in Child Bearing, London, England (1972)), reprinted in 4 MARRIAGE AND
FAMILY NEWSLETIER, February-April, 1973, at 12, 14-22 [hereinafter cited as A.
Wynn].
252. N. BuTLER & D. BONHAM, PERiNATAL PRORLEMS: FIrsT REPORT OF THE 1958
BRrnsf PERINATAL SURVEY 288 (1963) (noting that past medical history of one abortion
increased overall perinatal mortality by fifty percent) [hereinafter cited as BRrnsH
PERINATAL SURVEY]; M. Wynn, Some Consequences of Induced Abortion to Children
Born Subsequently, (Foundation for Education and Research in Child Bearing, London,
England (1972)), reprinted in 4 MARRAGE AND FAMILY NEWSLETTER, February-April,
1973, at 5-7 [hereinafter cited as M. Wynn].
253. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA BUREAu OF MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH, THERAPEUTIC
ABORTION IN CALIFORNIA: A BIENNIAL REPORT PREPARED FOR THE 1974 LEGisL&Tm
PURSUANT TO SECTION 25955.5 OF THE HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE 2 (1974) ("in the
early and most safe part of their pregnancy").
254. See Editorial, Latent Morbidity After Abortion, BnrISH MEDICINE, Mar. 3,
1973, at 506; Editorial, How Safe is Abortion?, Tim LANCET, Dec. 4, 1971, at 1239;
Fitzgerald, Abortion on Demand, MED. Opni. Am RnV., (1970); Nigro, A Scientific
Critique of Abortion as a Medical Procedure, PsYcHIATRIc ANNALS, Sept., 1972, at 22
[hereinafter cited as Nigro]; Stalworthy, supra note 249. In Legalized Abortion, Report
1975] 1299
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:1250
tion as the low mortality figures based upon the New York experience
might seem to indicate. 255 Indeed, a recent study, based mainly on
German sources, reveals that "there is a serious latent morbidity fol-
lowing an induced abortion that only becomes apparent during the
course of a subsequent pregnancy or confinement. 256  This morbidity
includes cervical incompetence, 25 7 intrauterine damage, 2 8 including
perforation,259 iso-immunization, 2 0 extrauterine (ectopic) pregnancy,
of the Council of the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, BrTIsH
Mm Icnqu, April 12, 1966, at 850 it was stated:
Those without specialist's knowledge, and these include members of the medi-
cal profession, are influenced in adopting what they regard as a humanitarian
attitude to the induction of abortion by a failure to appreciate what is involved.
They tend to regard induction of abortion as a trivial operation, free from risk.
fix fact, even to the expert working in the best conditions, the removal of an
early pregnancy after dilating -the cervix can be difficult and is not infrequently
accompanied by serious complications. This is particularly true in the case of
women pregnant for the first -time. For women who have a serious medical
indication for termination of pregnancy, induction of abortion is extremely
hazardous and its risks need to be weighed carefully against those involved in
leaving pregnancy undisturbed. Even for the relatively healthy woman, how-
ever, the dangers are considerable.
255. It is important to note at this point that no meaningful distinction can be
drawn between the terms "elective" and "therapeutic" abortion. Essentially the terms
describe the same indications, since most proponents of legal abortion admit that elective
removal of the fetus is without substantial psychiatric or medical justification. See, e.g.,
Halleck, Excuse Makers to the Elite: Psychiatrists as Accidental Social Movers, MED.
OPINION, December 1971, at 48; Sloane, The Unwanted Pregnancy, 280 NEW ENGLAND
J. MED. 1206 (1969). See also, Fleck, Some Psychiatric Aspects of Abortion, 115 J.
NERvous AND MENTAL DInEAsE 42 (1970):
The phrase [therapeutic abortion] compounds the ethical confusion and in-
tellectual dishonesty which are characteristic of popular and professional atti-
tudes and notions about abortion. Obviously abortion is not a treatment for
anything unless pregnancy is considered a disease, and if it were that, it is the
only disease which is 100 percent curable by abortion or delivery at term.
The identity of the two terms is borne out by the experiences of California and Oregon
where the abortion laws provided for abortion based on mental health. See CALIFORNIA
BUREAU OF MATERNAL AND CILD HEALTH, A REPORT TO THE 1971 LEGISLATURE:
FouRTH ANNUAL REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CALIFORNIA THDERAPEUTIC
ABORTION Acr PURSUANT TO CHAPTER No. 177 (ACR 113) 1967 4 (1971) (63,872 of
65,044 [98%] of abortions performed in calendar 1970); OREGON STATE HEALTH Div.,
VrrAL STATISTcs ANN. REP. 93 (1971) (97.9% for mental health).
This is not to say, however, that an abortion can never be truly "therapeutic." An
abortion to prevent the death of the mother clearly falls within this very limited
category.
256. A. Wynn, supra, note 251, at 12 (emphasis in original).
257. See Wright, Campbell, and Beazley, Second-trimester Abortion After Vaginal
Termination of Pregnancy, THE LANcET, June 10, 1972, at 1278 (noting a 10-fold
increase in spontaneous second-trimester abortion after one which had been induced
during the first).
258. A. Wynn, supra note 251, at 18-19. See also Stewart & Goldstien, supra note
251, at 548 (noting the risk of postabortal infertility due to high rate of infection); M.
Wynn, supra note 252, at 6 (noting that the tendency of induced abortion to increase the
rate of prematurity in subsequent pregnancies may have the overall effect of raising the
rate of infants born with some type of handicap).
259, See Stallworthy, supra note 249; Stewart & Goldstien, supra note 251, at 545.
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and psychological sequelae. 6 1 The very existence of these conditions,
as a result of first trimester abortions as well as from those performed
later in pregnancy, has led many medical experts to conclude that abor-
tion is clearly not as safe as carrying a pregnancy to term.2" 2
While a study of the comparative incidence of fatal and morbid
consequences subsequent to full term pregnancy and elective induced
abortion 2 3 is beyond the scope of this work, one difficulty inherent in
this task is worth mentioning. Since abortion-related mortality is often
compared with maternal mortality in an attempt to show that early
abortion is "safer" than carrying the pregnancy to term, it is necessary
to consider not only the number of deaths resulting from each pro-
cedure, 2 4 but also the characteristics of the woman electing either
abortion or full-term pregnancy. If the safety of abortion is to be com-
pared in any meaningful way to that of normal childbirth, one of the
following methodologies should be employed: (1) define abortion-re-
lated mortality and morbidity as broadly as those terms are defined in
regard to maternal mortality265 and morbidity; (2) restrict considera-
260. A. Wynn, supra note 251, at 21.
261. Much of the research into psychological sequelae of induced abortion has
focused upon feelings of guilt and depression. See e.g., Osofsky, Osofsky, & Rajan,
Psychological Effects of Abortion: With Emphasis Upon Immediate Reactions and
Followup, in OSOFSKY & OSOFSKY, supra note 248, at 188. However, a recent study has
noted the possible psychological trauma which may be associated with post-abortal
complications, especially infertility and sterility. See M. Wynn, supra note 252, at 6-7.
262. See, e.g., Nigro, supra note 254, at 37-38.
263. See note 255 supra.
264. In addition to the fact that reporting and followup are seriously incomplete,
certain abortion-related deaths may be mentioned, but not counted, in tabulating the
mortality ratio. Consider Tietze and Lewit, A National Medical Experience: The Joint
Program for the Study of Abortion (JPSA) in OsoFsKcY & OsoFsKY, supra note 248, at 1,
wherein it was noted that of the four deaths "directly attribut[able] to" abortion, one
involved a young woman, "18 years old, who committed suicide three days after a suction
procedure because of guilt feelings about having 'killed her baby,' before she could be
informed that she had not been pregnant." Id. at 13. But see Tietze, Pakter and Berger,
Mortality with Legal Abortion in New York City, 1970-72, 225 J.A.M.A. 507 (same
death not counted) (hereinafter cited as Tietze & Pakter), and Rovinsky, Abortion in
New York City, April 5-6, 1971 (paper presented to the meeting of the American
Association of Planned Parenthood Physicians, President Hotel, Kansas City, Mo.),
quoted in Brief for Certain Physicians, supra note 245, at 36:
There is at least one apocryphal story circulating about an abortion death in
a physician's office from air embolisation when an aspiration pump acted as
a pressure rather than a suction device; following which the woman's corpse
was transported back to her home state and the true cause of death there was
not recorded.
265. Maternal mortality has been defined as: "Mhe death of a woman dying of
any cause whatsoever while pregnant or within ninety days of termination of the
pregnancy, irrespective of duration of pregnancy at the time of termination or the
method by which it was terminated." Rnm, RYAN, AND B3ENIRScH, PRINCIPLES AND
MANAGEmENT OF HumAN REPRODUCTION 164 (1972).
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tions of mortality and morbidity to the sequelae of "abortion only" and
"birth only"; or (3) conspicuously disclose the relevant characteristics
of the universes from which the sample figures are derived."' Failure
to adopt one of the foregoing schemes, or another which is substan-
tially similar, will result in skewed complication rates and abortion will
appear substantially safer than if the samples were nearly identical.
2 07
The importance of reliable safety information should be obvious;
women are risking their lives and health no matter which alternative
is chosen. But such information is difficult to obtain. A study of the
28 major abortion studies conducted prior to 1965, found that in each
there were deficiencies in research design, sampling techniques, and
evaluation methods.2 8  The same report also found that the data upon
which these reports relied was inadequate for meaningful statistical an-
alysis of either the efficacy or the adverse consequences of the pro-
cedure. 69 Identical criticisms can be levelled at contemporary abor-
tion studies: sampling is incomplete, 270 followups are difficult,271 and
reporting is either skewed 7 2 or incomplete. Such unreliable sta-
266. Such characteristics would seem to include, among other things: (1) the age of
the patient; (2) the duration of the pregnancy at the time of birth or abortion; (3) the
state of the patients' prior physical health; (4) the method by which the abortion or
birth was effected; and (5) the degree to which the patients were able to receive post-
partum or post-abortal care.
267. See, e.g., Tietze and Lewit, A National Medical Experience: The Joint Program
for the Study of Abortion (JPSA), in OsoFsKY & OsoFsKY, supra note 248, at 12-13, 14-
20 ("A broad definition of complications.. . may produce a distorted impression of the
risk. ..."). Arguably, the contention of Tietze and Lewit would apply with equal force
to a broad definition of maternal mortality. See note 266 supra.
Evidently, Tietze and Lewit did not harbor fears of "distorted impression(s)" when
they broadly defined "pre-existing" complications to include consideration of a group of
164 women who had undergone abortion procedures although they had not been preg-
nant. Id. at 6.
268. See Simon and Senturia, Psychiatric Sequelae of Abortion, 15 AnculvEs OF
GENERAL PSYCHIATRY 378 (1966), discussed in Nigro, supra note 254, at 22, 23.
269. Id.
270. See, e.g., Tietze & Pakter, supra note 248 (mortality figures gathered from
recollections or second-hand knowledge of physicians specializing in obstetrics and
gynecology with 54.5% response from sample).
271. See e.g., Seiner and Mahoney, Coordination of Outpatient Services from
Patients Seeking Elective Abortion, CLINICAL OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY, March 1971,
at 48 (noting that 53.5% of the patients at one New York hospital were lost to
followup.); Pakter, supra note 248, at 66, 68-69 (noting that almost two-thirds of the
abortions performed in New York City were on non-residents and the followup "dilem-
ma" caused by the loss of such transient patients).
272. See note 267 supra.
273. E.g., CAL. DEP'T OF HEALTH, THERAPEUTIc ABORTION IN CALIFORNIA: A
BIENNIAL REPORT PREPARED FOR THE 1974 LEGISLATURE PURSUANT TO SECTION 25955.5
OF THE HALTH AND SAFEIY CODE (1974) (containing no information on complica-
tions); Tietze and Pakter, supra note 264 (failing to include one death, even though
"directly attributable" to the abortion).
The California Department of Public Health does not keep sufficient records on the
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tistical information should not form the basis for rigid constitutional in-
terpretations depriving the states of the power to regulate in the public
interest.
2 74
Even if a fundamental right to an abortion does exist,27 5 it cannot
be intelligently and safetly exercised with informed consent276 if all
governmental safety standards have been eliminated. Yet, the Court
stultified the access to information necessary for informed consent
when it prohibited any state regulation in the first trimester.2 77  The
Court's treatment of the health care standards imposed by the Georgia
legislature in Doe is a classic example of judicial preemption of a field
in which rigid constitutional rules are not only inappropriate, 2 7 but also
unwarranted in light of all the relevant medical data.
incidence of complications to answer requests for such information. Personal Communi-
cation, Center for Health Statistics, January 29, 1975.
274. It is ironic that the effect of the Supreme Court's invalidation of first trimester
health regulations was to eliminate the provisions of the New York City Health Code
credited with making the allegations of safety possible. See Johnson, Abortion Clinics in
City Face Rising Competition, New York Times, March 19, 1973, at 35, col. 3. That
health regulations cannot constitutionally be applied to the first trimester appears to be
settled in the lower federal courts. See, e.g., Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah
1973); Hodgson v. Anderson, 378 F. Supp. 1008 (D. Minn. 1974). For further
discussion on this topic see text accompanying notes 284-85 infra.
Perhaps the most noteworthy of the consequences of the Court's decision is to make
it virtually impossible for a state to require complete reporting, both for statistical, as
well as for followup purposes. See Doe v. Rampton, supra at 193, 197 (making details of
abortion procedures performed a matter of public record "chills" exercise of right to
privacy); Hodgson v. Anderson, supra at 1018, 1026 (regulations not reasonably related
to any valid state objective). Thus, in the future it will be a practical impossibility to
determine whether or not the Court's conclusions as to safety are supported by objective
medical fact.
275. See Part I supra.
276. See generally MnN. STAT. § 145.412(1)(4) (1973) (specifically requiring
such consent after explanation of the procedures and their effect), invalidated in
Hodgson v. Anderson, 378 F. Supp. 1008 (D. Minn. 1974) (held: unnecessary to protect
the woman's health; reliance must be placed upon clinical judgment of physician).
277. See note 275, supra.
278. The dangers of judicial tampering with legislatively devised regulatory schemes
on the basis of less-than-unanimous medical opinion were summarized in the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Burger in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 470 (1972):
The actual hazards of introducing a particular foreign substance into the
human body are frequently controverted, and I cannot believe the unanimity
of expert opinion is a prerequisite to a State's exercise of its police power, no
matter what the subject matter of the regulation. Even assuming no present
dispute among medical authorities, we cannot ignore that it has become com-
monplace for a drug or food additive to be universally regarded as harmless
on one day and to be condemned as perilous the next. It is inappropriate for
this Court to overrule a legislative classification by relying on the present con-
sensus among leading scientific authorities. The commands of the Constitu-
tion cannot fluctuate with the shifting tides of scientific opinion.
Id. at 470 (emphasis added).
See generally, Blank, The Delaney Clause: Technical Naivet6 and Scientific Advocacy in
the Formulation of Public Health Policies, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1084 (1975).
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1. Lochner Revisited
The Court's restrictions on state regulatory power in the context
of abortion are not without precedent, however. The now-discredited
Lochner79 series of cases evinces similar judicial second-guessing of
legislative reasoning. In Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan280 the Court
struck down a law aimed at eliminating short-weight loaves of bread.
In support of its ruling the Court reasoned that "it is contrary to com-
mon experience and unreasonable to assume that there could be any
danger of [consumer] deception" from such practices.28' Clearly the
law questioned in Burns was not invalid on its face; it merely sought
to protect consumers from deception by short weight. It was held in-
valid only because Nebraska had failed to convince the Court that the
law was necessary.
By setting up procedures by which state or federal legislative judg-
ments are tested for constitutional validity by judicially created stand-
ards of "necessity," the Court sets itself up as a super-legislature. The
Court followed this procedure in Doe v. Bolton when it held that
Georgia had to "show more than it [did]"28 2 in order to prove the
necessity of its health regulations. If a woman seeking an abortion
may fairly be classified as a consumer of medical services, the Court's
invalidation of legislation and administrative regulations designed to
protect her can only be based on the same type of judicial disagreement
with legislative judgment which characterized the decision in Jay
Burns.
2. Roadblocks to Free Access?
Although the "roadblock" argument has been made in several re-
cent cases invalidating state regulatory schemes, the courts accepting
the contention have failed to show why the health regulations unrea-
sonably or restrictively burdened access; 288 the regulations themselves
are surely not unreasonable on their face.284  Moreover, the lower
courts have adopted Roe's rigidity, and have opted for an extremely
279. E.g., Jay Burns v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924); Adkins v. Children's Hospital,
261 U.S. 525 (1922); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
280. 264 U.S. 504 (1924).
281. Id. at 517.
282. Doe, 410 U.S. at 195.
283. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Anderson, 378 F. Supp. 1008 (D. Minn. 1974).
284. See e.g., 17 CAL. ADMrN. CODE §§ 400-488 (1974), Minn. Health Dep't Regs.
271-288 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Minn. Regs.], invalidated in Hodgson v. Anderson,
378 F. Supp. 1008, 1018 (D. Minn. 1974) (virtually identical to those of California and
New York City - held: as a whole, not reasonably related to maternal health); New
York City Health Code, tit. 1H, art. 42 (1970) [hereinafter cited as N.Y.C. Health
Code].
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mechanistic interpretation of its trimester approach without considering
the independent validity of the ends sought to be attained by the regu-
lations: the courts have concluded that any law not excluding the first
trimester from regulation is automatically invalid.
2 8 5
Although the lower courts are bound by both the letter and spirit
of the Supreme Court's inflexible rules, the fear of reversal should not
force blind judicial acceptance of the Roe criteria. Each case must be
evaluated on its own merits. Unless judicial self-restraint is employed,
a set of judicially devised rules which are not only unsupported by basic
medical fact but which may also be constitutionally infirm as overbroad
judicial restrictions of legitimate state power to protect the health of
pregnant women will have been erected. These rules may be virtually
impervious to modification.
It is true that legislative enactments which seek to regulate con-
stitutionally protected areas must be narrowly drawn in order to effec-
tuate a legitimate state or federal purpose. But the protection of ma-
ternal health is clearly such a legitimate state or federal legislative func-
tion.2 80
285. Hodgson v. Anderson, 378 F. Supp. 1008, 1018 (D. Minn. 1974):
The regulations are completely without constitutional foundation insofar as
they may be applied to facilities involved in administering to first trimester
abortions. The words of Roe are unequivocal--"free of interference by the
State". This must mean all interference of whatever form . . . except. . . in
the context of its right to generally regulate professional [medical] standards.
Examples of some of the regulations invalidated on the basis of the Roe opinion's
conclusion that early abortion is now "relatively safe" are instructive. The state may not,
for example, specifically require that abortion clinics performing first trimester abortions
possess: (1) laboratory facilities capable of performing tests to determine blood group-
ings and Rh types. E.g., Minn. Regs. 274(5) (aa); N.Y.C. Health Code, § 42.19(a); (2)
emergency transportation arrangements with neighboring hospitals, e.g., Minn. Regs.
274(7); (3) minimum nursing personnel standards, e.g., Minn. Regs. 276(c), N.Y.C.
Health Code, § 42.27; or (4) detailed reporting and record keeping practices, e.g., Minn.
Regs. 281-282, N.Y.C. Health Code, §§ 204.03, 204.05.
286. The "fundamental" nature of the asserted right to procure an abortion and the
existence of a corresponding fundamental right of a physician to perform it have been
recognized. See Roe at 162-64; Doe at 197. However, it does not follow from the
application of a higher standard of review that the Court's restrictions upon state power
to regulate the procedures during the first trimester were necessary to protect these
rights. Past rulings of the Court have left little doubt that the government may impose
incidental regulations upon fundamental constitutional rights by restricting their non-
fundamental elements if the regulations: (1) are within the power of the government;
(2) further a substantial or important governmental interest; (3) are unrelated to the
exercise of the constitutional right; and (4) are no broader than necessary to obtain the
desired result. Accord, O'Brien v. United States, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). Aside from the
committee, GA. CObB ANN. § 22-1202(5) (1972), and residency, id. § 22-1202(1)
(1972), requirements, the regulations involved in Doe did not, on their face, run afoul of
the foregoing criteria and their application under the access rules of Roe had yet to be
observed.
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This reasoning applies with equal, if not greater, force to the pro-
nouncements of the judiciary. It is incumbent upon the judicial
branch, especially at the appellate level, to tailor the relief granted in
a particular case to the specific evils to be excised from the legislative
program in question. The very real medical risks attendant upon abor-
tions, including those performed in the first trimester, more than suf-
fice to support a comprehensive scheme of regulations aimed at pro-
viding the maximum amount of protection for those who seek to exer-
cise the prerogatives granted to them by the Court.
If the government has the power to protect a draft card during
an exercise of free speech,28 7 it also should have the power to protect
a pregnant woman who seeks an abortion, regardless of the duration
of the pregnancy. The relevant question in this area is not whether an
early abortion is "safe," but rather, in the words of Justice Holmes,
whether or not the prohibition or regulation in question imposes an
"unreasonable burden" upon the exercise of the protected activity. 288
Even assuming that first trimester abortions are less dangerous than
those performed later in pregnancy, regulations to ensure the safety of
the early procedures are not therefore invalid per se. Small wonder
that Mr. Justice Rehnquist was prompted to comment in dissent:
Unless I misapprehend the consequences of this transplanting of the
"compelling state interest test", the Court's opinion will accomplish
the seemingly impossible feat of leaving this area of the law more
confused than it found it.2s9
H
ROE AND DOE: AREAS OF UNCERTAINTY
In the heat of the current controversy over the immediate impact
of Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton, little has been written concerning
their implications in the future development of two areas of the law:
(1) the rights of the medical profession as enunciated by the Court
in Roe and Doe; and (2) the rights of the unborn when they do not
conflict with those of the mother.
A. The Rights of the Medical Profession
An intriguing facet of Mr. Justice Blackmun's opinions for the
Court in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton are his passing references
to the physician's right to practice the profession with a minimum of
287. O'Brien v. United States, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (draft card burning).
288. Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 513 (1924) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
289. Roe, 410 U.S. at 173 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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governmental interference. The statement can be viewed in either of
two ways: first, the asserted right of the physician to prescribe and
perform medical services, including abortions, is an adjunct of the
woman's right to seek and to procure medical advice and treatment or,
second, the right is personal to the physician. If viewed as a necessary
consequence of what is, in the Court's opinion, a fundamental right of
women, the right of the physician to administer such services rests upon
the same assumptions which underlie the asserted rights of the woman.
The right of the physician would then be contingent upon the validity
of the right from which it is derived. If, on the other hand, the right
of the physician to practice according to his professional judgment is
sui generis, the Court has broken new ground.
Since the Court merely mentions the "right to practice!' in the
course of its opinions in Roe and Doe, without further comment or ex-
planation,2 90 one is left floundering in an attempt to divine either its
source or parameters. In a rather straightforward statement of its posi-
tion, however, the Court recognized the right as follows:
[Roe v. Wade] vindicates the right of the physician to administer
medical treatment according to his professional judgment up to the
point where important state interests provide compelling justifications
for intervention.
291
Setting aside the question of where in the constitution such a right
might be found (e.g., fourteenth amendment "liberty," privacy, etc.),
we are told that any infringement of the right requires a "compelling"
state justification. This holding would appear to be based upon the
notion that this "right" to practice according to one's professional judg-
ment must then be "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental"--in short, a constitutional
right. But what are the implications of such a right?
As the position of the medical profession throughout the recent
controversy over abortion shows,292 the well-intentioned physician may
sometimes find it difficult to square the perceived needs of patients
with the letter of the law.2 93 As a result, there develops a clamor for
290. Roe, 410 U.S. at 165-66; Doe, 410 U.S. at 199.
291. Roe, 410 U.S. at 165-66 (emphasis supplied).
292. Roe, 410 U.S. at 143 (discussing the position of the American Medi-
cal Association). But see House of Delegates, Louisiana State Medical Soc'y, Res.
No. 600-Abortion, adopted at Monroe, La., May 1973:
Resolved, That the Louisiana State Medical Society repeats its conviction that
the deliberate interruption of pregnancy at any stage, except for the purpose
of saving the life of the mother, is reprehensible and in violation of the ethical
principles which must govern the conduct of members of our profession.
293. This is so notwithstanding the fact that the medical profession itself was
responsible for a great deal of the pressure leading to the adoption of restrictive statutory
schemes concerning abortion. Until 1970, the traditional position of the American
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change in an attempt to make the law responsive to these needs. 20 4
In the case of abortion, a successful campaign was waged by mem-
bers of the medical profession and others to eliminate the legal im-
pediments to what many of them considered to be a necessary and de-
sirable medical procedure. When legislative action to change the laws
was slow in coming, those favoring change found the courts a willing
vehicle through which it could be accomplished.205
The same legal and ethical dilemmas which face the physician in
regard to abortion also face the medical profession in such areas as
euthanasia, selective abortion 290 and fetal experimentation.20 7  The Su-
Medical Association had been that abortion should be prohibited since it involves the
taking of human life. See 12 TRANS. A.M.A. 73-77 (1859) (unanimous resolution of the
Twelfth Annual Meeting condemning abortion as the "unwarrantable destruction of
human life."); Quimby, Introduction to Medical Jurisprudence, 9 J.A.M.A. 164 (1887);
Markham, Foeticide and Its Prevention, 11 J.A.M.A. 805 (1888). See generally
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, DIGEST OF OFFICIAL ACTIONS 66 (Blasingame ed.
1959) (listing the repeated attacks of the A.M.A. on abortion).
294. The medical profession has changed its views concerning the advisability of
legalized abortion. See, e.g., Proceedings of the A.M.A. House of Delegates 40-51 (June
1970) discussed in Roe, 410 U.S. at 142-43; California Medical Assn., Where We Stand
1 (rev. ed. 1974) (position paper) (abortion is a medical procedure and should be a
matter between a woman and her physician). However, it has never repudiated its
position that abortion is the taking of human life. CALIFORNIA MEDICINE, supra note 24,
at 68 (expressly recognizing abortion as the taking of human life).
295. At first, abortion statutes were challenged on grounds of vagueness, a theory
consistent with the belief that wider access to abortion is both necessary and socially
desirable. Thus, a plausible argument could be made that a statute allowing abortion only
when "necessary" to preseve the life or health of the mother is unconstituionally vague
when there is no set definition of terms such as "necessity," "life," or "health."
Inevitably, some courts found the argument persuasive and some laws were struck down.
E.g., People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 934, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970). Others were interpreted broadly enough to permit abor-
tions for nearly any reason. E.g., United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1972) (District
of Columbia abortion statute). Most such efforts, however, were unsuccessful. E.g.,
Rosen v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 318 F. Supp. 1217 (E.D. La.,
1970), vacated mem., 412 U.S. 902 (1974); Stienberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741 (N.D.
Ohio, 1970); Kudish v. Board of Registration of Medicine, 356 Mass. 98, 248 N.E.2d
264 (1969); State v. Moretti, 52 N.J. 182, 244 A.2d 499 (1969), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
952 (1969).
The courts rejecting the vagueness argument recognized it as little more than a
narrow means by which to avoid forcing a stand on a broader and infinitely more
sensitive issue. See Stienberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741, 744-45 (N.D. Ohio 1970)
(by implication). It was not until the parties began to assert the substantive interests
of the litigants, both doctor and patient, that they were successful in having the laws
invalidated. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
296. The term "selective abortion" refers to abortion for purely eugenic reasons,
ranging from the desire to eliminate certain physical traits brought about by faulty gene
structures (e.g., hemophilia), to the avoidance of producing offspring with given sex or
racial characteristics.
297. Among these are: (1) the legal definition of death, (2) euthanasia and the
related concept of "Death with Dignity;" (3) genetic selection and experimentation; and
(4) human experimentation (prenatal or postnatal).
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preme Court's holdings in Roe and Doe regarding a physician's rights,
if taken at face value, support the conclusion that the physician's right
to practice is sui generis and "fundamental." This was the position
taken in the briefs.298 Thus, there is no meaningful guidance as to
the manner in which these dilemmas are to be resolved in situations
where a physician, either as plaintiff or defendant, asserts that the in-
terests of his patient, society as a whole, or his professional judgment
require judicial modification of the law. Since the Court required that
the state's interest be "compelling" before it may interfere with the
physician's professional judgment, it does not seem unrealistic to pre-
dict that, given the right series of facts, just such a judicial modification
of the law might occur.2 99
The opinion of the California Medical Association (C.M.A.)
lends credence to such a view by its frank recognition of the issues in-
In addition to these areas, one might foresee legal problems arising from homicides
caused by abortion, where a physician invokes the defense that his or her actions were
consistent with good medical practice and that they were in the interest of the woman
procuring the abortion. To what extent is the "right to practice" infringed by state
protection of the unborn? The Supreme Court was apparently content to leave the details
of the abortion procedure to the "best clinical judgment" of the attending physician. See
Doe, 410 U.S. at 199. The lower courts have apparently found this deference to be
conclusive. See Hodgson v. Anderson, 378 F. Supp. 1008, 1017 (D. Minn. 1974) (the
state must leave the determination of "viability" to the best clinical judgment of the
physician). See generally Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224 (D. Conn. 1973) (defining a
"successful" abortion as one in which fetal death is assured).
Although a thorough discussion of these topics is beyond the scope of this work,
several will be mentioned in passing. See generally Louisell, Biology, Law and Reason:
Man as Self-Creator, 16 AM. J. JuRISPRuDENCE 1 (1971); Louisell, Euthanasia and
Biathanasia: On Dying and Killing, 22 CATH. U.L. REV. 723 (1973); Williams, Our
Role in the Generation, Modification, and Termination of Life, THE ARcHIVEs OF
INTERNAL MEDICiNE, August 1969, at 215; CALIFORNIA MEDICINE, supra note 24, at 68
(editorial comment). In this regard see also Fletcher, The Ethics of Abortion, 14
CLINICAL OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1124, 1128, 1129 (1971):
It is not life as such we are committed to, but human life [in the evaluational
rather than the biological context]. We reject the classical sanctity-of-life
ethics and embrace the quality-of-life ethics. We are personists not humanists.
[WMe ought to be putting our heads together to see what criteria for being
"human" we can fairly well agree upon. It's worth a try. Medical initiative
is at stake in both abortion and euthanasia and the problem ethically is the
same. (italics in original).
298. Brief for The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists as Amicus
Curiae in support of Appellants, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
299. A judicial modification of the law is not limited to holding the governing
statute invalid. By refusing to punish a convicted defendant with anything but the most
minor sentence, a court effectively destroys the law's force as applied to a given
situation. See, e.g., NEwswnE, March 3, 1975, at 23 (physician convicted of postabortal
manslaughter, maximum sentence 20 years-sentence imposed: one year probation);
Lambert, Mercy Killings, San Francisco Chronicle, March 31, 1975, at 12, col. 5 (South
African physician convicted of murder after "mercy killing," one year sentence suspend-
ed to 56 seconds).
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volved.300 While agreeing that the "traditional Western ethic has al-
ways placed a great emphasis on the intrinsic worth and equal value
of every human life," 0' 1 an editorial in the C.M.A.'s publication, Cali-
fornia Medicine, suggests a "new ethic" which would place a relative
value upon the life of the individual and suggests further that:
Medicine's role with respect to changing attitudes toward abortion
will be a prototype of what is to occur .... One may anticipate
further developments of these roles as problems of birth control and
birth selection are extended, inevitably to death selection and death
control, whether by the individual or by society, and further public
and professional determination of when and when not to use scarce
resources. 30
2
The stakes in an issue such as "death selection" are immense, and
their fair apportionment should only come about through public debate
unclouded by the claims of any one profession to vague rights or im-
munities based upon their best judgment or professional "expertise."
Inevitably, difficult choices will have to be made, but extreme care
must be taken lest those choices be made without prior examination
of their consequences. Such has been the experience with abortion,
for the decisions in the abortion cases do little to resolve the many com-
peting interests involved.
B. The Rights of the Unborn
The post-Roe controversy over abortion differs markedy from any-
thing previously experienced on the issue because of the Court's tri-
mester-based approach to the resolution of competing interests. The
biological artificiality of the trimesters8 has resulted in substantial con-
troversy in those cases where the biological reality of prenatal life
comes into conflict with its legal status.
In its attempt to avoid deciding the point at which life begins, the
Court, in effect, held that the rights of the person do not attach until
live birth.30 4 Thus, in terms of fetal interests, the point of viability is
virtually irrelevant; the unborn have no rights. During the post-via-
bility period the state may seek to vindicate only its own interest in
their preservation, but it is not required to do so, and if it does its power
to restrict the availability of legal abortion is severely limited by this
broadly worded "life and health exception."
300. CALroRNA MEDiciNE, supra note 24, at 68.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 69. One need not reflect on this quote for any great length of time to
appreciate the significance of the term "death selection," especially when the "selecting"
is to be done by "society."
303. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
304. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-63.
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As recent developments have shown,805 the trimester approach of
the Court gives no guidance as to the steps a state may take to protect
the post-viable unborn. The recent conviction of a physician for homi-
cide committed during a late-gestation abortion a requires a careful
examination of a fundamental, but little discussed, question: what is
the purpose of an abortion?307 Is it to destroy the unborn, or merely
to terminate an unwanted pregnancy by physically separating mother
from child? The latter purpose appears the preferable choice, but
some courts apparently disagree.30 8 These questions taken on new
relevance as the states attempt to supplant the protection once offered
the unborn by their abortion statutes, with similar protection under the
law of homicide. 09
Much of the difficulty, it appears, lies in the legal classifications
which appear to have resulted from the Court's opinion in Roe. When
do the unborn become persons? The answer of Roe appears to be at
the point of live birth. The answers to the many questions which result
from this formulation, however, are far from clear.
1. The Concept of Viability
The inquiry begins with the concept of "viability." Making a
judgment on the medical evidence presented in the briefs,3 10 the Court
305. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Anderson, 378 F. Supp. 1008 (D. Minn. 1974).
306. Commonwealth v. Edelin, Crim. No. 81823 (Super. CL Suffolk County, Mass.,
filed Feb. 15, 1975), on appeal, No. 81823 (Ct. App. Suffolk County, Mass., filed July 1,
1975).
307. Abortion, both spontaneous and induced, is defined as follows:
Abortion is the termination of a pregnancy at any time before the fetus has
attained a stage of viability. Interpretations of the word "viability" have
varied between fetal weights of 400g (about 20 weeks of gestation) and 1,000g
(about 28 weeks of gestation) . . . . Although our smallest surviving infant
weighed 540g at birth, survival even at 700 or 800g is unusual.
L. HELLMAN & J. PRrrcHAR, WILLIAMS OBsTETRIcs 493 (14th ed. 1971). Since the 1971
edition of the foregoing source, an infant weighing less than 400 grams has survived.
TIME, March 31, 1975, at 82.
308. See Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224 (D. Conn. 1973) (defining a "success-
ful" abortion as one in which the fetus is destroyed).
309. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Edelin, Crim. No. 81823 (Super. Ct., Suffolk
County, Mass., filed Feb. 15, 1975, on appeal, No. 81823 (Ct. App., Suffolk County,
Mass., filed July 1, 1975). Thus, the law relating to abortion has come full circle from its
early common law beginnings. The report of The Twinslayer's Case, Anonymous, Y.B.
Mich. 1 Edw. 3, f. 23 pl. 18 (1327) (text accompanying note 79 supra), though not a
precedent, reveals that the writ of homicide was employed to summon one charged with
killing an unborn child. See note 82 supra. This fact is not without relevance to present
day adjudication regarding the steps a state may take to protect the unborn in the post-
viability period. Clearly, the difficulty-of-proof problem which beset the early common
law is of little relevance to current medical and legal standards.
310. See Brief for American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology as Amicus
Curiae, at 7, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Brief of Certain Physicians, Professors
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decided that viability usually occurs at 28 weeks, but may even occur
as early as 24 weeks."' Indeed, relevant medical data amply support
the Court's position, but only if viability is defined as the point beyond
which survival after premature termination of gestation becomes highly
likely. The concept of viability is not a static one. It differs for each
individual and does not reflect a particularized state of being. Rather,
it reflects the ability of an organism to cope with its environment and
to survive in a hostile atmosphere with a minimal amount of outside
support. To place the concept in an adult setting, an individual
stranded without water or nourishment in the middle of a desert may
fairly be termed "potentially" viable312 up until the point at which "ac-
tual" viability is proved by survival. 813
In the case of the unborn, the environmental conditions are simi-
larly adverse if gestation is terminated prematurely. The degree of
outside support necessary to preserve the life of a premature infant
varies inversely with the length of gestation prior to birth. As medical
science makes further advances in the specialities of fetology, embry-
ology, and perinatology the point of "viability" will continually be re-
adjusted downard until the point at which the development of an arti-
ficial placenta would spell its coincidence with conception.
If the "compelling" point at which the state may exert its interests
in the protection of the lives of the unborn is placed at viability, that
point moves closer to the time of conception with each development
in the treatment of prenatal and neonatal problems. Already the
Court's guidelines are obsolete; viability has occurred even prior to 20
weeks in an infant weighing approximately 395 grams.3 4 Although
such occurrences are rare, they will surely increase as science advances.
Given all this, is the Court's rigid definition of viability to be given a
frozen legal meaning separate and distinct from its commonly accepted
and continually changing biological meaning?" If so, what would
and Fellows of the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology as Amicus Curiae, at
6-24, id.
311. Roe, 410 U.S. at 160.
312. The Court itself defined "viable" as "potentially able to live outside of the
mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid." Id.
313. The term "potential" is used here to reflect the existence of a chance that
viability may or may not actually be achieved. Identical terminology was employed by
the Minnesota legislature when it set the point of "potential" viability at approximately
20 weeks of gestation. See MINN. STAT. § 145.411(2) (1973), ruled unconstitutional,
Hodgson v. Anderson, 378 F. Supp. 1008 (D. Minn. 1974).
314. See note 307 supra.
315. In Hodgson v. Anderson, 378 F. Supp. 1008 (1974), the Court adopted a rigid
trimester approach, construing the Supreme Court's statements on viability as absolute
constitutional lines of demarcation limiting the exercise of state power to protect the
unborn. Thus, 24 weeks was set as the absolute lower limit of viability, the court stating
unequivocally that it does not occur prior to this time.
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support such a distinction? 16
2. Legal Terminology and the Unborn
Even more difficult than the questions surrounding the viability
concept is the legal weight which seems to have attached to the varied
terminology used to describe the unborn. At what stage does a fetus
cease to be a fetus? When does it become a person? Of course, under
Roe the obvious answer is: when it is born. But, when does birth
occur? Is birth to be defined as physical separation of the fetus from
its mother, or redefined to be the point at which a pregnancy is ter-
minated by delivery of a "wanted" child? What then of "unwanted"
pregnancies? Would the termination of such a pregnancy which results
in a live infant's being separated from its mother produce a "person"
or merely a live fetus? Is "fetus" a term which has taken on a legal
significance of its own in the wake of Roe? In short, is the personhood
of the infant which survives an abortion to be determined on the basis
of its status as "wanted" or "unwanted"?
31 7
316. The only rational basis which could be put forward in this area is that a
flexible standard interferes with the Court's grant of the right to procure an abortion.
This contention is easily set at rest, however, once the purpose of the abortion process
itself is identified. If the purpose of an abortion is always to kill the fetus, state
intervention in the process on behalf of the unborn in the period prior to viability would
be unconstitutional under Roe. If this be the case, then Roe must be taken to require that
viability be defined narrowly in order to vindicate what would then have to be termed
the right to destroy one's unborn offspring. Cf. Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224 (D.
Conn. 1972).
The better view, however, would be to define abortion as the physical separation of
mother and child. In such a case the woman's interests in termination of an unwanted
pregnancy would be vindicated without interfering with the interests of her unborn
offspring. Under such a policy, any legislative or judicial rule hampering the effectuation
of the latter set of interests would not be related to any valid legislative or judicial policy.
See e.g., MINN. STAT. § 145.412(3) (3) (1974) (requiring that, to the extent consistent
with good medical practice, abortions after 20 weeks must be performed in a manner
reasonably assuring live birth and survival of the fetus), ruled unconstitutional, Hodgson
v. Anderson, 378 F. Supp. 1008, 1016 (D. Minn. 1974) (not reasonably related to ma-
ternal health and unnecessary in light of professional medical standards).
317. The concept of "unwantedness," although considered a crucial indication for
legal abortion, is not supported by direct evidence showing it to be a real problem for the
children involved; being unwanted does not lead inexorably to adverse reactions. Pohl-
man, Unwanted Conception: Research on Undesirable Consequences. 14 EUGENICS
QUARTERLY 143 (1967); Forssman & Thuwe, One Hundred and twenty Children Born
After Therapeutic Abortion Refused: Their Mental and Social Adjustment Up to the Age
of 21, 42 AcrA PSYCHIATRiCA SCANDInAViCA 71 (1966); Jackson, The Question of Family
Homeostasis, 31 PsYcHIATwc Q. Supp. 79 (1957). The foregoing sources are discussed in
Nigro, A Scientific Critique of Abortion as a Medical Procedure, PsycMTRuc ANNALS,
September 1972, at 22. See also David & Friedman, Psychosocial Research in Abortion:
A Transnational Perspective, in OsoFsKY & OsoFsKY, supra note 248, at 310, 316-18.
The problems caused a woman by an unwanted pregnancy or the birth of an
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The questions raised in the preceding paragraph represent real is-
sues as more becomes known of abortifacient techniques and their rela-
tive safety. Would it be permissible for a state to require that certain
abortifacient techniques be employed if they offer a substantially
greater chance of survival to the unborn? The answer under Roe ap-
pears to be in the affirmative, as long as such techniques do not offer
greater hazards to the life or health of the mother. 18 But what if the
techniques which almost always assure fetal death are also extremely
dangerous to the mother? 19 May a state validly forbid their use?8 20
Even if the result is an increase in the number of "live borns"?
821
Perhaps one approach to these questions would be simply to assure that
all abortions are performed during the very early gestational period.
But a governmental policy embodying such restrictions is precluded by
the Court's determination that outright prohibition of abortions after
the first trimester is unconstitutional. Thus, this approach does not of-
fer any guidance where the late or mid-trimester abortion is performed.
Neither does it offer any solution to the problems which must be faced
when medical advances lower the point of viability to the extent that
"unwanted" child are not immune to treatment by means other than abortion. Nigro,
supra note 254 at 37-38 (suggesting psychosocial help as an alternative).
318. The writer's suggestions as to answers to these questions may be identified by
reference to Part V.
319. Two examples of such methods are abortion by use of the "super coil," a series
of plastic strips which are inserted into the uterine cavity in order to induce the
expulsion of the fetus; and saline-amniotic fluid exchange, a process which involves
removing a portion of the amniotic fluid surrounding the fetus and replacing it with
hypertonic saline solution. The saline is ingested by the fetus and causes its death by
poisoning and dehydration; it is then delivered in normal fashion. The total complication
rates for the two procedures were reported as follows: Super Coil-60.0%; Saline-
27.9%. HEW CENTER FOn DISEASE CONTROL, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Rep.
(22) 18: 159-60 (May 5, 1973), in ABORTION SURVEILLANCE: ANNUAL SUMMARY 1972,
Table 20 (April 1974).
320. Saline abortions are no longer performed in Japan due to the high number of
fatalities associated with this method. FAMILY PLANNING FEDERATION OF JAPAN, HARM-
sw_ EFFEcTs OF INDUCED ABORTION 4 (1966) (translated from the Japanese). A statute
mandating abandonment of this practice in the United States would not preclude the
abortion, merely the destruction of the child. The Court did not hold that the state has
no interest in the preservation of the unborn even if they are not "viable." It merely held
that the state's interest in protecting the fetus before viability is not sufficiently
"compelling" to prohibit a woman's choice to terminate her pregnancy. Some courts have
apparently misconstrued the extent of the Court's holding, for they have invalidated just
such a law. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Anderson, 378 F. Supp. 1008 (D. Minn. 1974). See also
Hallmark Clinic v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 380 F. Supp. 1153
(E.D.N.C. 1974) (three-judge court).
321. A common complaint about the growing use of prostaglandins, agents which
induce contraction of the uterus, is that they result in an increase in the number of live
born infants. This fact is considered by some to be a "significant clinical disadvantage"
over the use of saline, which nearly always results in fetal death. See Guttmacher, Medi-
cal Aspects of the Abortion Experience, in OsoFsKY & OsoFsKY, supra note 248, at 535,
540-41.
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the trimester formulation collapses entirely. Again, using current tech-
niques as a referent, the problems caused by the Court's overly rigid
approach to the question might be avoided by reference to the
"health" exception to the state's interests after "viability," 322 but
only to the extent to which science is unable to perfect a "relatively
safe" method of early termination which also assures the survival of
the unborn child.
3. Experimentation: A Related Issue
The same problems arise in the area of fetal experimentation, a
subject somewhat beyond the scope of this Comment. The related
problems of abortion and experimentation will only be mentioned in
order to demonstrate their identity. The difficulties in both areas arise
from the legal status of the unborn, which may be alive both before
and after it has been removed from its mother. Regardless of whether
the individual becomes a "persof' immediately upon separation from
the mother, 23 it seems difficult to consider post-termination experi-
mentation upon living infants, at least where not directly beneficial
to the individual involved, as anything but a gross violation of individual
rights. Even condemned criminals are not forced to undergo life-
jeopardizing experiments without their consent: the very young are
entitled to equal solicitude. The consent of the mother in such a case
could hardly be considered appropriate; since her desire is to terminate
an unwanted pregnancy, her concern is obviously not directed to the
welfare of the child.1
24
Pre-termination experimentation presents different problems. Roe
v. Wade supplied no answers for situations where the interests of
the unborn are set against those of a third party, or of society as a
whole; Roe and Doe addressed only the conflict between maternal and
state interests in the preservation of the unborn. It can hardly be al-
leged that the state would have no rational basis for rules prohibiting
all such experimentation where not beneficial to the subject; the sub-
jects are unquestionably human beings 2 5 and are unquestionably
322. This assumes, of course, that extraction insuring survival would be more
dangerous to the mother's health than other methods which might be utilized.
323. Physical separation has historically been defined as "birth." As long as the
individual is alive at birth, it is a person. Roe does not hold to the contrary; it is wholly
silent on the subject. Were the status of "person" to depend upon ability to survive (i.e.
"viability"), Roe would indeed have implications far beyond abortion; human inability to
survive because of physiological problems is not limited to the time immediately after
birth.
324. Cf. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Memo-
rial Hospital v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964);
In the Interest of Kenneth Clark, 185 N.E.2d 128, 131 (Ohio Common Pleas 1962).
325. Any member of the species Homo sapiens is biologically a human being, the
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alive;126 Roe merely denied them the legal status of "person." A judi-
cial interposition of a compelling state interest requirement to justify
limits on pre-termination experimentation would mean that the courts
are willing to extend the basic rationale of Roe and Doe as it relates
to professional medical interests to an explicit recognition of a consti-
tutional right to practice medicine which would include the prerogative
of human experimentation, wholly independent of the woman's interest
in procuring an abortion. The ramifications of such a policy are dis-
cussed more fully in Part IV.
Thus, we have seen that the decisions in the abortion cases have
done little, if anything, to offer a meaningful solution to the central is-
sue of the abortion controversy: the rights of the unborn. In the fol-
lowing sections of this work, several proposals for reform will be identi-
fied and discussed, with particular emphasis upon some of the con-
siderations which should influence any decisions on their merits.
IV
CURRENT STATUS OF THE ABORTION CONTROVERSY
One may assume, and justifiably so, that the decisions in the abor-
tions cases have done little, if anything, to put an end to the abortion
controversy. Although there are some differences in their reasoning,
most opponents of the Supreme Court's decision agree on one thing-
the Court went too far.8 27  The exact nature of one's disagreement
unborn are Homo sapiens because they have two human parents. Any other definition of
"human" reflects subjective evaluation rather than biological fact.
326. As an organism, the unborn individual is alive; an organism can only be alive
or dead, there is no mediate state. See note 24 supra. By use of the term "potential life,"
one does not refer to a biological state of being, but rather to a perception of "life" as
something more than merely being "alive."
327. E.g., Byrne, The Supreme Court on Abortion: An American Tragedy, 41
FORDHAm L. REv. 803 (1973); Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v.
Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Ely]; Epstein, Substantive Due
Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup. Or. REv. 159, [hereinafter
cited as Epstein]. Professor Ely summed up his dissatisfaction in the following manner:
"[Roe v. Wade is] a very bad decision .... It is bad because it is bad constitutional
law, or rather becausue it is not constitutional law and gives almost no sense of an
obligation to try to be." Ely at 947 [emphasis in original]. Professor Epstein was even
more emphatic:
Mr. Justice Blackmun cannot take comfort in the bland declaration that the
Court "need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins," and still
invoke a notion of privacy to decide the case. It may be well to note that
philosophers, theologians, and physicians all have not reached agreement on
the matter, but they do not have, nor do they pretend to have, the power to
decide the question for us all. The Court admits to their ignorance. It is too
much to ask the Court to share their impotence? . . .
Roe v. Wade is symptomatic of the analytical poverty possible in constitu-
tional fitigation. . . . The foes of abortion may not have sufficient strength
to overturn Roe v. Wade by constitutional amendment. But if they fail, it will
not be because they are persuaded by anything the Court said.
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with the Court's conclusions depends, of course, upon the perspective
from which one approaches the decisions. In the pages which follow,
some of the major proposals for change will be identified and discussed
in some detail. Although such treatment is by no means exhaustive
of the range of views on the subject, it is hoped that, at the very least,
these proposals will not remain shrouded in a veil of emotionalism un-
conducive to public consideration of their merits.
A. Public Opinion as a Motivating Factor for Change
For a year after the decisions in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton
were handed down the question of legal abortion appeared to be one
of settled policy-or at least that was the hope.328 Unlike many Su-
preme Court decisions on controversial issues, however, it was not im-
mediately apparent that the decisions in the abortion cases would be
accepted. To be expected were the myriad articles appearing in both
professional and popular journals reacting to the unprecedented and
far-reaching decision of the Court. Less foreseeable, but not totally
unanticipated, were the "grass roots" reactions of both pro- and anti-
abortion groups.329 It is this "grass roots" movement, especially on the
part of the anti-abortion forces, which has led to the ever-increasing
movement in Congress as well as in the state legislatures to force the
issue into the public forum once again.
For pro-abortion forces, the development of widespread public ac-
ceptance of the concept of legalized abortion was crucial if the newly
defined constitutional right to procure an abortion were to remain se-
cure. As a result, numerous constitutional challenges were mounted
against state abortion laws, abortion clinics were set up, and pressure
was applied to state and local medical and hospital associations to as-
sure the availability of the newly legalized service. 3 0
Similarly, anti-abortion groups saw the abortion cases as calls to
action. It took only eight days from the date the decisions were handed
Epstein at 176, 184, 185.
328. See, e.g., Sanders, Enemies of Abortion (HmAPEl'S MAGAZINE, March 1974, at
26; Means, Slow Action on Abortion, San Francisco Examiner, March 14, 1974, at 38,
col. 7-8. See also Daily Californian, April 2, 1974, at 1, col. 1 (U.C. Berkeley);
NEWSWEEK, February 4, 1974, at 57.
329. For a discussion of the various tactics employed by organizations on both sides
of the issue see Otten, Highly Combustible, Wall Street Journal, October 17, 1974, at 18,
col. 3 (Pacific Coast ed.); Otten, Abortion, Wall Street Journal, March 20, 1975, at 22,
col. 3 (Eastern ed.).
330. See, e.g., Doe v. Hale Hospital, 500 F.2d 144 (1st Cir. 1974); Nyberg v. City
of Virginia (Minn.), 495 F.2d 1342 (8th Cir. 1974); Word v. Poelker, 495 F.2d 1349
(8th Cir. 1974); Doe v. Tamer, 361 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D. Iowa 1924); Montalvo v. Co-
lon, 377 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Puerto Rico 1974).
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down for the first proposed Human Life amendment to be introduced
in the House of Representatives,"3 ' while on the state and local levels
further actions were planned and carried out, both in the legislatures
and in public forums.881 2 An example of such action was pressure ex-
erted by the many "Right to Life" and other anti-abortion groups upon
state legislators for the most restrictive laws possible under the Su-
preme Court's ruling.3 s Of major concern in this area were the
numerous "freedom of conscience" statutes designed to assure the right
of an individual or institution to refuse to participate in abortions,
3 4
a right perceived by many pro-life advocates to be endangered by the
demands of those desiring immediate access to the service.83 5
One of the most notable developments in the growing movement
to restrict the sweep of the Court's decision was the attempt by Rhode
Island to circumvent the ruling of the Supreme Court by statutory enact-
ment.8"8 Although the statute was quickly overturned as inconsistent
with Roe v. Wade,1 7 the statute was intended to accomplish two goals:
(1) to define, as a matter of legislative policy, the point at which
human life "begins," and (2) to include the unborn offspring of human
beings in the class of "persons" referred to in the fourteenth amend-
ment."3 The import of the attempt was clear, for it reflected in con-
331. H.RJ. Rns. 261, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reintroduced as H.R.J. REs. 187,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
332. See Otten, Highly Combustible, Wall Street Journal, October 17, 1974, at 18,
col. 3 (Pacific Coast ed.).
333. See, e.g., OHIO RaV. CODE §§ 2701.15, 2919.14, 3701.431 (1974); UTAH CODE
§§ 76-7-301 to 76-7-320 (1973).
334. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 300a-7 (1973); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25955
(West Supp. 1974); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 § 201 (1974); IA. REv. STAT., §§ 40:
1299.31-1299.34 (1974); Oino REv. CODE §§ 4731.91, 5101.55 (1973); STAT. oF Nnv.
ch. 449.191, 632.475 (1973); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-7-30, 76-7-314 (1973).
335. See, e.g., Siedell, The Hospital and Abortion, 79 CASE & CoM. 24 (1974). See
also Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hospital, Civ. No. 1090 (D. Mont., Oct. 31, 1972) (injunc-
tion against hospital policy), injunction lifted, 369 F. Supp. 948 (1973). See generally
H.R. REP. No. 227, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (discussing the rationale of 42
U.S.C.A. § 300a-7, the federal 'freedom of conscience" statute and mentioning Taylor
as a motivating force for its enactment).
336. R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 11-3-1 to 11-3-5 (Supp. 1973).
337. Doe v. Israel, 358 F. Supp. 1193 (D.R.I. 1973), affl'd, 482 F.2d 156 (1st Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974). The rationale in Doe v. Israel is quite
interesting given its reliance on the lack of state legislative power over the fourteenth
amendment. One might only speculate as to the result of a case involving a congression-
al definition of the word "person!' under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment.
338. In relevant part the statute provided as follows:
Whereas, The State of Rhode Island, in fulfillment of its legitimate function
of protecting the well-being of all persons within its borders, hereby declares
that in furtherance of the public policy of said state, human life and, in fact,
a person within the language of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States, commences to exist at the instant of conception; now
therefore, it is enacted by the General Assembly as follows:
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cise terms the issues presented for debate in the proposals for a Life-
Protective amendment. It is understandable that the statute was un-
able to attain its purpose, since the Court's interpretation of "person"
was binding on the states under the supremacy clause, and since legis-
lative power to enforce the fourteenth amendment is vested exclusively
in the Congress.3 9 By holding the statute unconstitutional the federal
courts made clear to the opponents of elective abortion that a constitu-
tional amendment was the only means available to overturn the Supreme
Court's holdings in Roe and Doe.
Any proposed constitutional amendment must overcome substan-
tial obstacles before it becomes law. 40 It is then not surprising that,
in the eyes of some commentators, the possibility that the abortion deci-
sions would be overturned via constitutional amendment seemed very
remote.3 41 That the possibility is much more real, however, than these
commentators realized was illustrated in early March, 1974, when the
first Senate hearings were held on a proposed Human Life amendment
submitted by Senator James Buckley of New York.342 The publicity
and controversy generated by those hearings made it obvious that the
debate over the abortion issue was far from over; a new chapter was
about to begin.
B. The Proposed Amendments
Turning to an examination of the proposals themselves, one finds
that although they are sometimes referred to collectively as "Human
Life" amendments, such a collective characterization is somewhat mis-
leading: the proposals vary in form as well as in substance. At this
writing there are over 30 such proposals, and the number grows larger
as "Right to Life' and other groups dissatisfied with the Court's de-
cisions in Roe and Doe make their opinoins and influence felt. The
proposals falls into two categories: (1) "states' rights" amendments,
and (2) "affirmative" and Life-Protective amendments.
1. States' Rights Amendments
Prior to the decisions in the abortions cases the availability of le-
galized abortion was a matter of legislative determination within each
§ 11-34: (establishing a conclusive presumption that human life begins at
conception and allowing abortion only for the purpose of saving the mother's
life.)
339. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 5.
340. See U.S. CONsT. art. V.
341. Ely, supra note 314, at 947.
342. S.J. Rl~s. 119, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
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state, notwithstanding occasional judicial intervention.848 By virtue of
Roe and Doe, however, the availability of legalized abortion became
a matter of federal constitutional right, immune from the usual methods
of legislative or popular modification. Proposals for a states' rights
amendment would return control of abortion policy to the states and
leave the particulars of that policy to legislative wisdom;844 an interesting
combination of traditional political thought and wise practical politics.
By deciding that nearly every facet of an individual's choice to
abort is deserving of strict constitutional protection, the Supreme Court
forced drastic changes in even some of the nation's most liberal abor-
tion laws. Many state police powers which, until the movement to
liberalize abortion laws began in the mid-1960's, had not been ques-
tioned since 1934345 were struck down by the federal courts. In short,
the Court left the idea of orderly change through the political process
somewhat out in the cold. Thus, from a political standpoint, the
strength of the states' rights proposals is readily ascertainable. The
concept of "states' rights" is as old as the nation itself and finds expres-
sion in the tenth amendment to the Constitution:
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the States espec-
tively, or to the people.
While proposals for a "states' rights" amendment reject the
Court's contention that abortion is a matter of constitutional right, it
is equally true that the Court's contention is a matter of considerable
doubt among some of the commentators who have considered the ques-
tion since the decisions were handed down.340 Before the Supreme
Court's decisions in Roe and Doe the abortion issue was being settled
in the public forum. A "states' rights" proposal would merely return
the issue to that forum.
The chief flaw in these proposals, from the perspective of those
who feel that all human beings-born and unborn-are deserving of
express constitutional protection, is that they would leave considerable
doubt as to the extent to which human life would receive affirmative
protection under the laws of the several states. Under such a proposal
the states would be free to grant as much or as little protection to un-
343. Compare U.S. v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1972), with People v. Belous, 71 Cal.
2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1970).
344. See, e.g., H.R1J. REs. 261, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1975):
SECTION 1. "Nothing in this Constitution shall bar any State or territory
or the District of Columbia, with regard to any area over which it has juris-
diction, from allowing, regulating, or prohibiting the practice of abortion."
345. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
346. Ely, supra note 314; Epstein, supra note 314.
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born human life as political pressure and popular sentiment dictate.
Such proposals, therefore, do not necessarily portend the demise of
legal abortion; during the period preceding the decisions in the abor-
tion cases the dominant political pressure in this country was toward
the liberalization of existing abortion laws. 47
2. "Life-Protective" and "Affirmative" Amendments
Unlike the Supreme Court in Roe, which characterized the opera-
tive interests in the abortion controversy as those of the state, the wo-
man, and the physician, a Life-Protective amendment would recognize
the marshalling of interests which should properly have been the focus
of Roe and Doe.3 48  An "affirmative" or Human Life amendment
would require recognition of the unborn as individuals deserving of
constitutional protection; a "states' rights" amendment would give the
states the option of doing the same.
Much like the first section of the fourteenth amendment in pur-
pose and primary effect,3 49 proposals for a Human Life amendment are
designed to accomplish several goals. The proposals would negate the
effect of the Supreme Court's restrictive interpretation of the word
"person" as it is used in the fourteenth amendment by imparting sub-
stantive constitutional protection to the unborn. The proposals them-
347. Political pressure, however, should be distinguished from popular sentiment.
The former term reflects the activities of "interest" groups, while the latter reflects the
feelings of the so-called "silent majority."
348. The Court recognized that the central issue in the abortion cases was the
question of whether the unborn have a constitutionally protected right to live. See Roe,
410 U.S. at 153. However, it characterized the issue as one involving a conflict between
state and maternal interests. The Court was apparently unwilling to attack the issue
directly, for it refused to hear the only case in which the issue had been fully argued and
decided, Byrn v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 194, 286 N.E.2d
887 (1972), appeal dismissed, 410 U.S. 949 (1973).
A similar opportunity to decide the issue directly was offered by Doe v. Bolton as
originally filed in the District Court. The Georgia abortion statute provided that the
rights of the unborn be protected by the appointment of a guardian ad litem. GA. STAT.
ANN. § 26-1202(c) (1972). But the District Court revoked its order appointing a
guardian, relegating the statutory representative of the unborn to the status of amicus
curiae. See Brief for Ferdinand Buckley as Amicus Curiae at i-ill, Doe v. Bolton, 410
U.S. 179 (1973). In effect, the District Court had decided the central issue of the case
before any arguments were heard. Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048, 1055 n.3 (1970)
("the court does not postulate the existence of a new being with federal constitutional
rights at any time during gestation"). The court offered no citations in support of its
postulate and, thus, rested its decision squarely upon nothing more than judicial ipse
dixit.
349. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 (broadly defining "citizen"), with, e.g.,
H.R.J. Ras. 317, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), (broadly defining "person"), and H.R.J.
Rps. 99, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (no "human being" shall be deprived of life or of
equal protection).
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selves fall into two sub-categories: the first type would redefine the
word "person" as used in the due process clauses of the fifth and four-
teenth amendents, 35  the second would extend substantive protec-
tion to the lives of the unborn without regard to the Supreme Court's
ruling on the meaning of "person."s"' Since it has been alleged that
the proposals for such an amendment, if passed, would create "chaos"
in the law,852 it is necessary to determine just what foundation there
might be for such a charge.
Perhaps the most comprehensive of the proposed amendments is
House Joint Resolution 132, (hereinafter HJR 132), introduced in
January, 1975.863 An examination of its provisions, with particular
reference to potential areas of difficulty, helps to place the debate in
proper focus.3 54  HJR 132 is framed as follows:
Section 1)
With respect to the right to life, the word "person" as
used in this article and in the fifth and fourteenth
Articles of Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States applies to all human beings irrespective
of age, health, function, or condition of dependency,
950. E.g., S.I. RES. 6, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975):
ARTICLE -
SECTION 1. With respect to the right to life guaranteed in this Constitution,
every human being, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, or of any
State, shall be deemed, from the moment of fertilization, to be a person and
entitled to the right to life.
SEC. 2. Congress and the several States shall have concurrent power to en-
force this article by appropriate legislation.
HLR.J. REs. 197, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975):
1. With respect to the right to life, the word 'person' as used in this article
and in the fifth and fourteenth articles of amendment to the Constitution of
the United States applies to all human beings irrespective of age, health, func-
tion, or condition of dependency, including their unborn offspring at every
stage of their biological development.
2. No person shall deprive any unborn person of life, except in a case where
it is necessary to prevent the death of the mother of such person or to
terminate a pregnancy of no more than 10 days' duration resulting from rape.
3. The Congress and the several States shall have power to enforce this article
by appropriate legislation.
See also H.RJ. , s. 317, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (containing exception for life
of mother).
351. E.g., H.R.J. Rns. 99, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. (1975):
1. Neither the United States nor any State shall deprive any human being,
from conception, of life without due process of law; nor deny to any human
being, from conception, within its jurisdiction, the equal protection of the law.
2. Neither the United States nor any State shall deprive any human being of
life on account of age, illness, or incapacity.
3. Congress and the several States shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.
352. See, e.g., Sanders, Enemies of Abortion, H~ARPER's MAGAZINE, March, 1974, at
26, 28.
353. H.R.J. REs. 132, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
354. It should be noted that the writer's use of this proposal is for analytical
purposes only. No opinion is expressed as to its merits relative to the other proposals
which have been introduced.
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including their unborn offspring at every stage of their
biological development.
Section 2)
No unborn person shall be deprived of life by any per-
son; Provided, however, that nothing in this article
shall prohibit a law permitting only those medical pro-
cedures required to prevent the death of the mother.
Section 3)
The Congress and the several states shall have power
to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
a. Section One
Designed to overturn the central proposition of the Supreme
Court's opinion in Roe v. Wade-that the unborn are not "persons"
within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment-this section is typi-
cal of the first subcategory of Life-Protective proposals. It opts for a
fairly restrictive approach to protecting the rights of the unborn by pro-
tecting only the right to life. Although the proposal was written in re-
sponse to the immediate problem of abortion, it should be noted that its
coverage is not so restrictive. By specifically mentioning age, health,
function, and condition of dependency as impermissible criteria on
which to deny the status of "person," the proposal seeks to counter the
growing pressure to accord legal protection to life according to its "qual-
ity" rather than its existence. In effect, the proposal does nothing more
than to declare the inherent equality of all biologically human life, a
proposition supported by the history of the fourteenth amendment it-
self. In this regard it can hardly be said to be inconsistent with the
history and spirit of either the original Constitution or the fourteenth
amendment. Moreover, like the fourteenth amendment, the proposal
provides, in its final section, for legislative enforcement of its essential
terms. Unlike the fourteenth amendment, however, the enforcement
powers are granted to the states as well as to Congress.355
Consistent with its limited intent, however, the proposal does not
reach all the implications of the Court's decision in Roe, and may, in
fact, freeze some of them into the Constitution. By restricting its
sweep to the protection of the right to life, HJR 132 may leave intact
a possible interpretation of the Supreme Court's ruling to the effect that
the unborn are not "persons" with regard to the other express due
process rights, liberty and property. While the right of liberty is hardly
one that can be exercised by any infant, born or unborn, the right to
property presents a much more serious question. By virtue of the de-
cision in Roe, the Supreme Court cast substantial doubt upon the ability
355. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV § 5 (enforcement power vested in Congress).
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of the courts to protect the property rights of the unborn, a function
they had been exercising from the earliest days of the common law.3"'
A proposed amendment expressly limited to the right to life could be
construed as a ratification of the argument that the Court's holding
applies equally to property rights.
Unless a legal system which forbids abortion except where the
woman's life is in danger may be fairly described as "chaotic," 85 7 the
first section of HJR 132, despite its flaws, can hardly be characterized
as a radical idea. It merely adopts the policy alternative rejected by
the Supreme Court in Roe, but found acceptable by the West German
Constitutional Court when it struck down as unconstitutional a relaxed
version of West Germany's criminal abortion law passed by the Bundes-
tag.3 58 In this regard it is similar to other proposals for a Life-Protec-
tive amendment.
b. Section Two
This section typifies those proposals that do not seek to redefine
"person" and is the most remarkable in H-R 132, since it would ope-
rate against the individual as well as against the state. Although some
question might be raised as to the propriety of using the Constitution
as a restraint upon private action, such a procedure is not without pre-
cedent. The thirteenth amendment operates as a similar limitation on
the right of the individual to hold another in slavery. Like the thir-
teenth amendment, enforcement of its provisions would be left to the
discretion of the legislative branch of the government."' Moreover,
356. The unborn child is considered to be a life in being for purposes of the rule
against perpetuities. GREY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPErTurms §§ 931-47. The right of the
unborn to recover for prenatal injuries is also recognized. See, e.g., Scott v. McPheeters,
33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 634, 92 P.2d 678, 681 (3d Dist. 1931):
The respondent asserts that the provisions of section 29 of the [California]
Civil Code are based on a fiction of law to the effect that an unborn child
is a human being separate and distinct from its mother. We think that the
assumption of our statute is not a fiction, but upon the contrary that it is an
established and recognized fact by science and by everyone of understanding.
See generally HARPER & JAMEs, THE LAW OF ToRTs 1029 (1956); PROSSER, THE LAW OF
TORTS 335-38 (4th ed. 1971).
357. This was precisely the argument raised in the briefs in Roe. See Brief for
Appellant at 124, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Unfortunately, however, the brief
writers failed to point out just where the chaotic situation they alleged might be found.
Before Roe several states had made legal abortion available, either by legislative action
or judicial decree. The vast majority did not. It is submitted that the decisions in Roe
v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton have done more to create a chaotic situation by their
constitutional-administrative law approach to the entire question than could fairly have
been attributed to any of the statutory or administrative schemes in force before the
decisions. See Part H supra.
358. Judgment of February 25, 1975, 39 BVerfG 1. A partial translation of the
opinion appears as an appendix to this article.
359. Thus it cannot be argued that such a proposal, in and of itself, would make the
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the modem analysis of state action already includes much that is "pri-
vate" in laymen's terms."' 0 In so providing, the proposal would merely
eliminate any need for a showing of "state action" before the courts
could act to implement the policy embodied in the first and second sec-
tions. It too can hardly be characterized as a radical proposal; the com-
mon law had long recognized that even the mother could be held re-
sponsible for the destruction of her unborn offspring. 8 '
C. The Need for Rationality
A policy position recognizing the existence of fundamental rights
in the prenatal period is consistent with both constitutional history and
precedent. In view of this consistency, it is understandable that the
proponents of elective abortion consider the proposals to be ana-
themas. 62  Since the Supreme Court expressly noted that the asserted
right to elective abortion would collapse were the unborn to be ac-
corded the protection of the due process clause, 63 proposals such as
HJR 132 will most surely provoke the most heated debate, in Congress
as well as in the public forum. It is important therefore, to make clear
just what is not involved in the controversy over these proposals.
1. Legal Abortion: A Policy Choice
By taking a position in favor of legalized abortion, the Supreme
Court chose between a number of difficult and controversial policy al-
ternatives. Proposals for a constitutional amendment to reverse the
Supreme Court's decision involve those same policy alternatives: they
merely reach the opposite result. In view of this, it cannot validly be
alleged that the arguments supporting a constitutional amendment are
necessarily contingent upon religious belief or dogma. 6 ' It is true that
taking of unborn human life murder; the degrees of homicide are strictly matters of
legislative determination. Remarks of Congressman John A. Bingham, House of Repre-
sentatives, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 432 (1866) ("You do not prohibit
murder in the Constitution; you guarantee life in the Constitution.") To argue otherwise
would be akin to alleging that the thirteenth amendment makes the holding of slaves a
felony by its terms, a proposition which finds no support in the cases.
360. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
361. See, e.g., State v. Murphy, 27 NJ.L. 112, 114 (1858); In re Vince, 2 N.J. 443,
67 A.2d 141 (1949).
362. See, e.g., Sanders, Enemies of Abortion, HARPERS MAGAZI, March 1974,
at 24.
363. Roe, 410 U.S. at 156-57.
364. Closing Brief of Prosecution at 1077, United States v. Griefelt, 4 TRIALS OF
WAR CRmnNALs BmxoRB THB NUREMBERO MLrrARY TRIBUNAL UNDER CoNTROL
COUNCIL LAW No. 10 (1946) (arguing that denial of legal protection to unborn children
of Russian and Polish women was a crime against humanity).
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the position of some religious groups is that abortion is morally abhor-
rent. However, the fact that an opinion may spring from religious be-
liefs does not mean that such a view is irrelevant in the political con-
text.865 The establishment clause should not be available as an excuse
through which to avoid discussion of the non-religious policy aspects
of the issue.3"6
Although it can safely be predicted that charges of religious bias
will contribute significantly to the bitterness of the public debate over
the abortion issue,167 it is imperative that debate in the academic and
legal communities be unclouded by such inflammatory rhetoric; the in-
tegrity of the political process demands no less. The abortion issue
is essentially a civil rights issue: one side favoring a woman's right to
privacy, the other favoring her child's right to life. By the introduction
of proposals for a Life-Protective amendment, questions have been
raised as to the consistency of the Supreme Court's resolution of the
abortion issue with the basic philosophical tenets and established prin-
ciples of American constitutional law. What the ultimate responses to
these questions should be is the topic of the remainder of this Com-
ment, and a problem which will ultimately be solved by resorting to
the supreme arbiter of such conflicts-the American people.8 8
2. The Fundamental Right to Life
One need not dwell on the intricacies of constitutional interpreta-
365. It is clear that someone's perceptions of moral propriety are always behind
societal or legal prohibitions. It is not enough to make specious distinctions between
"moral" and "legal" prohibitions; in either case the prohibited activity is considered by
someone to be "wrong." The decision of the Supreme Court in Roe represents the
obverse of the policy behind a Life-Protective Amendment. See Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 360 (1972) (Marshall, 3., concurring) (death penalty found to be immoral and
therefore unconstitutional). See also Prosecution Exhibit 491, United States v. Griefelt, 4
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINAS BEFORE THE NURE MnURG MuTARY TrRIBUNAL UNDER
CONTROL CoUNciL LAw No. 10 (1946) at 1084:
The decree on interruptions of pregnancy . . . has called forth objections on
the part of a minority of reactionary Catholic physicians. Even physicians
who hold the right political views occasionally voice objections [on the
grounds that the degree was not in accordance with the physician's moral ob-
ligation to preserve life].
366. See, e.g., Tribe, The Supreme Court 1972 Term-Foreword: Toward a Model
of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Tribe] (arguing that the feeling of necessity to draw a strict line is "unmistaka-
bly religious" and thus effectively structuring the argument in such a way as to make
opposition to the Supreme Court's decision tantamount to an argument in favor of "an
establishment of religion").
367. See, e.g., NEwsWEEK, March 3, 1975, at 18.
368. The very nature of the amending process set out in article V assures that the
Constitution does not impose a "minority" viewpoint on the American people. To argue
against even exposing such a proposal to the monumental hurdles of the amendment
process bespeaks more a fear by a minority that the majority will adopt it than a concern
for the integrity of the constitutional process.
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tion to appreciate that certain individual rights are fundamental. Such
reasoning is implicit in the Bill of Rights,869 the "Civil War" amend-
ments,8 70 and the franchise amendments,3 71 as well as in the proposed
Equal Rights amendment. Consistent with this philosophy, the Su-
preme Court itself has shown little hesitation protecting these rights in
appropriate cases.
3 72
The right to life is clearly among those "so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental" and is
given explicit protection in the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 73
Thus, to deny an individual is a person and, therefore, not entitled to
the rights of life, liberty, and property, is to reject the egalitarian
philosophy embodied in the Declaration of Independence and the four-
teenth amendment. The right to life is absolutely essential to the
preservation of a free society; it is the foundation of all rights,
described by Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring in Furman v. Georgia,374
as the "right to have rights." Whether this right shall be protected at
all stages of human development is the issue to be decided.
3. The Dangerous Implications of Roe and Doe
In Roe and Doe the Supreme Court exercised the power to say
who is-or, more importantly, who is not-a person within the meaning
of the Constitution. The awesome nature of this power should be
abundantly clear; the power over life and death is indeed the ultimate
power.87 5  While the Court does have such power, the validity of its
369. U.S. CONSr. amends. I-X.
370. Id. amends. XIII-XV.
371. Id. amends. XV, XIX, XXIV, and XXVI.
372. E.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 419 U.S. 822 (1975) (sex-based discrimina-
tion); Brown v. Board of Edue., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (segregation).
373. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
374. 408 U.S. 238, 272 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (death penalty).
375. Cf., Dredd Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 577-78 (1857) (Curtis,
J., dissenting). The relevance of Justice Curtis' dissent in Dredd Scott to the exercise of
judicial power in Roe is unmistakable:
Before examining the various provisions of the Constitution which may relate
to this question it is important to consider for a moment the fundamental na-
ture of this inquiry. It is... whether the Constitution empowered Congress
,to create privileged classes . . . who alone are entitled to the franchises and
privileges of citizenship. . . . If it be admitted that the Constitution has en-
abled Congress to declare what free persons. . . shall be citizens of the United
States, it must at the same time be admitted that it is an unlimited power. If
this subject is within the control of Congress it must certainly depend wholly
upon its discretion. For certainly, no limits of that discretion can be found
in the Constitution, which is wholly silent concerning it; . . . the necessary
consequence [being] that the Federal Government may select classes of persons
• . . who alone can be entitled [to the rights of citizenship]. [emphasis sup-
plied]
There is, however, one difference between Dredd Scott and Roe: the former rests upon a
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exercise is open to serious question where the nature of the inquiry
and the sought-after results lead inexorably to the creation of legal dis-
tinctions which have no basis in reality. As long as the power to make
such distinctions remains in the hands of any governmental body,8"'
even those of the "least dangerous branch,' 37  the ultimate safety of
any group of individuals whose existence or physical need threatens to
exacerbate the "profound problems" of others is in question.3 1
The significance of a judgment dealing with fundamental rights
which is based upon the relative values of the parties in the eyes of
the Court was underscored by Justice Douglas' use of Buck v. Bell21
to support the part of his concurring opinion dealing with the existence
of the state's power to protect its own interests. 80 In Bell it was held
that the state has a compelling interest in reducing the number of men-
tally retarded individuals in society. The Court, per Justice Holmes,
held that a woman committed to a state mental institution may be
sterilized to prevent her bearing retarded children. In addition to indi-
cating that the woman's freedom of choice in such a situation is not
inviolate, Justice Holmes' words manifest the Court's willingness to ex-
ercise the same type of judgment earlier identified by Marshall McLu-
han: 
381
fairly solid basis in constitutional history, the latter does not. Although Justice Curtis
argued persuasively that persons of African descent could be "citizens" as long as some
states considered them to be such at the time the Constitution was ratified, Chief Justice
Taney pointed out that history was replete with intent to exclude that race from the
status of "citizen." In Roe the Court invalidated a state-devised program of protection for
the unborn; because the Court could not do so, it did not attempt to point to any history
or past interpretation of the Contsitution which required exclusion of the unborn from
the status of "person."
376. Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 662 (1875):
It must be conceded that there are such rights in every free government beyond
the control of the State. A government which recognized no such rights,
which held the lives, the liberty, and the property of its citizens subject at all
times to the absolute disposition and unlimited control of even the most demo-
cratic depository of power, is after all but a despotism.
377. If it is true that the fundamental rights of the person may be withheld by the
simple expedient of judicially constructed definition, the "least dangerous branch" has
become, by far, the most powerful, for its adversarially inspired definitions, once woven
into the fabric of the Constitution, can only be erased by the cumbersome machinery of
constitutional amendment or by appeal to the Court itself.
378. As Marshall McLuhan has noted:
Since all current secular discussion of abortion takes place on quantitative as-
sumptions relating to human convenience, there can be no question that the
arguments in favor of abortion apply with equal validity to the status of all
other living beings. The same assumptions of more or less convenience or in-
convenience must apply to the decisions about continuing or suppressing the
existence of any members or groups of all human or non-human populations.
M. McLuhan, Private Individual v. Global Village, in ABORTION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 246
(Hilgers and Horan ed. 1972).
379. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
380. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 215 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
381. See note 378 supra.
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We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon
the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call
upon those who already sap the strength of the State for these lesser
sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those concerned, in order to
prevent our being swamped with incompetence. It is better for all
the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for
crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent
those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. The prin-
ciple that sustains compulsory vaccinati6n is broad enough to cover
cutting the Fallopian tubes. (citation omitted) Three generations
of imbeciles are enough.3
82
Through the process of amniocentesis,38 3 science has made it pos-
sible to predict with an ever-increasing degree of accuracy the charac-
teristics of unborn infants, including possible physical or mental defi-
ciencies. Therefore, it does not seem unreasonable to predict that, un-
der certain conditions, the state might very well be in a position to de-
mand that a woman be aborted as a "lesser" sacrifice in order to pre-
vent her bringing "deficient" children into the world. In fact, it might
be argued that, given the right "compelling" interest, the principle
which supports compulsory vaccination is "broad enough" to include
compulsory abortion. If the unborn are not persons, as the Court held,
or human beings, as the appellant argued,3 4 what "of value' would
be destroyed?38 5  Although most would recoil at such a suggestion, 386
it is difficult to ignore the fact that the merits of some degree of com-
pulsion in this area are being extolled by many respectable parties in
the scientific and medical communities. 887  If such suggestions are to
be subjected to the searching inquiry fitting such matters it is impera-
tive that a thorough examination be made of the basis for much of the
current debate over the value of human life-the notion that the
382. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 203 (1927). One might inquire just how Justice
Holmes, or anyone else for that matter, could be in a position to declare: (1) what is
"best" for all the world; (2) who is "manifestly unfit;" and most importantly (3) who
shall or shall not be able to continue their own kind. It is incongruous that any member
of the Supreme Court would go so far as to condone such reasoning today, especially one
who feels that "valleys, alpine meadows, rivers ...or even air" should be given legal
personality to protect them from the "destructive pressures" of modem life. Sierra Club
v. Morton, 405 U.S. 704, 727, 743 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
383. This is a process by which a sample of the amniotic fluid surrounding the fetus
is withdrawn. The cells of the fetus suspended in the fluid are stained and the
chromosomes mapped in order to determine the nature of any possible infirmity.
384. Brief for Appellants at 119, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
385. Id.
386. E.g., Tribe 27-28 n.22.
387. E.g., Hardin, Parenthood: Right or Privilege? 169 Scilaca 427 (1970);
Williams, Our Role in the Generation, Modification, and Termination of Life, 124
AxcnvEs OF INr NAL MED. 214 (1969). See also, CALn'oaRN MEDicm, supra note
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quality of life, rather than its existence per se, is the supreme virtue.888
The concept is an interesting one, to be sure, but what are its impli-
cations?
In his testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Aging,
Representative Walter W. Sackett, M.D.880 testified on some of the
motivating factors which led him to introduce a bill to legalize "death
with dignity," a common euphemism for euthanasia90 in Florida.8 0'
Captioned "Cost-Benefit Question," Dr. Sackett's testimony revealed
that there are 1500 severely retarded individuals in Florida's mental
institutions who cost the state a great deal of money each day they re-
main alive.392 Dr. Sackett asked: "Now where is the benefit in these
1,500 severely retarded, who never had a rational thought . . . ?"Boa
Rather, he continues, society should concern itself with those whose
lives are "useful."' '
Similarly, Nobel Laureate James Watson has suggested that the
preservation of the lives of laboratory-conceived children be contingent
upon their "normality" in the eyes of the physicians attending their
birth. 95 Moreover, he would extend the choice to all parents: "[Miost
birth defects are not discovered until birth . . . . All parents would
be allowed the choice that only a few are given under the present
388. Compare Judgment of February 25, 1975, 39 BVerfGI (the "Abortion" case),
with Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The West German Federal Supreme Court's
opinion, translated in part in an appendix to this article, carefully distinguishes the
interests involved in any decision regarding abortion: those of the unborn, and those of
the woman. The State's interest is analyzed in terms of its duty to protect these interests.
See pp. 1346-48 infra. Although the German case arose from a legislative challenge to a
"liberalized" abortion law, its reasoning is equally applicable to the contentions made
by the State of Texas in Roe v. Wade-that the state has an obligation to protect unborn
life.
The clause of the West German Constitution upon which the Court relied in
striking down the revised abortion law is virtually indentical to the provisions of the
United States Constitution referring to the right to life. Compare U.S. CONST. amends.
V, XIV ("nor [shall any person] be deprived of life"), with GRuNDGSPTZ art. 2,
para. 2, phrase 1 (1949, amended 1961) (W. Ger.) ("Everyone has the right to life
and to physical inviolability") ("Jeder hat das Recht auf Leben und kdrporliche
Unversehrtheit").
389. Member, Florida House of Representatives.
390. In this context "euthanasia" is used in the strict sense to denote the concept of
"involuntary" mercy killing. The subject is far too complex to make any further
distinctions in this context. It is mentioned only because the rationales upon which its
proponents base their contentions bear a striling similarity to those heard in the context
of the abortion controversy.
391. H.B. 407, Florida Legislature, 1973 Regular Session. The bill was severely
modified in committee.
392. Hearings on Death with Dignity Before the Senate Special Comm. on Aging,
92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt., 1 at 30 (1972).
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. TmF, May 28, 1973, at 104, discussed in Tribe, supra note 366.
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system . . . [i]f a child were not declared alive until three days after
birth."3 8
The thought of one's own life being terminated because it lacks
"utility" or "normality" is a sobering one. "Meaningful life," the
"quality" of life, and the necessity to be "wanted" are but a few of
the rallying points in a "new ethic" which relegates life itself to a posi-
tion in which it must be balanced against societal values, opinions, and
policies which are apt to change with every generation, ideology, or
regime.3 97  In Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton the Supreme Court,
perhaps unwittingly, wrote this "new ethic" into the Constitution in the
name of personal liberty.
V
A LIFE-PROTECTIVE AMENDMENT: A LOGICAL OUTGROWTH
OF CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE
A. What is a "Person"?
At the crux of the controversy over the Supreme Court's decisions
in the abortion cases lies the difficult problem of determining who shall
be protected as a "person!' under the Constitution. The Constitution
and its amendments use the word several times, 9 8 yet nowhere is it
396. Watson, Children from the Laboratory, PiusM, May 1973, at 12, 13.
397. Consider Shakespeare:
Out, out, brief candle!
Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage
And then is heard no more; it is a tale
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
Signifying nothing.
-Macbeth, Act V, Sc. 5
What a piece of work is man! how infinite in
facultyl in form and moving how express and
admirablel in action how like an angel! in
apprehension how like a god! the beauty of the
world! -the paragon of animals!
-Hamlet, Act 11, Sc. 2.
Teilhard de Chardin, writing in 1938, observed:
The truth is that, as children of a transition period, we are neither fully
conscious of, nor in full control of, the new powers which have been re-
leased.
T. DR CHARDI, THE PBENOmBNON Op MAN 279 (Wall trans. 1959), quoted in, Louisell,
Biology, Law and Reason: Man as Self-Creator, 16 AM. J. JUmSPRTJDENCE 1, 16 (1971).
De Chardin's recognition of the fallibility of the human intellect may be profitably
compared to the statement of Judge Cassibry in Rosen v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical
Examiners, 318 F. Supp. 1217, 1236 (E.D. La. 1970) (dissenting opinion) to the effect
that "human life is a relative" term, its meaning dependent upon -the "purpose for which
it is defined."
398. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2,3; § 2, cl. 2,3; § 3, cl. 3; § 9, cl. 1,8; art. II,
§ 1, cl. 2,5; art. IV, § 2, cl. 2; amends. V, XIV, and XXII.
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given any concrete definition. Perhaps the authors of the fourteenth
amendment thought it needed none, for they certainly must have in-
tended it to include every living human being. Indeed, Congressman
Bingham's words amply support this contention, 39D as do those of his
contemporaries.4 00
In the wake of Roe v. Wade, however, the United States was left,
for the first time since 1868, with an express construction of its Consti-
tution which excludes a class of biologically human individuals from the
enjoyment of fundamental human rights. There has been no sufficient
399. Address by Congressman John A. Bingham, Bowerstown, Ohio, August 24,
1866, printed in Cincinnati Commercial, August 27, 1866, at 1, col. 3:
[The amendment] imposes a limitation upon the States to correct their abuses
of power, which hitherto did not exist in your Constitution, and which is es-
sential to the nation's life. Look at that simple proposition. No State shall
deny to any person, no matter whence he comes, or how poor, how weak, how
simple-how friendless-no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws. . . . That proposition, I think, my fel-
low citizens needs no argument. No man can look his fellow-man in the face,
surrounded by this clear light of heaven in which we live and dare to utter
the proposition that of right any State in the Union should deny to any human
being who behaves himself well the equal protection of the laws. Paralysis
ought to strangle ,the tongue before a man should be guilty of the blasphemy
that he himself to the exclusion of his fellow man, should enjoy the protection
of the laws.
Accord, remarks of Congressman John A. Bingham, House of Representatives, CoNo.
GLOB, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089 (1866):
If a State has not the right to deny equal protection to every human being
under the Constitution of this country in the rights of life, liberty, and prop-
erty, hcw can State rights be impaired by penal prohibitions of such denial as
proposed?
400. Address by Congressman Thaddeus Stevens, Bedford, Pennsylvania, September
4, 1866, printed in Cincinnati Commercial, September 11, 1866, at 2, col. 1, 3:
That [Union] triumph brought with it difficulties even greater than the war
itself. To rebuild a shattered empire. . . and to erect thereon a superstructure
of perfect equality of every human being before the law; of impartial protection
to everyone in whose breast God had placed an immortal soul . . . . I shall
not deny, but admit, that a fundamental principle of the Republican creed is
that every being possessing an immortal soul is equal before the law.
Accord, remarks of Senator Jacob M. Howard (the floor sponsor of the fourteenth
amendment in the Senate), CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866):
The last two clauses of the first section . . . disable a state from depriving not
merely a citizen of the United States, but any person, whoever he may be, of
life, liberty or property without due process of law [or of equal protection].
This abolishes all class legislation in the States and does away with the injus-
tice of subjecting one class of persons to a code not applicable to another ...
It establishes equality before the law and it gives to the humblest, the poorest,
the most despised of the [human] race the same rights and the same protection
as it gives to the most powerful, the most wealthy, or the most haughty.
Accord, remarks of Representative Edgar Cowan, House of Representatives, CONo.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2890 (1866):
So far as the courts and the administration of the laws are concerned, I have
supported that every human being within their jurisdiction was in one sense
of the word [i.e., the non-political sense] a citizen, that is, a person entitled to
protection . ..
See also In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 43 (Rutledge, J. dissenting).
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justification offered to support this construction, either in the opinion
of the Supreme Court itself, or in the appellant's brief in Roe v. Wade.4"1
It has been argued that the fourteenth amendment does not admit of
prenatal application, and therefore, an individual does not become a
"person' until birth.402 Although this analysis is fundamental to the
Court's holding that abortion is a matter of personal privacy, the ex-
press language of the amendment itself does not support it. The argu-
ment that a fetus is not a person appears only once in the appellant's
brief in Roe, and, even then, in a footnote.40 3
Evidently, the appellants did not consider this argument to be im-
portant in justifying broader access to legalized abortion, for an exam-
ination of the briefs submitted in both Roe and Doe leave little doubt
that the key to their attacks on the Texas and Georgia abortion laws
was their contention that the unborn are not human beings:
404
People who worry about the moral danger of abortion do so because
they think the fetus is a human being, hence equate feticide with
murder. Whether the fetus is or is not a human being is a matter of
definition, not fact, and we can define it any way we wish.
40 5
The arguments in the briefs apparently assumed that the term
401. Brief for Appellant at 123 n.6, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1974).
402. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 156-58.
403. Brief for Appellant at 123 n.6, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The full
text of the footnote is as follows: "Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution refers to all persons born or naturalized in the United States
... . There are no cases which hold that fetuses are protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment."
It is interesting to note that, once again, the advocates of legalized abortion appear
to have exercised their penchant for deleting the final clauses and sentences of the
sources thought to support their position. These pertinent words follow the ellipses in
the quotation: ". . . are citizens of the United States and of the state in which they
reside" [emphasis added]. The citizenship clause does not define who is or is not a
person. It was meant to ensure citizenship to all persons meeting its requirements, not
merely the slaves. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474-76, 2887-90, 3040
(1866) (tracing the rejection of a citizenship clause limited to those of African descent).
Furthermore, it is equally noteworthy that the construction of the amendment urged
above would deprive even aliens of fundamental rights of life, liberty and property. In
this regard it is clearly erroneous; that result was expressly rejected by Bingham, the
author of section one of the fourteenth amendment. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1292 (1866).
As has been seen, the lack of an express holding on the subject of prenatal
constitutional status is attributable to the fact that it was not an issue which had any
relevance in any context other than the abortion controversy. Only in the area of
prenatal property rights would the issue be of similar import, but even there, the law was
settled in favor of prenatal rights. See Louisell, Abortion, the Practice of Medicine, and
Due Process of Lmv, 16 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 233 (1969). See generally W. PROSSER, Tim
LAw OF TORTS 641-82 (4th ed. 1971) and cases cited therein.
404. Brief for Appellant at 119, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
405. Id. at 122, quoting G. Hardin, Abortion or Compulsory Pregnancy?, 30 J.
MAR. & FAM. No. 2 (1968).
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"human being" was, in fact, synonymous with "person." In this as-
sumption the appellants were justified, for several of the Radical Re-
publicans who explained the fourteenth amendment to the public were
under the same impression.40  The only difference between the Radi-
cal Republicans and the appellants in Roe, however, was that at least
one of the original supporters of the amendment, Senator Jacob M.
Howard (the amendment's floor sponsor in the Senate) saw it as ex-
tending to every living human being. 407 In short, those most familiar
with the purpose of the fourteenth amendment, its authors, rejected
any but a biological standard by which to judge the existence of per-
sonal rights. They implicitly recognized that only through the preser-
vation of such a standard can the requisite certainty in this sensitive
area be preserved. The alternative is to make the protection of basic
rights dependent upon "anything we wish." 08
But is it true, as Judge Cassibry argued in his dissent in Rosen
v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners,400 that the "meaning
of the term 'human life' is a relative one which depends on the pur-
poses for which the term is being defined"? 410  If it is, is it not more
sensible to argue that, since the purpose for which the term is to be
defined is to expand or contract the protection of fundamental rights
applicable to a class which stands to lose everything by a limited defini-
tion, the term should be given its broadest possible meaning?
Since even the appellants in Roe impliedly admitted that "human
being" and "person" can be used interchangeably to describe the
406. See e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2890 (1866) (remarks of Senator
Howard); Address by Congressman Thaddeus Stevens, at Bedford, Pa., Sept. 4, 1866,
printed in Cincinnati Commercial, Sept. 11, 1866, at 2, col. 3; CoNG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2890, (1866) (remarks of Congressman Edgar Cowan). See also address
by Congressman John A. Bingham, supra note 378.
407. See note 400 supra. See also text accompanying note 405 supra.
408. See Glona v. American Guarantee Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75-76 (1968):
To say that the test of equal protection should be the "legal" rather than the
biological relationship is to avoid the issue. For the Equal Protection Clause
necessarily limits the authority of a State to draw such "legal" lines as it
chooses.
Accord, B. ScHwARTz, Thm SuPREME COURT 265 (1957) quoted in, Brief in Opposition
to Motions to Dismiss Appeal at 34, Byrn v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp.,
No. 72-434 (October Term 1972), appeal dismissed, 410 U.S. 949 (1973):
If we are frank, we must admit that racial classification reflects not objective
science, but racial animosity. If the equal protection clause means what it
says, such irrational classification cannot mount the hurdle of the Fourteenth
Amendment (emphasis added).
As the brief goes on to note, "scientifically speaking", classification of the unborn as
non-persons is irrational; it does not reflect objective science. Rather, it reflects animosi-
ty towards those whose lives are not "meaningful" due to their youth and utter
dependence upon others for protection from a hostile environment. See id.
409. 318 F. Supp. 1217 (E.D. La. 1970).
410. Id. at 1236.
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same biological entity, what justification can be cited for the crea-
tion of a legal distinction between them? It is submitted that such a
justification does not exist."' If one looks to the Constitution for a
solution to the problem which faced the Court, one finds that, on its
face, the document embodies no judgment whatever as to who is or
is not a human person; such an appraisal is foreign to the essentially
egalitarian philosophy upon which its provisions concerning individual
rights are based. Membership in the protected class, "persons," cannot




As Justice Douglas pointed out in the course of his concurring
opinion in Doe,4" the controversy over abortion lies in the valuation
to be placed on prenatal human life at the various stages of its develop-
ment. By holding that the unborn are not persons within the meaning
of the Constitution, the Court attached very little value to prenatal hu-
man life. While it did not deny that the unborn are living human be-
ings, it held that, alive or not, they are not worth protecting in light
of the "profound problems of the present day."414
In the 106 years since the fourteenth amendment was ratified, the
Supreme Court had had but two occasions to interpret the meaning of
the word "person." On the first occasion, the Court took the oppor-
tunity to extend the amendments protections to a legal fiction known
as a corporation by holding it to be a person within the meaning of
the due process clause;415 on the second, the Court denied those same
protections to the unborn offspring of human beings.41 6
411. See Byrn v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 194, 286 N.E.
2d 887 (1972) (Burke, J., dissenting).
412. The Declaration of Independence provides, in relevant part:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among
these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness. . . . (emphasis sup-
plied.)
413. 410 U.S. 179, 209, 217-18 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
414. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165 (1973). But what are these profound
problems? The preservation of the "quality of life"? See CALJORNIA MEDICINE, supra,
note 24 at 69. Overpopulation? See e.g., Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800, 803 (D.
Conn. 1972). The "vicissitudes of life"? See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 209, 215-
16 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring). Convenience? See id. The need to assure each per-
son a "meaningful" life before he or she is permitted to be born? See Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
415. Santa Clam County v. Southern Pacific R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886). See
also notes 145-47 supra and accompanying text.
416. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). There was one other occasion when a
party litigant raised the issue of his "personhood" in support of a contention that the
War Crimes tribunal which tried him had violated his right as a "person" to due process.
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Considered from this perspective, the overriding policy issue to
be resolved in the debate over abortion is not the simple question of
whether or not the procedure shall be legal, but rather the more funda-
mental question of whether or not an individual may be deprived of
his or her rights, pre-natally or post-natally, on the basis of third-party
determinations that the profound problems of the day demand it. Al-
though the Framers of the Constitution drew distinctions among individ-
uals-black people were not citizens,4 17 women could not vote or hold
property in their own name, and Indians not taxed were not to be
counted in the decennial census41 5-few would have denied that these
politically and socially disadvantaged individuals were persons. 419
There is no reason, no matter how appealing it might seem, to return
to a policy of such differentiation among individuals.
If one rejects the dubious legal distinction which lies at the basis
of the Supreme Court's decision in Roe, it becomes extremely difficult
to square the notion of abortion-on-request with contemporary social
The Court did not consider the issue. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 25 (1946).
In his dissenting opinion in Yamashita, Justice Rutledge noted the dangers of
restricting the applicability of the due process clause.
I am completely unable to accept or to understand the Court's ruling concern-
ing the applicability of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to this
case. Not heretofore has it been held that any human being is beyond its uni-
versally protecting spread in the guaranty of a fair trial. . . . That door is
dangerous to open. I will have no part in opening it. For once it is ajar, even
for enemy belligerents, it can be pushed back wider for others, perhaps ulti-
mately for all.
Id. at 78-79.
417. See also Dredd Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 403-04. Chief
Justice Taney, writing for the majority summed up the distinction as follows:
We think . . . that [black persons] are not included, and were not intended
to be included, under the word "citizens" in the Constitution. . . . On the
contrary they were at that time considered as a subordinate and inferior class
of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether eman-
cipated or not, . . . had no rights or privileges but such as those who held the
power and the Government might choose to grant them.
418. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, changed by U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 2.
419. Although it had been argued in some quarters that members of the Negro race
were not persons, but things, this philosophy was not accepted by the Framers of the
original Constitution or by the authors of the fourteenth amendment. See Bailey v.
Poindexter's Ex'r, 55 Va. (14 Gratt.) 132, 142-43 (1858), wherein it was argued by
counsel for those heirs of the decedent who stood to benefit if the Supreme Court of
Virginia refused to recognize the slave as a person that:
[M]arried women may have sound legal discretion in the eye of the law.
. . . They may take estates by deed or will. So may infants, even in ventre
sa mere, or idiots, or lunatics. They are all free persons, although under par-
tial or temporary disabilities. To reason in favor of similar powers, rights or
capacities in slaves. . . is to plunge at once into a labyrinth of error.
But see CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1090 (1866) (remarks of Representative
Bingham), wherein Bingham, reasoning from the absence in the Constitution of a grant
of power to Congress to enforce the rights of all persons, argued that the Framers
considered slaves to be persons, if not citizens.
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thought, which still considers human life as an affirmative value. Al-
though few serious students of the human condition believe that given
individuals are any less "valuable" than others and, therefore, not
worth the cost or trouble of keeping alive, it is also true that such a
philosophy-the "new ethic"-is being suggested in very respectable
circles as a remedy for many of society's ills.420 Assuming that the
world has not forgotten the hard-learned lessons of a recent period
when the value of human life was set by state-created standards of ex-
pedience and racial policy,421 it is fair to assert that the majority of
Americans remain committed to the philosophy that every human life
is inherently equal in value and should be sacrificed, if at all, only in
the face of grave or compelling necessity.422 It is for this reason that
420. See, e.g., Fletcher, The Ethics of Abortion, 14 CLIN. OBSTETRICS & GYNE-
COLOGY 1124, 1125 (1971); G. Hardin, Parenthood: Right or Privilege? 169 SCIENCE
427 (1970); Williams, Our Role in the Generation, Modification, and Termination of
Life, 124 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 215 (1969); cf., CALIFORNIA MEDICINE, supra
note 24, at 68; San Francisco Examiner, March 12, 1974, at 12, col. 1.
421. See Indictment, Count 1, subd. 12, United States v. Greifelt, 4 TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBURG MILITARY TRIBUNAL UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL
LAw No. 10 613-14 (1946). See also note 351 supra.
422. In 1972 it was reported that "National and local polls over the past decade
now demonstrate that increasing proportions-now nearly two-thirds of all Americans
-support the ready availability of abortion ...... The question upon which this
contention was based was framed as follows:
As you may have heard, in the last few years a number of states have
liberalized their abortion laws. To what extent do you agree or disagree with
the following statement regarding abortion: The decision to have an abortion
should be made solely by a woman and her doctor.
Pomeroy and Landman, Public Opinion Trends: Elective Abortion and Birth Control
Services to Teenagers, FAMnLY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES, Oct. 1972, at 44-45, discussed in
Blake, Elective Abortion and Our Reluctant Citizenry: Research on Public Opinion in
the United States, in OsoFsKn & OsoFsKY, supra note 248, at 447, 456. The percentage
favoring abortion in this particular poll, taken in June 1972, was 64%. Id.
When the question is framed in terms of abortion-on-request (the result in Roe),
however, the response is markedly different. The following question was inserted in the
September 1972 Gallup survey:
Do you believe that there should be no legal restraints on getting an abortion-
that is, if a woman wants one she need only consult her doctor, or do you be-
lieve that the law should specify what kinds of circumstances justify abortion?
The percentage of respondents approving or having no opinion when the question was
framed in this manner was 39 percent. Id. at 458. This figure hardly evinces majority
support for elective abortion; 61 percent of those polled were opposed.
The validity of the foregoing figures was affirmed in November 1972 in the general
elections held in Michigan and North Dakota where elective abortion was at issue. In
Michigan the issue, denoted "Proposition B", was framed as follows:
The proposed law would allow a licensed medical or osteopathic physician to
perform an abortion at the request of the patient if (1) the period of gestation
has not reached 20 weeks, and (2) if the procedure is performed in a licensed
hospital or other facility approved by the Department of Public Health.
SHOULD THIS PROPOSED LAW BE APPROVED?
The proposal was defeated by approximately 60.65 percent of the vote. 1972
MICHIGAN OFFICIAL CANVAS OF VOTES at 63. The North Dakota election produced
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even some of the most highly reputed proponents of this "new ethic,"
by their own admission, find themselves forced to obscure 23 the as-
sumptions underlying the policies they propose by characterizing them
as matters of privacy or personal liberty.
Open debate over a Life-Protective amendment would force
recognition of the fact that abortion involves the taking of another life
as well as the rights of the state, the woman, and her doctor. Such
proposals reach to the very philosophical roots of the nation. The pro-
ponents of a Life-Protective amendment have raised questions as to the
constitutional permissibility of legally sanctioned deprivation of human
life, the most fundamental of all rights, 424 on the basis of its value in
the eyes of others. The point is well-summarized by Representative
Robert F. Drinan:
However convenient, convincing, or compelling the arguments in fa-
vor of abortion may be, the fact remains that the taking of life, even
though it is unborn, cuts out the very heart of the principle that no
one's life, however unwanted and useless, may be terminated in order
to promote the health or happiness of another human being.425
It seems anomalous that such a deviation from basic constitutional
philosophy, such as occurred in Roe, could parade as an extension of
personal liberty, when its basis is a restrictive construction of the very
clause of the constitution on which it is purportedly based. Perhaps
the Court was misled as to the true position of the common law and
decided the abortion cases according to an erroneous belief that it was
unconcerned with unborn human life. If so, the decision still fails to
give a satisfactory explanation as to why the United States Supreme
Court relied so heavily upon a newly discovered common law of abor-
tion, which purportedly became static in the mid-14th century while
similar results--76.59 percent opposed to wider access to abortion. NORTH DAKOTA
OmzcrA ABnSrTAcT OF VOTES CAST AT THE GENERAL ELECTION HuD NovEnM 7,
1972. It does not seem unreasonable to predict that the percentage of defeat might have
been substantially higher had the proposals provided for no limitation on abortions for
the full 9 months of gestation-the effect of Roe v. Wade in the absence of state regu-
lation during the last 3 months.
A proposal to revise the Washington State abortion law was submitted to the voters
in the election of November 1970. "Referendum 20" passed with 56.49 percent of the
vote, but the figures do not significantly compare with those of Michigan. "Referendum
20" not only failed to mention abortion-on-request, but, more importantly, it was
presented to the Washington electorate as not involving abortion-on-request. See Or'Fx-
CIaL VoTRas' PAMIHLLr, STATE OF WASHINGTON 8-9, November 1970.
423. CALiORNiA MEnicmE, supra note 24, at 68.
424. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 272 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(characterized as the "right to have rights").
425. Drinan, The Inviolability of the Right to Be Born, in ABORTION AND Ta LAW
123 (Smith ed. 1967).
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the rest of the common law developed apace.426 If, on the other hand,
the Court's decision is based upon its perceptions of the quality or hu-
manity of prenatal life, it has overstepped the constitutional bounds
of governmental power.427
C. Proposed Action
In the last half-century this nation has experienced a veritable
revolution in science, economics, and social policy. Although there re-
mains much to be done, both women and members of racial minorities
have come to be recognized by the law as individuals whose interests
require full and equal protection. The transition has not been a simple
one, and in order to achieve it each group had its champions, often
not even members of the disadvantaged class, to mobilize the public
support and internal class consciousness without which change would
have been impossible. It is this consciousness of purpose, no different
in essence than that which inspired the fourteenth amendment and the
proposed Equal Rights amendment, which has given impetus to the
movement for a Life-Protective amendment.
The cherished constitutional guarantees of life and liberty should
not fall victim to restrictive judicial or legislative interpretations before
the public has examined and attempted to understand both the rea-
soning and result of any proposed change. The best protection for in-
dividual rights lies with an informed populace which understands the
nature and extent of its own freedom.
The realization of such a goal is, of course, an immense task. One
thing, however, is abundantly clear at the outset: it is impossible for
either the government or the sovereign which creates it to subordinate
the right to life to a societal perception of liberty without working the
destruction of the intricate balance which makes both of these ideals
reality. The Supreme Court did this in Roe. Admittedly, the need
to preserve individual liberty is one which constantly challenges a free
society; equally challenging are the many profound problems which
face the world today. On balance, however, it is not unreasonable to
state unequivocally that one person's interest in personal freedom, or
426. Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973) (relying on an advocate's
view of 19th century legal practices and implicitly rejecting modem scientific data of
unquestionable validity on the beginning of the human organism), with Brown v. Board
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 & n.11 (1954) (rejecting 19th century understanding
in favor of "modern" psychological developments).
427. Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 663 (1875):
There are limitations on [governmental] power which grow out of the essential
nature of all free governments. Implied reservations of individual rights, with-
out which the social compact could not exist, and which are respected by all
governments entitled to the name.
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another's conception of a "profound problem," fail to outweigh any in-
dividual's interest in the preservation of his or her own life. Such is
the philosophy of a Life-Protective amendment.
It is submitted that any argument mounted in opposition to a Life-
Protective amendment could have had equal applicaton to the debates
over the first sections of both the thirteenth and fourteenth amend-
ments. They, too, extended substantive constitutional protection to a
group of individuals who had been considered by the Supreme Court
and by some segments of society to be less than human, and certainly
not deserving of fundamental rights. Life is the ultimate right, and
its denial, publicly or privately, under the aegis of the state, brings back
haunting memories of a time when the "quality" of some individuals
was the rationalization for their extermination. Abortion involves those
same qualitative determinations.
Santayana once noted that those who fail to learn from the mis-
takes of history are condemned to repeat them. By officially diminish-
ing the value of the lives of one class of human beings society has al-
ready made its first mistake. One can only hope that it is rectified be-
fore the cycle begins once again.
CONCLUSION
In the course of its opinion in Roe v. Wade the Supreme Court
recognized that a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy, whether
based upon the right to privacy or some other constitutional right,
4 28
is contingent upon a prior finding that her unborn offspring has no
constitutionally protected right to life. Relying upon an analysis of the
constitutional usage of the word "person," while also citing a lack of
19th century common law protection for the unborn, the Court ruled
that the unborn are not "persons" within the meaning of the due proc-
ess clause of the fourteenth amendment and, thus, not entitled to the
right to life.
In the hope of protecting this extension of the right to privacy,
the Court also struck down virtually all state regulation of the heatih-
related aspects of abortion procedure in the first trimester of pregnancy
and placed severe limitations upon state power to interfere with access
to the process for the remainder of the pregnancy.
The reasoning of the Court has been examined and found to be
wanting legally, historically, scientifically, and philosophically. The
basic issue in the abortion cases was not whether a woman has a right
to terminate her pregnancy, but rather, whether or not the Constitution
428. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
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forbids the protection of her unborn offspring. The Court did not dis-
cuss the issue.
Both aspects of the holdings in the abortion cases have come un-
der attack by the introduction of various proposals for constitutional
amendments. If passed, these proposals would either reverse or sub-
stantially modify the decisions in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton. The
proposals merit serious and careful consideration, for they present two
issues which are of vital importance to any efficient resolution of the
abortion controversy: (1) the extent to which unborn human life is
to be considered a value deserving of constitutional protection; and (2)
the extent to which the states, as sovereign governmental units, are to
be permitted to promulgate reasonable regulations to protect the public
health and the welfare of women seeking abortions.
Although it is true that no resolution of the abortion controversy
will be satisfactory to all, this should not obscure the need for a critical
re-examination of the Supreme Court's decisions in this sensitive area.
Indeed, Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton raise more questions than they
resolve. The decisions are no more than an interim "solution" to a
problem which must be resolved by the ultimate sovereign-the Ameri-
can people. The controversy is as complex as it is volatile and it will
clearly not "go away" if ignored.
Appendix
On June 18, 1974 the West German Bundestag passed a bill
modifying the basic provisions of section 218(a) of the Criminal Code
relating to abortion.42 9 Essentially the bill removed all criminal sanc-
tions imposed upon abortions during the first trimester of pregnancy,
leaving the remainder of the statute unchanged.
The statute was challenged by the minority members of the Bun-
destag in an appeal to the Federal Constitutional Court;4 30 they were
joined in the appeal by five of the federal states. In an opinion handed
down on February 25, 1975 the court ruled (5-2) that the modifica-
tion of West Germany's abortion law was unconstitutional. 3 1 The ma-
jority of the court expressed its views, in part, as follows:
429. See BGB I § 1297 (Germany).
430. Such appeals are permitted under Article 93 of the West German Constitution.
The perfection of such an appeal requires the application of one-third of the members of
the Bundestag.
431. 1 BVerfG 39. The appeal was based, in part, on the interpretation to be given




1) Art. 2, Para. 2, phrase 1 Grundgesetz (Constitution of the Federal
Republic of Germany) [hereinafter G.G.] also protects the life grow-
ng in the womb, as this has to be regarded as an independent right,
which has to be protected.
a) The right of life (Recht auf Leben), which normally is self-
evident, has become an explicit part of the Federal Constitution-
contrary to the Constitution of Weimar. Mainly, this must be regarded
as a reaction to the administrative measures taken by the National So-
cialist Regime: the so-called "destruction of worthless life", "end-
solution" (Endl6sung) and "liquidation". Likewise Article 102 Grund-
gesetz, by which the death penalty was abolished, Art. 2, Para. 2, phrase
1 G.G. (Grundgesetz) expresses the belief in the absolute value of human
life and in a conception of state which is completely contrary to the
conception of a political regime in which individual life meant little and
which therefore excessively abused this usurped right to decide on
people's life and death.
CBVerfGE 18, 112 [117].
b) The interpretation of Article 2, Para. 2, phrase 1 must begin
with the meaning of its words: "Everybody has the right to life. .... "
According to affirmed biological-physiological knowledge "life"-in
the sense of historical existence of a human individual-doubtlessly is
present fourteen days after nidation (citation omitted). The process
of development, beginning at this time, is a continuous one without any
evident gaps; no precise delimitation can be admitted in the different
stages of human life's develpoment. Neither does this process end
with birth; the phenomena of consciousness, which are specific for hu-
man personality, only appear some time after birth. Therefore, the
legal protection of Art. 2, Para. 2, phrase 1 G.G. can neither be limited
to the "complete" human being after birth, nor to the independently
viable nasciturus. The right to live is guaranteed to everybody who
is "alive". No distinction can be made among the several stages of
developing life before birth, or between prenatal or postnatal life.
"Everybody" in the sense of Art. 2, Para. 2, phrase 1 G.G. means
every "living person," in other words, every human individual, being
in possession of "life"; therefore, "everybody" in this sense also in-
cludes unborn human beings.
c) Objections have been made that according to colloquial lan-
guage as well as to legal terminology the expression "everybody" nor-
mally refers to a "complete" human person and that the sole interpreta-
"Everyone has the right to life, and to physical inviolability." ("Jeder hat das Recht auf
Leben und kUrperliche Unversehrtheit.").
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tion of the word makes it impossible to include unborn life in the
sphere of the provision of Art. 2, Para. 2, phrase 1 G.G. It must be
emphasized accordingly, that in any case, the sense as well as the pur-
pose of this constitutional provision requires that the protection of life
also be extended to unborn life. The protection of human life from
the encroachments of the state would be incomplete if the first element
of "complete life", unborn life, would not be included.
This broad interpretation corresponds to the general rule estab-
lished by the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court)
that "in case of douct such interpretation must be chosen, which makes
the legal force and application of the constitutional provision most
effective." (BVerfGE 32,54 [71], 6, 55 [72]). This result also can
be explained by the history of Art. 1, Para. 2, phrase 1 G.G.
d) After the parliamentary group of the Deutsche Partie (Ger-
man Party) repeatedly had proposed to mention expressly-in the con-
text of the right of life and of physical inviolability-the right of un-
born life to exist, the Parliamentary Council [a body which existed be-
fore the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949 and
which elaborated the German Federal Constitution, the Grundgesetz-
ed.] discussed this problem (Publications of the Council at 11.48-298
and 12.48-398) for the first time during the 32nd session of its commit-
tee for principle questions on January 11, 1949. During this discussion
the question arose as to whether a provision should be entered into the
Grundgesetz to prohibit surgical treatments which are not curative treat-
ments in their proper sense. The delegate Dr. Heuss (FDP) [Free
Democratic Party] explained-and there was no contradiction on this
point-that such a provision would refer to compulsory sterilization,
and, in the context of the right to life,-to abortion. On the second
reading of the basic constitutional rights on January 18, 1949, the 42nd
session, the General Committee of the Parliamentary Council went
more into the details of the problem of whether the right of unborn
life to exist should be included in the protection of constitutional provi-
sions. (Negotiations of the General Committee of the Parliam. Coun-
cil S.529 ff.). The delegate Dr. Seebohm (Deutsche Partie) brought
forward a motion to add the following to sentences to the proposed ver-
sion of Art. 2, Para. 2: "The right of unborn life to exist is guaranteed"
and "The death penalty is abolished". Dr. Seebohm pointed out that
the right of existence and physical inviolability might not necessarily
include unborn life. Therefore, it must be mentioned expressly in case
there should be another point of view as to this problem. Dr. Seebohm
insisted that the record of the negotiations reflect that the protection
of growing life is expressly included in the provisions referring to the
right of life and physical inviolability.
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The delegate Mrs. Dr. Weber declared in the name of her party,
the [Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union], that the
right of life means life in every sense, including unborn life, and par-
ticularly, the protection of unborn life. Dr. Heuss (FDP) agreed
largely that life also includes growing life; but in his opinion no pro-
visions should be taken into the constitution which already were part
of the criminal law. Therefore expressly mentioning the problems of
unborn life and the death penalty would be unnecessary [Citation
omitted]. After these "uncontradicted declarations that the protection
of growing life is included in the provision of the right of existence
and physical inviolability", Dr. Seebhom intended to withdraw his
former motion [citation omitted]. But at that point the delegate Dr.
Greve, member of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) stated: "In my
opinion the right of life does not include the protection of unborn life
and I want this to be taken on the record expressly; I make this state-
ment also in the name of my friends [the other members of the SPD
-ed.] or at least most of them, so that the records prove that the Gen-
eral Committee of the Parliamentary Council does not in its entirety
share the opinion expressed by our colleague Dr. Seebohm." In an-
swer to this, Dr. Seebohmu resumed his former motion which now was
rejected by 11 votes to 7 [citation omitted]. Referring to Art. 2, in
the bulletin of the General 'Committee, the delegate Dr. von Mangoldt
(CDU) stated: "The intention was to include unborn life in the gen-
eral idea of the right of life. The motion forwarded by the German
Party to insert a special provision relating to the protection of unborn
life, had not been accepted by the majority solely for the reason that
the committee was dominated by the general opinion that this right al-
ready was protected by the version of A t. 2 as originally proposed."
Art. 2, Para. 2 passed the plenum of the Parliamentary Council in the
second reading on May 6, 1949-with two adverse votes. During the
third reading on May 8, 1949 the delegates Dr. Seebohm and Dr. Weber
stated that in their opinion of the protection of [unborn life] was in-
cluded in this constitutional provision. [Citation omitted]. There
was no contradiction to either of these statements.
The origin of Art. 2, Para. 2, phrase 1 G.G. leads to the reason-
able assumption that the words "everybody has the right to live" also
should include unborn life. In any case, even less can be found in
these historical materials which supports a different opinion. On the
other hand, no answer can be derived from those materials to the ques-
tion whether unborn life has to be protected by the criminal law.
e) There was unanimity in the negotiations relating to the 5th re-
formatory bill of criminal law about the need of protection of unborn
life, but without a final discussion of the constitutional side of this prob-
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lem. The bulletin of the special committee for the reform of the crim-
inal law said the following about this bill, proposed by the parliamen-
tary group of the SPD and FDP:
Unborn life fundamentally equals born life. This statement is self-
evident in those cases when the unborn life is viable even outside
the womb. But it also relates to the earlier stages of development
beginning about fourteen days after conception-which was pointed
out convincingly by Hinrichs, and others, in the public hearing. In
accordance with general knowledge and opinions in the medical, an-
thropological, and even theological fields, there is no break in the
whole later development equivalent to this one after 14 days. There-
fore, unborn life may neither be neglected nor be looked at with in-
difference after the nidation [after 14 days]. Further, there is no
reason for answering the controversial question of whether-and in
case the answer is yes-how far the constitution includes the protec-
tion of unborn life. In any case, it is the general legal conception
in our community--disregarding extremely differently oriented opin-
ions of some single groups-that unborn life has a high value of it-
self. This legal conception is basic to this bill. [Publications of the
Bundestag 7/1981 neu. p. 5].
Nearly the same words can be found in the documents of the spe-
cial committee for the other reformatory bills. [Citations omitted].
2) Therefore the duty of our state to protect all kinds of human
life can be derived directly from the provisions of Art. 2, Para. 2 G.G.
This duty is also expressed in Art. 1, Para. 1, phrase 2 G.G. which
guarantees the protection of the dignity of man including the protection
of unborn life. Where "life" exists, it has human dignity, regardless
of whether there is consciousness of this dignity or not, or whether the
dignity is maintained by the human being itself. The potential abilities
given to every human being by origin entitle him to the "dignity of
Man".
3) There is no reason for deciding the controversial question of
whether a nasciturus itself is entitled to be protected by the provisions
of the constitution or whether it "only" can be protected in its right
of life by the constituent facts of the constitutional provisions-because
of absence of proper legal capacity and especially capacity to be pro-
tected directly by the constitution.
According to the jurisdiction of the Federal Supreme Court, basic
constitutional rights not only secure every individual right against inter-
ference by the state, but they also represent impartial values which in
their quality as basic constitutional decisions influence all fields of law
and furnish the leading principles and impulses for legislation, adminis-
tration, and jurisdiction [citations omitted]. Therefore, the question
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of whether the constitution forces the state to protect unborn life can
be answered only by the constitutent facts of the constitutional process.
11.
1) The duty of the state to protect every individual is all-encompassing.
It not only prohibits direct interferences with unborn life by the state,
a point which is obvious, but this duty also forces the state to protect
and even to support this unborn life, which means, above all, to save
it from the illicit encroachments of others. Therefore the several
branches of our legal system must act according to this rule in compli-
ance with their special functions. The duty of the state to protect a
right becomes even more serious the higher the impartial value of the
right in question is estimated by our Constitution. Human life is esti-
mated to have the highest value in the constitutional system, a fact
needing no explanation-it is the compelling basis of the dignity of
man and it is the pre-condition for all basic constitutional rights.
2) The duty of the state to protect unborn life also exists relative to
the mother. 'Undoubtedly the natural unity of unborn life and the life
of the mother involves a special relationship without parallel in other
situations in life. Pregnancy is a part of the woman's privacy which
is protected constitutionally by Art. 2 in conjunction with Art. 1, Para.
1 GG. If the embryo would be regarded as only a part of the mother's
organism, abortion would be in the sphere of private decisions which
may not be penetrated by legislation. (BVerfGE, 32 [41]; 6, 389
[433]; 27, 344 [350]; 32, 373 [379]). But as the nasciturus is an
independent human being of itself, protected by the constitution, abor-
tion involves social implications which make it necessary to bring it un-
der the regulatory power of the state. The woman's right to freely and
fully develop her personality, which inclues freedom of choice and ac-
tion as well as the responsibilities attendant to this freedom, and the
freedom to decide against motherhood and its duties, is deserving of
recognition and protection. But this right cannot be granted unre-
stricted; it is limited by the rights of others, the constitutional decisions
as to fundamental rights, and by moral laws. The woman's right never
can include automatically the right to penetrate into the protected
rights of another without any legal justification, or even to destroy this
right by destroying the life itself, least of all when a very special re-
sponsibility, which is in the nature of things, exists in particular for this
human life.
No compromise which guarantees both the embryo's life and the
pregnant women's freedom of abortion is possible, abortion always
means the destruction of unborn life. As it becomes necessary to con-
sider the prevailing right, "both values protected by the Constitution
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have to be seen in their relationship to the dignity of man, which is the
focal point of the constitutional decisions relating to fundamental prin-
ciples" (BVerfGE 35, 202 [225]).
Turning to Art. 1, Para. 2, phrase 1 G.G. the decision must be that
protection of the foetus prevails over the right of self-determination of
the pregnant woman. The woman may be affected in her personal
development by pregnancy, confinement, and by bringing up the child.
But in case of abortion unborn life is destroyed. Following the prin-
ciple that where a conflict between two constitutionally protected rights
arises, the most indulgent solution must be found, and considering the
principles of Art. 19, Para. 2, the protection of the embryo's life must
prevail. This protection prevails during the whole time of pregnancy
and may not be limited in any respect.
During the negotiations of the principal law reform bill the opin-
ion was expressed "that the woman's right of self-determination result-
ing from the general idea of the dignity of man should prevail over
the right of unborn life to exist for a certain period." (Essentially the
first "trimester"-ed.). This opinion is inconsistent with the basic con-
stitutional decisions as to values.
3) All this leads to the fundamental and constitutionally mandated
position of the legal system towards abortion: the woman's right of
self-determination may not be the only guiding principle of regulations
in the legal system. The state must always start from the consideration
that a child always has to be carried to term; abortion in general means
an injustice. The legal system must make clear that abortion is dis-
approved. It must avoid the wrong impresson that abortion is a social
act which can be compared to a normal medical treatment or even to
such a legally irrelevant alternative as contraception. The state may
not deny its responsibility by leaving a certain field of problems legally
unregulated. This would mean that the state could evade its judgment
as to fundamental principles and leave it to the individual to decide
on it in self-responsibility.
The means by which the state complies with its duty to set up ef-
fective protection of unborn life must be chosen by legislation. The
legislature decides which measures it thinks appropriate and necessary
to guarantee effective protection.
1) The protection of unborn life especially must begin from the gen-
eral idea that preventive measures prevail over reprisals. Therefore,
it is a duty of the state to set up social and welfare institutions to protect
unborn life. What exactly must occur in this field as well as the form
of the measures to be taken by the state to support this development
cannot be decided by the Federal Constitutional Supreme Court. In
any case those measures must intend to strengthen the mother's willing-
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ness to accept pregnancy and to bring the child to birth. In reference
to the state's duty of protection, it must be said that it is primarily the
mother who, by nature, is entrusted with the protection of unborn life.
The chief intention of the state's efforts to protect life should be to
awaken and-of necessity-to strengthen the willingness of the future
mother to protect unborn life in cases where this willingness has been
lost. But the legislature's influence of course can only be limited.
The measures taken by legislation often become efficient only indi-
rectly and with a certain delay resulting from extensive efforts in edu-
cation, leading to change in social attitudes and points of view.
2) The question of whether the state has the constitutional obligation
to use its most powerful weapon, the criminal law, for the protection
of unborn life cannot be answered by the simple question of whether
the state has to punish certain kinds of behavior.
A general view is necessary; looking, on the one hand, at the value
of the right which would be violated and the degree of social harm
caused by the violation in comparison to other penalized acts estimated
to involve about the same degree of social-ethical harm, and looking
on the other hand at the traditional legal regulation in this field, the
development of attitudes, and in the part criminal law plays in modern
society. Further, the efficiency of the penalty provided by law and the
possibility of replacing it by other legal sanctions should not be over-
looked.
a) In general, the legislature is not obliged to take the same penal
sanctions for protecting unborn life as are taken to give all the neces-
sary protection to life which is already born. The historical develop-
ment of the law shows that, as to punishment, this has never been the
case, and, further, the law did not require it before the 5th Bill to re-
form the criminal law. It always has been the function of criminal
law to protect basic societal values within the community. It has been
said above that the life of every human individual belongs to these basic
values. Abortion destroys definitely existing human life. Abortion is
an act of homicide. This is clearly demonstrated by the fact that the
punishment-even in the 5th Bill to reform the criminal law-is a part
of the section dealing with crimes and violations against human life,
and that until now, the name for abortion in the penal code was "killing
a foetus", the new term, "interruption of a pregnancy," cannot disguise
the facts. No regulation can deny that abortion violates the rights of
Art. 2, Para. 2, phrase 1 GG which guarantees, in general, that human
life is inviolate and not subject to the disposition of any third party.
Therefore, it is undoubtedly legitimate to provide penal laws for sanc-
tioning "acts of abortion." Most of the civilized states have such pro-
visions-under differently developed pre-conditions-and it corres-
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ponds especially to German legal tradition. Furthermore, these facts
show that abortion must be characterized clearly by law as "injustice."
b) But punishment can never exist for its own sake. In general
it is the decision of the legislature to provide it or not. It is also in
the nature of the legislature to express, due to the Constitution, its legal
disapproval by means other than criminal law provisions, but always
considering the rules pointed out above. The crucial point is whether
all the measures taken to protect unborn life-no matter whether the
meaures are in the field of civil law, public law, especially social policy
(and law), or criminal law-can guarantee an adequate, effective pro-
tection of this right appropaite to its importance. If the protection con-
stitutionally necessary cannot be attained by any other means, then, in
this extreme case, the legislature can have the duty to provide penal
sanctions to protect unborn life. A penal provision is, as to say, the
last of all legal instruments the legislature can provide corresponding
to the legal principle of "proportionality" which wholly governs the field
of public and constitutional law, the legislature must use the means pro-
vided by the criminal law with care. But it must be employed if the
protection of life cannot be reached by other means. The value and
the importance of the right that must be protected require it. The duty
to provide punishment then, is not an "absolute" one, but, realizing the
ineffectiveness of all other means, a "relative" duty to employ penal
sanctions arises.
The argument that constitutional provisions granting rights are in-
capable of supporting a duty to punish is without merit. If the state
is bound by constitutional decisions as to fundamental principles to pro-
tect effectively an important right against the attacks of a third person,
then measures which touch the scope of the liberties of others enjoy-
ing constitutionally guaranteed rights will often be indispensible. Here
the legal situation is not different regardless of whether civil law, social
policy measures, or provisions of penal law are invoked. The differ-
ence is only as to the intensity of the measure deemed necessary.
But the legislature must solve this conflict by considering carefully the
two basic liberties or values provided by the constitutional scheme and
by following the constitutional principle of "proportionality."
If the duty to use the weapon of the criminal law would, as a gen-
eral rule, be denied, this would mean an essential limitation upon the
requisite protection of life. The basic value of the right of unborn life
which is threatened by destruction corresponds to the severity of the
sanction for its destruction, just as the basic value of human life cor-
responds to the penalty provided by law for its destruction.
3) The duty of the state to protect unborn life also exists relative to
the mother. But here special problems arise as to penal sanctions
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because of the unique situation of the pregnant woman. Pregnancy
profoundly affects the physical and psychic condition of the woman, a
fact which is obvious and needs no elaboration. These effects often
cause a substantial change in the conduct of her life and a restriction
of her natural development possibilities. This burden cannot always
or completely be compensated by the fulfillments of motherhood, its
new responsibilities, and by the right of the woman to be supported
by the society. (Art. 6, Para. 4 GG). Thus, grave conflicts may arise
in individual situations which are threatening or even dangerous to her
life. The right of unborn life to exist may, in this situation, be a bur-
den for the woman which exceeds, by far, the normal situation during
pregnancy. Thus we are presented with the question of what can be
demanded from the pregnant woman, or, phrasing it differently,
whether, in these cases, the state may force the woman, under threat
of penal sanction, to carry the child to term.
Although due respect is owed to unborn life, such respect is not
to be demanded too strongly in those situations of conflict where a
woman would have to give up her own fundamental interest in life. In
the face of such a conflict, one not admitting of a clear moral judgment,
and one in which a decision in favor of abortion can have the quality
of a respectable decision of conscience, the legislature is under a par-
ticular duty of discretion. If, in these cases, the legislature does not
consider the woman's choice to be criminal, and if it therefore re-
nounces the use of a criminal penalty, the result is constitutionally ac-
ceptable as a product of the careful deliberations which the legislature
is entitled to make.
But in deciding on the criteria for defining an unreasonable de-
mand, circumstances which do not burden the individual to a great de-
gree must be excluded, as these are merely a part of everyday life with
which everyone must contend. These criteria must reflect grave situa-
tions which make it extremely difficult for the individual in question
to fulfill her duty, and which present a situation in which it would be
unfair to expect it. In particular, these facts do exist when the individ-
ual would be thrown into a deep inner conflict by fulfilling her duty
[to carry the child to term-ed]. Solving such conflicts by means of
penal sanctions would not generally seem to be appropriate [citation
omitted] due to the nature of penal sanctions as external compulsion, and
where respect for the personal province of the human individual would
require full freedom of decision.
The demand that a pregnancy be continued seems especially un-
reasonable when it is proved that abortion is necessary to avert "danger
to life or grave impairment of the pregnant woman's physical condi-
tion" (§ 218 (1) Penal Code) in these cases her own "right to life
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and to physical inviolability" is at stake, Art. 2, Para. 2, phrase 1 GG,
and which she cannot be expected to sacrifice for the unborn. Further,
it is within the power of the legislature to leave abortion unpunished
where the pregnant woman is faced with other burdensome situations
which as "unreasonable demands" appear similarly grave as those set
out in Penal Code § 218(1). These situations may be seen in refer-
ence to the cases of eugenic (see § 218(b)(2) StGB), criminological,
and social indications for abortion proved in the draft [of the revised
law] submitted by the federal government during the sixth electoral
period of the Bundestag, and which were the subject of both public
and legislative discussion. During the negotiations of the special com-
mittee for the reformation of the criminal law, the representative of
the federal government argued convincingly and in detail that, in these
four cases, bringing the child to term would be an unreasonable de-
mand. The main point is that, in all these cases, another constitu-
tionally protected right is at stake with such urgency that the state can-
not insist that the pregnant woman must, in any case, let the rights of
the unborn prevail.
The indication of general distress [the social indication] belongs
in this area. The general social situation of the pregnant woman and
her family can lead to conflict of such gravity that the pregnant woman
may not be forced beyond certain limits by penal sanctions to a sacrifice
in favor of unborn life. In order to make the social indication congru-
ent with the others the legislature must describe those situations consti-
tuting unreasonable demands with such clarity as to make the gravity
of the social conflict apparent. If the legislature exempts these real
cases of conflict from the protections afforded by the criminal law it
does not disregard its duty to protect life. Even in these cases, how-
ever, the state may not content itself with controlling or even certifying
that the criteria for legal abortion have been fulfilled. On the contrary,
the legislature is expected to offer consultation and assistance with the
aim of reminding the pregnant woman of the principal duty to respect
the right of unborn life to exist, to encourage her to continue her preg-
nancy, and, especially in cases of social indication, to support her with
auxilliary measures.
In every other case, abortion is a punishable injustice, because the
disposition of the highest ranking right-without being motivated by
a situation of grave distress-remains within the free disposition of a
third person. If the legislature were to abrogate the legal sanctions
in these cases the duty to protect demanded by Art. 2, Para. 2, Phrase
1 would be fulfilled only when alternative and equally effective legal
sanctions were available to make clear that abortion is an injustice and
which would avoid it with the same effectiveness as a penal sanction.***
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